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(UN)WICKED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS 
AND THE CRY FOR IDENTITY 
Leslie Patrice Culver* 
IRAC is not the arbiter of legal analysis. In fairness, it never claimed to be. 
Yet despite IRAC’s willingness to be a prototype of analytical structure incapable 
of providing creative depth—a sentiment that many within the legal academy 
have readily acknowledged for decades—its dominance still persists sustained by 
a presumption of innocence. This presumption harms novice legal writers who do 
not see IRAC’s shallowness, and instead blindly follow its siren of seductive sim-
plicity as a norm for the process of legal analysis. Critiques of IRAC are not nov-
el, but my aim is not to challenge IRAC as a structural framework, rather, I cast 
IRAC as an overbearing character engendering an identity crisis in legal writing 
and stunting cultural awareness as professional growth in law students. 
Situating this discussion in Law & Literature discourse, I use the musical 
Wicked—the untold story of the Witches of Oz—as a contemporary framework to 
juxtapose identity performance with legal writing. My thesis is twofold: First, 
comparing IRAC to Glinda the Good Witch, I suggest that IRAC is a rigid, objec-
tive, and neutral approach to legal analysis, an approach that mimics white nor-
mativity. Thus, I question its ability to serve as an entry point for a more complex 
analysis or platform for Other experiences. Second, comparing Analytical 
Frameworks to the Wicked Witch of the West, I suggest the richness of such 
frameworks are truly the transformative process of legal analysis, serving not as 
an impediment to students’ authentic identity as lawyers, but as further develop-
ment of it. 
Heralded as a cultural phenomenon, Wicked transformed the way its audi-
ence viewed The Wizard of Oz. Wicked not only narrated the Wicked Witch’s 
identity from her perspective, but it also provided a revealing reflection on the 
Good Witch’s identity—her privileged life and superficial rise to popularity. In 
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contrast to the tension that exists in replicating rigid paradigms, such as IRAC, 
this literary approach demonstrates the richness of legal analysis to convey the 
human experience and make the law accessible, particularly for those who exist 
at the margins. In the end, the audience loved Wicked—not because it outshined 
The Wizard of Oz—but because Broadway finally shared with the world the 
identity formation of the “Wicked Witch of the West.” Her name is Elphaba, and 
she’s not so wicked. 
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PROLOGUE 
“I’m through accepting limits ‘cause someone says they’re so. 
Some things I cannot change but ‘till I try I‘ll never know.”—Elphaba, the 
“Wicked Witch of the West”1 
IRAC2 is not the arbiter of legal analysis. And as a professor of legal writ-
ing raised on reductive paradigms like IRAC, I now stand at a slightly uncom-
fortable juncture to examine IRAC’s innocence through an identity perfor-
mance lens. The late Toni Morrison once penned, in reflecting on her wax and 
wane process of fiction writing, that many of her novels felt “impossi-
ble . . . equally undoable,” and she remained “astonish[ed] [at] how, the more 
 
1  Wicked Quotes, GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/work/quotes/12807927-wicked-
the-complete-book-and-lyrics-of-the-broadway-musical [https://perma.cc/UT8K-8MGQ]. 
2  An acronym standing for Issue, Rule, Application and Conclusion. Its contours will be di-
vulged in detail in this Article. Stay tuned. 
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work one does, the more difficult it becomes, the more impossible the task.”3 
Hardly a Morrison in my own right, I empathize with her struggle. 
As an identity performance scholar,4 I sought out on a journey to reflect on 
the relationship between legal writing and identity formation.5 My greatest ache 
 
3  TONI MORRISON, THE SOURCE OF SELF-REGARD: SELECTED ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND 
MEDITATIONS 247 (2019). 
4  See Leslie P. Culver, No Matter How Loud I Shout: Legal Writing as Gender Sidelining, J. 
LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming 2021) (viewing legal writing, which is often outside the unitary 
tenure program in legal academia, as a mode of gender sidelining). See generally Leslie P. 
Culver, Conscious Identity Performance, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577 (2018) [hereinafter 
Culver, Conscious Identity Performance] (drawing on co-cultural theory, which describes 
how non-dominant cultures communicate in a dominant setting, as a framework for discuss-
ing the pressures marginalized groups feel to perform their identity in a predominantly white 
legal profession); Leslie P. Culver, The Rise of Self Sidelining, 39 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
173 (2018) (examining the collision between impostor phenomenon and gender sidelining, 
which results in a false endorsement of inadequacy and leads women to self-sideline); Leslie 
P. Culver, White Doors, Black Footsteps: Leveraging “White Privilege” to Benefit Law Stu-
dents of Color, 21 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 37 (2017) (examining the value of intercultural 
mentoring relationships between white law professors and law students of color in efforts to 
reduce ethnic bias against these students). 
5  This journey between legal writing and identity formation became complex when I met 
Thomas (name changed for privacy), a young African American male law student. Thomas 
was a regular visitor to my office hours during his first year of law school. In a short time, 
we developed a natural rapport that fostered an atmosphere of ease. On one particular day he 
visited my office to receive feedback on his most recent legal memorandum submission. He 
sat across the desk watching me review his memo. With my pen in hand, scribbling and cir-
cling at various points, I simultaneously articulated verbal comments, and every few minutes 
would look up to engage in a short discussion regarding those comments, and then return to 
his memo, head down. He continued to wait patiently for my next feedback reprise, and I 
could hear him take a few deep breaths and shift slightly in his seat. Then on the end of one 
of his breaths, he said nervously, “I just don’t want anyone to think this was written by a 
Black man, ya know?” I stopped. Still looking down, I took a deep breath of my own. Look-
ing back, I know this moment only lasted seconds, but in my head flashed years of my own 
ethnic experiences, disappointments, frustrations, and anger. I looked up from his memo, put 
my pen down, met his eyes, and sighed. Slowly I responded, “Yeah. I know.” I will never 
forget this moment. I was angry that this young Black man, who was diligently meeting with 
his professors and the teaching assistants, attending campus academic success workshops, 
still needed to worry if the very words on the page of his memo would reveal his true identi-
ty as an African American man, and worse, discredit the hard work that he has done. I was 
angry that despite his membership in student clubs and organizations, clinics, pro-bono ac-
tivities, and internships, that at the end of his three years in law school—donned with all the 
esteem and privilege of this noble profession—he was still just a “Black man,” with all the 
stereotypes and stigmas that entails. And if I am honest, I think in that moment, I was re-
minded of my own reality as an African American woman, and I was angry because deep 
down I knew he was right. I repeat Thomas’ words often in my mind. The fear of not having 
his writing reveal his ethnicity is woven with complexity; the thoughts of where to begin are 
almost suffocating. That African American people have been subject to a history of discrim-
ination is widely known, and so too is the dominance of “White” people in the legal profes-
sion. And in the legal profession, perhaps less well known, is the existence of bias against 
legal writing produced by African American people as compared to “White” people, based 
not necessarily on document errors, but on the reviewer being made aware of the writer’s 
ethnicity. See ARIN N. REEVES, WRITTEN IN BLACK & WHITE: EXPLORING CONFIRMATION 
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was hearing my students speak of legal writing as foreign, inauthentic, rigid, 
and just hard. I can do nothing of the latter—the process is hard—but I am sad-
dened by the former. Writing has always been the outlet that has set me free, 
allowed me to push through pain, to capture and return to joy, and as of late, to 
find my authentic voice in a professional space not created by design for people 
like me.6 Legal writing has been no different. 
This reflection raised two questions: first, what was “good” legal writing, 
and was it tethered to an ethnic identity? And second, how might legal writing, 
the process, not the product, be useful in shaping student’s identity develop-
ment as lawyers? As to the first, I became more resolved of the white ethnic 
identity of reductive analytical paradigms for reasons I will explain below.7 As 
to the second, and really in response to the ethnic identity resolve, I became 
equally resolute in changing how I talked about the process of legal writing, 
and lawyering for that matter, to allow the process of legal writing to add depth 
and dimension to students’ existing identity, instead of suppressing it. To be 
clear, I did not invent new terms to, for example, replace analogical or deduc-
tive reasoning. But, if identity is the “the condition of being oneself or itself,”8 
then I allowed myself to be critical of analytical methods that seemingly define 
and bound9 the legal profession, so that I could teach legal writing in a way that 
grants students agency to “manipulate the very language and discourses that 
define them.”10 
 
BIAS IN RACIALIZED PERCEPTIONS OF WRITING SKILLS (2014), http://nextions.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/written-in-black-and-white-yellow-paper-series.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/WGV9-F35R]. When Thomas made his statement, I was aware of this unfortunate history 
and research, and perhaps it was because of this knowledge that the best I could offer him 
was, “Yeah. I know.” But that response was hardly a response at all. It was more of an excit-
ed utterance, less the excitement. Looking back, I think there may have been additional 
words that I offered along the lines of, “you are a good writer,” “this is well-written,” and the 
like. But my recollection is now burdened with what I did not say. Perhaps I should have 
said, “If it’s good, it’s good. Your ethnicity doesn’t matter!” Not only is that not true—
ethnicity certainly matters—but even those words seem trite. In this Article I take care to use 
the term ethnicity as opposed to the socially constructed term ‘race’—and thus similarly use 
quotes around the term “White” or “Black” people where necessary. 
6  By this I mean an African American woman law professor. 
7  The significance of this resolution is based on the previous title of this work being “De-
Racing Legal Writing,” where in light of my interaction with my student, Thomas, supra 
note 5, I hypothesized that good legal writing is not “White,” that it does not belong to any 
one ethnicity. I was wrong. And the journey toward this realization has been both a pedagog-
ical and emotional pilgrimage to say the least. 
8  Identity, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/identity [https://perma.cc/ 
5KF4-BRVS]. 
9  See, e.g., Holli R. Leggette et al., Developing Writing Identity in an Advanced Agricultural 
Communications Media Writing Course, 99 J. APPLIED COMM’NS 67, 67 (2016) (quoting 
Sheldon George, The Performed Self in College Writing: From Personal Narratives to Ana-
lytic and Research Essays, 12 PEDAGOGY: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO TEACHING LITERATURE, 
LANGUAGE, COMPOSITION, & CULTURE 319, 340 (2012)). 
10  Id. 
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This Article is my humble attempt to grapple with these questions. It is 
thematically situated in the realm of Law & Popular Culture, and Law & Lit-
erature,11 and it joins the chorus of legal writing scholars who have examined 
how legal education replicates race, class, and gender norms.12 I use the musi-
cal Wicked13 as a contemporary framework to underscore the limitations of 
IRAC and simultaneously highlight the depth of the Analytical Framework.14 
A few structural considerations will be helpful on this literary and theoreti-
cal journey. First, the broader conversation is situated within identity perfor-
 
11  See James R. Elkins, Popular Culture, Legal Films, and Legal Film Critics, 40 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 745, 746 (2007) (arguing that popular culture about the law is wildly popular in 
America, and although popular culture “teach[es] Americans about the civil justice system,” 
it is sometimes “at variance . . . with the ‘real world’ ” and can impose change on the legal 
system, such as influencing jurors); Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary 
System, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 653, 667–68 (2007) (maintaining that America’s support for 
adversarialism is due to and enforced by popular culture such as media coverage of celebrity 
trials, which mirror sporting events because they play on primitive tendencies). See generally 
JENNI RAMONE, POSTCOLONIAL THEORIES (2011) (reviewing postcolonial literature and un-
derlying theories by examining the historical link between commerce, colonization, and cul-
tural representation); JEAN RHYS, WIDE SARGASSO SEA (1966) (offering a different perspec-
tive of Antoinette Cosway, the “mad wife” in Jane Eyre, and bringing her into full view as a 
woman driven to madness by a hateful and sexually driven society); ALICE RANDALL, THE 
WIND DONE GONE (2001) (offering a different perspective of Gone with the Wind from the 
viewpoint of Cynara, one of Scarlett’s slaves, who manages to escape the damage of antebel-
lum South and demonstrates a life of love and emancipation). 
12  See Michael J. Higdon, A Place in the Academy: Law Faculty Hiring and Socioeconomic 
Bias, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 171, 173–74 (2013) (noting that “class-based discrimination is in 
American legal education” and focusing on class discrimination in the hiring of law profes-
sors, the “overwhelming majority of [whom] in the United States graduated from top-tier law 
schools”); Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools 
Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (2008) 
(relying on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory on class as a theoretical framework for researching is-
sues of class in legal education, and being rightly concerned that if she “teach[es] [her] stu-
dents how to master the upper-class culture of the law, there is still no guarantee that the le-
gal profession will return the favor and accept [her] students as bona fide members”); Teri A. 
McMurtry-Chubb, Toward A Disciplinary Pedagogy for Legal Education, 1 SAVANNAH L. 
REV. 69, 71 (2014) (grounding her study of Writing in the Discipline, in which “writing and 
assimilating knowledge are linked . . . in the study of rhetoric, more specifically, discourse 
and genre theory”); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy 
Contributes to the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 11 (1998) 
(noting that “legal writing pedagogy may contribute to the marginalization of certain groups 
by focusing on audience and socializing them into the culture and language of law”); Melissa 
H. Weresh, Stargate: Malleability as a Threshold Concept in Legal Education, 63 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 689, 690 (2014) (arguing that malleability of the law is a threshold concept to be mas-
tered in the first-year curriculum because it “provides a beneficial lens to the ultimate educa-
tional objective of teaching students to think like a lawyer”); Lucy Jewel, Does the Reasona-
ble Man Have Obsessive Compulsive Disorder?, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1049, 1050, 1056 
(2019) (probing the limits of Western traditional rhetoric and its “use of rigid categories, de-
contextualized syllogisms, unforgiving dichotomies” through an examination of the reasona-
ble man standard as a construct for approved legal conduct). 
13  References to The Wizard of Oz and Wicked are from the movie/musicals, not the book. 
14  I capitalize Analytical Framework throughout as an intentional choice to personify its 
identity as a character. 
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mance discourse to make visible parallels between legal analysis and human 
conditions. Briefly, identity performance describes the way one acts out or pre-
sents the various characteristics of themselves in interactions with others.15 
Second, this Article is arranged parallel to Act I and Act II of the musical 
Wicked. (If you have not seen Wicked, sorry, there are many spoiler alerts). 
Third, I align the following pairs: The Good Witch (Glinda) with IRAC (Issue-
Rule-Application-Conclusion), and the Wicked Witch of the West (Elphaba) 
with the Analytical Framework. Finally, I use the phenomenology method—a 
common framework for qualitative research—to reveal the untold story of the 
Analytical Framework, in her own words. 
Also, two definitions bear mentioning: phenomenology and analytical 
frameworks. Phenomenology captures the lived experiences of its subjects. 
This “study of a human phenomenon . . . enables the researcher to explore the 
phenomena as [they] manifest themselves in human consciousness.”16 It is an 
analytical approach that is best used to explore the “rich detail of the essence of 
people’s experiences,” particularly where there is minimal in-depth data, as it 
attempts to understand how participants, themselves, make sense of their expe-
riences.17 In other words, this method lets the subject tell its own story. Driven 
by the human consciousness, this approach casts off presuppositions and judg-
ments, and has long since been a beacon of hope for marginalized voices.18 
Most relevant here, this approach invites an exploration of the dynamic human 
character, an approach that I believe is sadly void in the legal profession.19 
“Analytical frameworks” serve as a model or placeholder term for various 
lenses or approaches to the process of legal analysis. They can bridge the gap 
between various disciplines and the law and hopefully prevent a one-sided in-
terpretation or analytical lens on a particular issue. In this work, I define “Ana-
lytical Frameworks” as consciously20 using legal analysis as a means to struc-
 
15  See Culver, Conscious Identity Performance, supra note 4, at 579. 
16  ELIZABETH A. PETERSON, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN: A STUDY OF WILL AND SUCCESS 
23, 30 (1992) (using phenomenology in the study of the human will in African American 
women in efforts to “stud[y] . . . it [as the will] emerges in the consciousness of [the] indi-
vidual human being[]”); see also CAROL GRBICH, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: AN 
INTRODUCTION 93 (Katie Metzler ed., 2d ed. 2013) (calling phenomenology “the science of 
the essence of consciousness” that focuses on “first-person experiences and the trait of inten-
tionality . . . seen as the means by which an established world of objects or an established 
way of seeing is brought into being”). 
17  GRBICH, supra note 16, at 92. 
18  See PETERSON, supra note 16, at 23, 24. 
19  This sentiment rings throughout this Article. 
20  In some respects, the various iterations of IRAC are comparable to terms used in identity 
discourse: covering, passing, and comforting, to name a few. The underlying presumption 
being that you will assimilate; the only question is how. Thus, I use this term “conscious” to 
signal the need to offer novice legal writers with analytical alternatives to rote reliance on 
IRAC—a position I believe The Rhetorical Profile provides them with. See generally Culver, 
Conscious Identity Performance, supra note 4 (relying on interdisciplinary tools to empower 
attorneys and law students from traditionally marginalized groups to perform their identities 
in a way that limits or avoids internalizing insider stereotypes to their detriment). 
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ture one’s thinking about the law in an effective manner. The engagement with 
the legal analysis is thoughtful, critical, and skillful—able to support a holistic, 
and inclusive, view of the law. Further, the breadth and depth of Analytical 
Frameworks can reveal the human experience behind the law, bridge cultural 
gaps, give voice to the voiceless, dismantle power, and make the law accessi-
ble, even to those who exist at the margins of our society.21 
My thesis is twofold: First, that IRAC (i.e., Glinda the Good Witch)—a 
rigid, objective, and neutral approach to legal analysis—represents a paradigm 
that mimics white normativity and is misleading as an indicator of success and 
further thwarts identity development in young law students. And second, Ana-
lytical Frameworks (i.e., the Wicked Witch of the West) offer a rich and trans-
formative process toward legal analysis, such as issue reframing, relying on 
narrative and storytelling in setting forth the client’s facts, identifying legal lim-
itations in controlling jurisdictions that warrant the use of persuasive law, and 
reminding or reinforcing legislative intent or policy considerations. To do so, 
the Framework’s identity must be told on its own terms. This type of trans-
formative power simply cannot be reduced to a formula.22 
I do not suggest that the conventions in which IRAC, or related iterations, 
prompts law students to remember are the ethnic or assimilationist culprit. In 
other words, helping students to remember to rely on the law to analyze an is-
sue is not problematic. I believe, however, that it is becoming problematic to 
even present the organization of a thoughtful and complex analytical process 
with “IRAC.” To be frank, I believe we have far surpassed “IRAC” as only rep-
resenting a framework of deductive analysis for novice law students. Its larger 
popularity and dominance inside legal education, and outside in the broader 
profession, demonstrates the reach of its “brand,” and novice law students 
simply lack the experience to appreciate its limitations. 
 
21  I draw upon the common definitions of “analytical”—the skilled or habitual use of analy-
sis, and “framework”—a skeletal structure designed to support or enclose something. My 
analytical framework is termed “The Rhetorical Profile,” which I examine in depth in a 
companion pedagogical piece. Leslie P. Culver, The Rhetorical Profile (May 22, 2019) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (deriving the term “rhetorical profile” from two 
primary considerations: first, rhetoric, as the art and study of persuasion within the broader 
theme of communication; and second, the notion of flavor profiles as used by professional 
chefs, a once sensory analysis method for resolving taste problems and developing new 
foods, but more modernly used to describe the flavor of food (e.g., Unami (savory), tempera-
ture, sweet, bitter, salty, sour, texture, and spicy)). The Rhetorical Profile is not a new para-
digm for effective legal writing; rather, it is a contemporary, holistic framework to situate 
and give a name to the already existing questions students should consider at each stage of 
legal analysis to engage consciously and confidently in critical legal analytical thinking. In 
this way, The Rhetorical Profile includes many analytical features that IRAC omits, as evi-
denced by IRAC’s dizzying number of iterations. 
22  In many ways, as an African American woman law professor, the framework of this Arti-
cle models the broader point—that a presumably innocuous traditional scholarly framework 
may be deceptively steeped in a white normative standard, and the results can silence outsid-
er voices. 
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Alas, the classic roadmap. The first section, Act I, compares Glinda the 
Good Witch with IRAC and reveals the complicated relationship between the 
Good Witch and the Wicked Witch of the West. I invite you to enter Act I with 
a critical eye toward Glinda—not personally critiquing her, but attentive toward 
her popularity and dominance. Here, I suggest that like Glinda, reductive para-
digms—chief of which is IRAC—rest in an unearned status of privilege and 
dominance. That is, their seductively simple formulas lure students into a 
feigned legal process with a narrow eye toward an objective and neutral finish 
line.23 This section also grapples with a subtle relationship between IRAC as a 
trope for white normativity, an affinity that magnifies the gravitas of labeling 
IRAC as an innocent tool. 
The second section, the Interlude, is a necessary pause. My suggestion that 
IRAC’s privilege and dominance is a trope for whiteness is a daunting and un-
comfortable proposition for some. A common reflex is to dispute IRAC as 
simply an innocent organizational tool, nothing more. To respond, in the Inter-
lude I parallel the defense of “IRAC as a simple tool” to the film The Wiz,24 an 
oft-dubbed “black version” of The Wizard of Oz that was entirely constructed 
by white writers during the controversial Black Arts Movement, thus magnify-
ing racial tensions between “Black” and “White” America. Of relevance, I 
grapple with the tension of whether a white construct is capable of fully captur-
ing or conveying marginalized voices. More critically, if IRAC bears some re-
semblance to white normativity, should we question the harm in letting it be a 
 
23  See Stanchi, supra note 12, at 24, 36 (arguing traditional objective memorandum requires 
the “writer to approach the law through the lens of neutrality, not as an advocate for one 
side[,]” which can alienate outsider writers “from the substance of the law” and “widens the 
gap between their personal and professional voices.” Further commenting that the inability 
to consider the audience “creates a ‘fit’ problem when the outsider lawyer or law student at-
tempts to frame the issue in a way that reflects her world view.”); see also Tracy Turner, 
Finding Consensus in Legal Writing Discourse Regarding Organizational Structure: A Re-
view and Analysis of the Use of IRAC and Its Progenies, 9 LEGAL COMMC’N & RHETORIC: 
JALWD 351, 356 (2012) (“[R]arely does a legal analysis revolve around a single major 
premise. Rather, an effective legal analysis usually requires synthesis of a complex web of 
pronouncements about the law. As a result of these complications, IRAC has been heavily 
criticized as incapable of capturing the nuances of legal analysis.”). 
24  The Broadway musical was in 1974, and the film was in 1987. The focus of the Interlude 
is on the 1978 film version, as it fared far worse than its Broadway counterpart. Jennifer 
Giarrusso, Seeking a Home: The Wiz and the Black Arts Movement, YALE NAT’L INITIATIVE, 
https://teachers.yale.edu/curriculum/viewer/initiative_16.03.06_u [https://perma.cc/CL7S-
373C] (commenting that “[c]ritics have also used the differences between the musical ver-
sion and the film as a negative portrayal of black culture. ‘[The film] even undermines the 
black stage version’s attempt to inculcate black consciousness into a white fable.’ Al Auster 
called the stage version a ‘cheerful piece of miscegenation’ that infused elements of black 
history and social commentary that were ‘bleached out’ in the film version, leaving it ‘cul-
tureless.’ He goes on to argue that this was a strategy to make the film as least black as pos-
sible because of ‘the conventional industry wisdom that black audiences will go see a white 
film, but that white audiences won’t go to see a black film’—ostensibly to attract a more di-
verse audience. Ultimately he credits the hiring of Lumet to this aim toward a white audi-
ence.” (quoting Al Auster, The Wiz: Review, 9 CINEASTE 2, 41 (1978))). 
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necessary entry point—or access—for more complex legal analysis and Other 
voices? 
Finally, the last section, Act II, pushes against the socially constructed 
wickedness by bringing the Analytical Framework to life through an elevated 
lens of identity formation. Through the Wicked Witch’s interactions with the 
famed Tin Man, Scarecrow, Cowardly Lion, and the Wizard, I highlight the 
ability of the Analytical Framework to discern the heart of legal issues, to be a 
voice for the voiceless, and to dismantle power systems that contribute to out-
sider marginalization. IRAC, as a shortcut, fails to invite such depth. If you en-
ter Act I with skepticism toward the privilege that the Good Witch built, you 
should enter Act II with curiosity toward the untold story that shaped the Wick-
ed Witch. From a pedagogical standpoint, the Wicked Witch’s story invites the 
question, “If not IRAC (or Glinda’s version), then what?” My response? Then 
liberation—liberation through Analytical Frameworks that usher in critical 
thought and growth. 
What follows is what I hope will be a wonderful journey into understand-
ing the richness and identity formation of the Analytical Framework through 
the colorful narrative of the Wicked Witch of the West. As the heralded antag-
onist since the 1939 debut of The Wizard of Oz, Wicked explored and investi-
gated the phenomenon known as the “Wicked Witch of the West” as “an ongo-
ing, open-ended process of coming to feel, experience and ‘conscious’ better 
what we have preciously felt, experienced, and ‘conscioused’ in part.”25 To tell 
the Analytical Framework’s story, however, necessitates telling the story of 
IRAC—for every antagonist has a protagonist. But I implore you—do not get 
stuck here. Please. Dominance, privilege, and normativity are often masked, 
subtle in their resiliency for attention, and it can be uncomfortable to truly see 
their presence, let alone resist their effect. But this story is about the Analytical 
Framework that undergirds IRAC and related paradigms, and it deserves as 
much to have its own richness and essence revealed—in its own words. 
In the end, the audience loved Wicked—not because it outshined The Wiz-
ard of Oz—but because Broadway finally shared with the world the identity 
formation of the “Wicked Witch of the West.” Her name is Elphaba, and she is 
not so wicked. 
 
25  See PETERSON, supra note 16, at 23 (emphasis added) (quoting SHERMAN STANAGE, 
ADULT EDUCATION AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 93 (1987)). 
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“ ‘She’s troubled psychologically and she’s troubled by grief and by a lack of a 
sense that she even possesses a soul,’ he says adding that he wanted to pursue 
the themes of identity, purpose and ‘how one plants one’s green sneakers on 
the floor of one’s life and says, ‘I am good,’ maybe ‘I’m not so good,’ or maybe 
‘I’m both.’ I think this question [faces us] every day. What are we doing that’s 
good and what are we doing that’s bad?’ ”—Wicked author Gregory 
Maguire26 
“Ding Dong! The Wicked Witch is dead.”27 It is likely that every school 
child and aging soul knows the fate of the Wicked Witch of the West. Her fury 
began when a tornado, a house, a little girl with the infamous red shoes, and a 
dog altered the course of her family with the death of her sister, the Wicked 
Witch of the East. Scenes later showcase the same little girl with red shoes, and 
the dog, now joined by a Scarecrow, Tin Man, Cowardly Lion, yellow brick 
road, and a Wizard, and this time it is the Wicked Witch of the West that meets 
her fate. Almost from the opening scene of The Wizard of Oz we are primed to 
loathe the Wicked Witch of the West,28 and our distaste for her continues 
through the end of the movie (and the creepy music that signals her onscreen 
presence does not help), so we cannot help but rejoice when the heroine Doro-
thy bravely throws water on the Wicked Witch of the West to send her melting 
away to her final fate. And given how the Wicked Witch of the West treated 
fair Dorothy, or so we believe, the reality of her fate is not disturbing when, 
over six decades later, the Citizens of Oz open Wicked with the musical score, 
“No One Mourns the Wicked.”29 
But “why does wickedness happen?”30 they ask. This is the most probing 
question the Ozians (the citizens of Oz) ask of Glinda the Good Witch in Act I 
of Wicked, and it is this question that frames the musical’s intellectual and 
thoughtful journey. Glinda, in all her genius, replies: “That’s a good question; 
one that many people find confusifying. Are people born wicked, or do they 
have wickedness thrust upon them? After all, she had a childhood . . . .”31 
Indeed, she did have a childhood. As the audience comes to learn, the 
Wicked Witch of the West, Elphaba, and the Good Witch, Glinda, moved from 
 
26  Frank Rizzo, The Evolution of ‘Wicked’ from ‘Oz’, HARTFORD COURANT (Oct. 30, 2014, 
12:28 PM), https://www.courant.com/entertainment/stage/hc-wicked-bushnell-1102-201411 
02-story.html [https://perma.cc/PW3C-524B]. 
27  1939 MGM Wizard of Oz Script: Munchkinland, WENDY’S WIZARD OF OZ, http://www.we 
ndyswizardofoz.com/script4.htm [https://perma.cc/YSJ4-ZLRM]. 
28  Her character is first introduced as a crabby old neighbor, Miss Gulch, who is annoyed by 
Dorothy’s dog, Toto, constantly coming into her garden. Id. 
29  Wicked Script, ALL MUSICALS, https://www.allmusicals.com/lyrics/wicked/script.htm [htt 
ps://perma.cc/LX9X-GQR5]. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. (emphasis added). 
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enemies toward true friendship.32 After Act I opens with the Ozians singing of 
the Wicked Witch of the West’s death, the scene quickly shifts back to Elpha-
ba’s birth, and then fast forwards a decade or two to spend a significant amount 
of time on her identity development through her college days at Shiz Universi-
ty, where she meets Glinda.33 
By analogy, I argue that the “Glinda” of good legal writing has been domi-
nated by a highly formulaic and reductive paradigm known as IRAC (Issue-
Rule-Application-Conclusion).34 In many ways IRAC’s formulaic method mir-
rors the view of legal writing at its inception. Formal legal writing training was 
filling a systemic gap in legal education to prepare law students for the real 
work of practicing law.35 In other words, Begin real lawyering: Issue-Rule-
Application-Conclusion. End real lawyering. The origin of IRAC is unknown, 
but regardless of its orphan roots, it has become the doting (but controversial) 
child of the legal academy as the dominant “friendly reminder” tool for law 
students in crafting an effective legal analysis.36 So who is the “green-skinned 
freshman” of legal writing? She is the Analytical Framework, the substantive 
depth that undergirds IRAC, but history has not donned her a hero. 
Viewing the unsung hero from a cultural awareness lens demonstrates the 
dangers of monolithic representations. Consider the literary works of Mary 
 
32  Carol de Giere, Wicked Synopsis–Wicked Songs in Context, http://www.musicalschwartz.c 
om/wicked-songs.htm [https://perma.cc/RR8W-CEQM] (discussing synopsis of Wicked dur-
ing the fourth song, “What is this Feeling?”). 
33  Id. (discussing synopsis of Wicked during the opening song, “No One Mourns the Wick-
ed”). 
34  For various variances of IRAC used by legal writing professors, see The Value of IRAC, 
10 THE SECOND DRAFT 1, 1–4, 9 (1995) (noting such iterations as IREAC, IGPAC, CRAC). 
35  See Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards the Millennium: The Law School, the Research 
University, and the Professional Reforms of Legal Education, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1965, 1986 
(1999) (discussing the introduction of legal writing programs as a response to two influ-
ences: “One was the Legal Realist critique of legal education, which called for ‘some real-
ism’ about professional training and the provision for more comprehensive education in the 
activities of practicing lawyers. The second consisted of the egalitarian or democratic values 
of the New Deal and World War II, which suggested that more attention and resources be 
paid to the majority of law students who do not obtain the educational benefits of a law re-
view experience. . . . As writing programs have developed and expanded, however, they 
have become subject to a host of competing purposes and competing conceptions about writ-
ing or how to implement writing, to say nothing of limited resources and the unwillingness 
of most full-time faculty to supervise student writing.” (footnotes omitted)). 
36  See, e.g., Terrill Pollman, Building A Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking 
About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 898 (2002) (“During the period when most 
programs employed solely a formalist approach, legal writing teachers began creating a lan-
guage to facilitate learning. The focus on the formal aspects of legal documents meant that 
teachers were teaching issue statements, brief answers, discussion sections, and conclusions. 
In particular, when teaching the discussion section of an analytical memorandum, legal writ-
ing professionals taught the conventions of organizing a formal legal analysis. The attempt to 
articulate a step-by-step guide to analytical organization fostered the creation of IRAC, and 
its variations. Some have questioned the efficacy of IRAC, suggesting that it leads students 
to produce formulaic responses and ultimately uninspired writing. Others find it a useful 
teaching tool.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Helen Washington and Zora Neale Hurston. Washington, in her work The 
Darkened Eye Restored, criticizes the acclaim of Black men as always repre-
senting the “fugitive slave, the fiery orator, the political activist, the abolition-
ist” in shaping the tradition of ALL black people.37 The broader parallel to the 
tension between IRAC and the Analytical Framework is revealed when she 
writes: 
How does the heroic voice and heroic image of the black woman get suppressed 
in a culture that depended on her heroism for its survival? . . . Our ‘ritual jour-
neys,’ our ‘articulate voices,’ our ‘symbolic spaces’ are rarely the same as 
men’s. Those differences and the assumption that those differences make wom-
en inherently inferior, plus the appropriation by men of the power to define tra-
dition, account for women’s absence from our written records.38 
African American male writers, privileged to access white elite education 
in northern colleges, obtained a status of power that made them a phenomenon, 
which Hurston termed “Race Champions” in her work Art and Such.39 The 
work of Washington and Hurston highlight not only a complex tension between 
African American men and women but also “Black” people vis-à-vis “White” 
people regarding literature and tradition. Within the African American commu-
nity, women intellectuals and activists were being dulled down to “social deco-
rations” and literary “stepdaughter[s] who prefigure[d] and direct[ed] us to the 
real heirs (like Ellison and Wright)” without influence over the literary can-
non.40 Equally tragic is the broader influence of African American culture on 
literature. By only African American men articulating a false notion of a mono-
lithic black experience, it rendered, as Hurston remarks, “the effect of the 
whole period [as activities fixed] in a mold that precluded originality and de-
nied creation in the arts.”41 If the African American man wanted to sing of 
morning, to sing a song of uprising and joy, the “Race Champion” reminded 
him that the subjects relegated to “Black” people were race and suffering.42 “So 
the same old theme, the same old phrases get done again to the detriment of 
art. . . . [W]hat was produced was a self-conscious document lacking in drama, 
analysis, characterization and the universal oneness necessary to literature.”43 
Both African American male writers and IRAC create a false view of in-
clusivity with their counterpart. For example, African American male writers 
 
37  Mary Helen Washington, “The Darkened Eye Restored”: Notes Toward a Literary Histo-
ry of Black Women, in READING BLACK, READING FEMINIST: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 30, 32 
(Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1990). 
38  Id. 
39  Zora Neale Hurston, Art and Such, in READING BLACK, READING FEMINIST: A CRITICAL 
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 37, at 22 (“It was so easy to become a Race Leader in those days. 
So few Negroes knew how to read and write that any black man who was proficient in these 
arts was something to be wondered at.”). 
40  Washington, supra note 37, at 33. 
41  Hurston, supra note 39, at 24. 
42  Id. at 23–24. 
43  Id. at 24, 26. 
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are improperly viewed as the monolithic voice of “Black” people, when the Af-
rican American women themselves were heroines who offered a unique view-
point on African American culture and tradition.44 Similarly, IRAC feigns a 
monolithic representation of analytical depth, despite IRAC’s need for the 
Framework’s creativity and actual depth for survival. As a result, the more 
complex and inclusive analysis became the add-on, the Other.45 Ultimately, for 
first-year law students, this green-skinned freshman can become quite “confusi-
fying,”46 a burden, and ultimately wicked. A richer observation is also gleaned 
from Hurston’s work when she remarks that the goal of the African American 
male, or society’s line of least resistance for the African American male, “was 
not to produce literature—it was to ‘champion the Race.’ ”47 Is the legal profes-
sion yearning for outsider voices, for creativity, for diverse thought and per-
spective in legal analysis? Or is the profession championing the replication of 
the same old theme, the same old phrases of a privileged and dominant, but 
shallow, legal analysis? 
These questions are not easy to answer. But a starting place, similar to Act 
I of Wicked, is a critical exploration of IRAC (portrayed by Glinda the Good 
Witch). How did it obtain a privileged status? What led to its superficial rise to 
popularity and dominance, which inevitably resulted in the complete and mer-
ciless rejection of the Analytical Framework, i.e., the “green-skinned fresh-
man.”48 And as set forth as an Interlude—a necessary and relevant pause to dis-
cuss The Wiz—what is the cost of regarding IRAC as simply a tool, an entry 
point, for complex legal analysis? 
 
44  See Washington, supra note 37, at 32. 
45  I am reminded of Toni Morrison’s well-known quote: “In this country American means 
white. Everybody else has to hyphenate.” Toni Morrison, Quotes, GOODREADS, https://www. 
goodreads.com/quotes/157837-in-this-country-american-means-white-everybody-else-has-to 
[https://perma.cc/6XJK-Q52G]. May she rest in peace. 
46  See supra note 31 and accompanying text (term used by Glinda the Good Witch when 
asked why wickedness happens). 
47  Hurston, supra note 39, at 24, 26. 
48  Giere, supra note 32 (discussing synopsis of Wicked during the second song, “Dear Old 
Shiz”). 
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A. What is This Feeling?: On IRAC’s Privileged Status 
“[C]onfrontation [with privilege] will expose the ways in which Whiteness is 
continuously reinforced as the norm, as neutral, or ‘doxa.’ If the seemingly 
normal Whiteness is not questioned . . . it will continue to be the dominant, 
subordinating actor.” —john a. powell49 
Act I, in many respects, forces the audience to wrestle with and question 
the authenticity of Glinda’s privilege. Her thematic stance throughout Act I is 
largely one of blind ignorance and self-promotion, which further magnifies 
Elphaba’s otherness.50 Even as their friendship grows in the latter part of Act I 
and into Act II, Glinda never uses her privilege to offer public support for 
Elphaba’s cause, to offer Elphaba a platform for her own voice, nor to publicly 
object to the oppression that the citizens of Oz were subjecting Elphaba to. 
Glinda, like members of dominant groups, had the ability to avoid recognizing 
Elphaba’s “otherness” as reality. This is inherent in privilege. But the reverse is 
not true for marginalized people, as Patricia Monture-Angus, a Canadian indig-
enous scholar, recognized in her book, Thunder in My Soul.51 Speaking about 
her experience in law school, she wrote: 
The study of law for me is the study of that which is outside of myself and my 
community. It requires that I be expert at both the ways in which “White” people 
do things, as well as continuing to learn as an Aboriginal woman. In fact, my 
survival of the law school depends on my intimate knowledge of who and what 
White people are. The same does not hold true in the reverse. White people have 
the opportunity to fully discard my reality and this is at least one of the signifi-
cant sources of my marginalization.52 
Broadly, in Act I we learn that one significant source of marginalization is 
the status and class differences between Elphaba and Glinda,53 which artificial-
 
49  john a. powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial Privilege, 34 
UNIV. S.F. L. REV. 419, 426–27 (2000) (quoting Ruth Frankenberg, Introduction: Local 
Whiteness, in DISPLACING WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CRITICISM 15–16 
(Ruth Frankenberg ed., 1997)) (discussing a visibility approach used by Ruth Frankenberg). 
50  This thematic overview is my personal opinion. As background, in their formative years 
Glinda observes her college peers making fun of Elphaba’s green skin, yet she remains more 
concerned about her own comfort. For example, in Act I, her focus is on obtaining a private 
suite in the college dorms, getting into Madam Morrible’s sorcery seminar, attending the Oz 
Dust Ball with Fiyero, and redirecting Boq’s unrequited love toward Elphaba’s sister, Nessa-
rose. In Act II, when Fiyero begins to grow concern, and interest, in Elphaba’s social justice 
plight, Glinda’s attention toward herself manifests in her becoming the public face of 
strength for the citizens of Oz and offering public concern for Elphaba’s safety. Yet, in nei-
ther Act I nor Act II did she attempt to change the Ozians’ opinion of Elphaba or use her 
privilege to provide public support for Elphaba’s cause. 
51  Cynthia Levine-Rasky, Foreword to THE INTERSECTIONS OF WHITENESS xi, xi–xii (Evan-
gelia Kindinger & Mark Schmitt eds., 2019) (citing PATRICIA MONTURE-ANGUS, THUNDER IN 
MY SOUL: A MOHAWK WOMAN SPEAKS 64 (1995)). 
52  Id. (quoting MONTURE-ANGUS, supra note 51, at 64). 
53  During Act I, Scene 2, which begins the return to college days, the character’s name is 
Galinda, with an intentional and superficial emphasis on pronouncing it as “Guh--linda.” See 
21 NEV. L.J. 655 
Spring 2021] (UN)WICKED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS 669 
ly results in diametric positioning between the two—and apparently only one 
can be privileged. Interestingly, before they were the Wicked Witch of the 
West and the Good Witch, respectively, the two were college students at Shiz 
University.54 In Scene four, Glinda and Elphaba are forced to share a room to-
gether, and the scene opens with both young ladies sitting on their beds writing 
to their respective parents about their less than excited feelings for the other.55 
During the song, “What is This Feeling?,” the other university students rally 
around Glinda to share in her loathing feelings toward Elphaba, without any 
substantial basis for praising Glinda and detesting Elphaba.56 Having declared 
Elphaba to be both “a terror [and] a Tartar,” the students proclaim that Glinda 
is “just too good,” and that though they “don’t mean to show a bias;” Glinda is 
simply a “martyr,” and they are “all on [her] side!”57 The audience can chuckle 
at Glinda’s false affliction as she eloquently responds that “these things are sent 
to try us;”58 but the larger point, however, is to highlight the palpable conclu-
sion that Glinda did nothing to deserve the corporate praise other than to be the 
physical antithesis of the now loathed Elphaba. 
IRAC, like Glinda, has done nothing to deserve the popular praise from the 
legal academy other than to be the artificially created structural framing tool for 
the engaging and thoughtful Analytical Framework. Yet IRAC bathes in privi-
lege despite the inability to cultivate critical and independent thinking, prob-
lem-solving, adaptability, creativity, and depth.59 While it is debatable whether 
the broader legal academy loathes IRAC,60 I argue that like Glinda, IRAC—in 
some ways also artificially—gained a privilege status that is emblematic of a 
normative white standard. 
 
Wicked Script, supra note 29. But, in efforts to not distract or confuse the reader, I have re-
tained the more well-known title of Glinda through both Acts I and II, except for when por-
tions of the script are directly quoted. In those instances, Galinda is used where appropriate. 
54  Carol de Giere, Wicked the Musical—Synopsis Without Spoilers, http://www.musicalschw 
artz.com/wicked-songs2.htm [https://perma.cc/LD49-8KYK]. 
55  See Wicked Script, supra note 29. 
56  What Is This Feeling?, ALL MUSICALS, https://www.allmusicals.com/lyrics/wicked/whatis 
thisfeeling.htm [https://perma.cc/YKA9-KB5N]. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  See generally the discussion of the limitations of IRAC infra notes 165–69 and accompa-
nying text. 
60  See, e.g., David Ziff, Judge Posner vs. Professor Dorf on Legal Writing, ZIFF BLOG (Oct. 
3, 2016), https://ziffblog.wordpress.com/2016/10/03/judge-posner-vs-professor-dorf-on-legal 
-writing/ [https://perma.cc/A6HS-MPZ8] (highlighting Judge Posner’s criticism of 
IRAC/CRAC structure as “straitjackets”); The Value of IRAC, 10 THE SECOND DRAFT 1 
(1995) (providing a special edition of the journal that contains numerous short articles from 
legal writing professors on the value and limitations of IRAC in the first year curriculum, 
such as offering a simplistic way to organize a legal analysis for novice writers, but also if 
relied upon too heavily, stunting law students’ ability to provide adequate analytical depth). 
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Understanding privilege can be foreign territory to some and unpleasant for 
others. While many scholars of critical white studies discuss it as a concept,61 
Professor Stephanie Wildman offers two distinct features that are helpful in 
viewing the contours of privilege as it relates to IRAC.62 They include, first, 
“the characteristics of the privileged group define the societal norm,” and sec-
ond, “privileged group members can rely on their privilege and avoid objecting 
to oppression.”63 
1.  IRAC’s Characteristics and Attributes Define the Norm in Legal 
Writing Discourse 
The normalization of privilege, as Wildman contends, rests heavily on the 
characteristics and attributes of the privilege group.64 They define the standard, 
and “those who stand outside are the aberrant or ‘alternative.’ ”65 As this section 
explores, IRAC’s own characteristics—scientific-like methodology, rigid 
framework, conclusiveness, and its reliance on a distinct professional voice that 
breeds objectivity and generality (or neutrality), with minimal reliance on 
unique human experiences—are described as norms, “as the way things are and 
as what is normal,”66 in traditional legal writing pedagogy. 
IRAC’s hallmark feature is arguably the almost scientific method-type 
model of drafting legal analysis. In the 1995 edition of The Second Draft, many 
prominent legal writing scholars discussed the various features of IRAC in The 
Value of IRAC.67 One of the most desirable features was that it provided novice 
legal writers some sense of structure in drafting a legal analysis, which can be a 
welcome relief in a profession that often wades through shades of gray and am-
biguity. For example, Professor Mary Beth Beazley commented that “IRAC 
helps keep the focus on the reader by encouraging writers to discuss important 
elements in the order that is usually most helpful to the reader.”68 Professor 
Charles Calleros added that “[a]s a tentative and general approach to organiza-
tion based on deductive reasoning, IRAC provides an analytic framework that 
 
61  See, e.g., Tonnia L. Anderson, For the Common Good: Re-inscribing White Normalcy 
into the American Body Politic, in THE INTERSECTIONS OF WHITENESS, supra note 51, at 39, 
42 (discussing white privilege as “confer[ing] certain benefits based upon sta-
tus . . . . [which] may be perceived or go unrecognized by the beneficiary”); ROBERT P. 
AMICO, EXPLORING WHITE PRIVILEGE 2 (2017) (describing white privilege as a “form of 
domination” that “positions one person or group over another person or group”). 
62  STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE 
UNDERMINES AMERICA 13 (1996). 
63  Id. 
64  Id. at 14. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. (discussing the normalization of privilege). 
67  See The Value of IRAC, supra note 60. 
68  Mary Beth Beazley, Fire, Flood, Famine & IRAC?, 10 THE SECOND DRAFT 1 (1995). 
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is illuminating or persuasive in most legal analyses or arguments.”69 More re-
cently, Professor Laura Graham, in her work, Why-Rac? Revisiting the Tradi-
tional Paradigm for Writing About Legal Analysis, also limits IRAC’s useful-
ness to a legal analysis framework.70 
Outside of the legal writing discipline IRAC’s methodical usefulness is 
similarly recognized. In fact, one practitioner suggested that IRAC has value 
beyond “merely an organizational tool.”71 He posited that “[f]aithful adher-
ence” to its technique forces a precise discernment of the issue, and an en-
gagement in a “mental exercise of distinguishing Rule from Application there-
by crystallizing the source of dispute.”72 This practitioner went so far as to hale 
IRAC as the “key to success on law school exams, the bar exam, and a success-
ful career in litigation.”73 Similarly, Dr. H. Russell Cort, an educational psy-
chologist, noted that: 
IRAC, the lawyer’s version of the classical Aristotelian syllogism, can provide 
beginning students with a useful framework for organizing a legal analysis. It is 
seductive in its seeming simplicity, but for students just starting out it provides a 
model for understanding how to apply the facts to a rule and for seeing what 
proof can mean in a legal dispute.74 
Dr. Cort’s own suspicion toward IRAC’s simplicity is revealing, as a view 
that IRAC can provide a model for understanding is arguably problematic. Il-
lustratively, IRAC no more engages students in an intimate understanding of 
deductive reasoning (that is, application of the law to a given set of facts), than 
a mere list of ingredients provides a chef with intimate knowledge toward culi-
nary delight. IRAC simply tells students to include certain conventions, but the 
“how to apply” is less intuitive. 
For this Article, the chief argument is that IRAC models a method of gen-
erality and objectivity, a falsely simplistic analytical process, and a removal 
from the human experience. But perhaps its greatest transgression is its implicit 
boast of an idealized professional voice. Almost from day one of law school, 
students are routinely and appropriately reminded of professionalism, but they 
are also being prodded to find or create a professional identity befitting a law-
yer. And to add to this already overwhelming phenomenon that is law school, 
we then instruct them to find the amorphous professional voice in legal writing. 
At first glance, the parallel between IRAC and professional voice may not be 
intuitive, but to the extent novice law students seek to find or imitate a profes-
 
69  Charles Calleros, IRAC: Tentative and Flexible and Therefore Reliable, 10 THE SECOND 
DRAFT 4 (1995). 
70  See generally Laura P. Graham, Why-Rac? Revisiting the Traditional Paradigm for Writ-
ing About Legal Analysis, 63 KAN. L. REV. 681 (2015). 
71  Jeffrey Metzler, The Importance of IRAC and Legal Writing, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
501, 501 (2003). 
72  Id. at 502. 
73  Id. at 501. 
74  H. Russell Cort, A Nest of IRACs, 10 THE SECOND DRAFT 5 (1995). 
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sional voice in their legal writing, I believe to them that striving toward suc-
cess75 or a state of being “lawyer-like” is legitimized through an intentional 
mimic of IRAC. Stated otherwise, the heavy reliance on IRAC’s reductive par-
adigm, with its constricting conclusiveness and tone of objectivity, is in many 
ways the subtle move toward the “professional voice.” The notion of the pro-
fessional voice raises many concerns that feel misleading. All students most 
certainly enter law school with a voice, but is the claim that their voices are not 
professional? What makes one’s voice professional? Or perhaps more to the 
point, who decides the standards of this professional voice? 
The connection between legal writing and voice has been extensively dis-
cussed by Professor Christopher Rideout.76 His work on voice points toward 
the early work of Julius Getman whose description of the professional voice is 
grounded in objectivity and generality.77 For context, Getman remarks that 
“[t]he great bulk of legal education is devoted to inculcating ‘professional 
voice.’ The magical moment at which the ‘light dawns’ and bewildered first-
year students are transformed into lawyers occurs when this voice becomes the 
 
75  See Metzler, supra note 71, at 501 (“And while there is some value to IRAC as merely an 
organizational tool, I would like to impress upon students intending to practice law, especial-
ly litigation, that IRAC is much more than an organizational structure. IRAC is an important 
mental exercise that forces an author to a deeper understanding of the legal issues at stake. 
Understanding IRAC is indispensable for sifting through hundreds of cases to find the one 
that most helps your case. IRAC is the key to success on law school exams, the bar exam, 
and a successful career in litigation.”). 
76  See, e.g., J. Christopher Rideout, So What’s in a Name? A Rhetorical Reading of Wash-
ington's Sexually Violent Predators Act, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 781, 783 (1992) (“The 
question for this Article, however, is what happens once the story has been recast into anoth-
er form, here that of a statute? How well do the immediacy of the details and the authorial 
voice of the story lend themselves to the generalized and categorizing language of a rule?”); 
J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. 
REV. 35, 64 (1994) (commenting that students’ participation in the legal writing classroom is 
vital, most notably that through their “participation, they will also be constructing them-
selves, rhetorically, as lawyer-writers, a construction that entails the development of a writ-
er's persona and a professional voice”); J. Christopher Rideout, Voice, Self, and Persona in 
Legal Writing, 15 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 67, 68 (2009) [hereinafter Rideout, Voice, Self, 
and Persona] (tackling the question of whether legal writing as a voice, be it personal or pro-
fessional, but nonetheless that “voice belongs high on the list of things that legal writing pro-
fessionals teach,” and requires one to “dig deeply into the self of a legal writer and to explore 
what [he] would call the persona that legal writers must construct for themselves”) (empha-
sis added); J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: The View from Within, 
61 MERCER L. REV. 705, 706–07 (2010) (arguing that both the identity and the voice of a le-
gal writer are best understood as discoursal); J. Christopher Rideout, Ethos, Character, and 
Discoursal Self in Persuasive Legal Writing, 21 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 19, 44 (2016) (not-
ing the important role of voice as an “important component of a writer’s ethos”). 
77  Rideout, Voice, Self, and Persona, supra note 76, at 81 (noting that “the literature on 
voice in legal discourse is limited, what literature there is, not surprisingly, discusses voice 
in terms of professional voice”). 
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student’s own.”78 This professional voice is the “primary goal of law school,”79 
whose features include being 
objective and register[ing] at a high level of generality; its style tends to be for-
mal, erudite, and ‘old-fashioned’; it contains both terms of art and Latin phrases; 
and it situates itself at a distance, ‘as though its user were removed from and 
slightly above the general concerns of humanity.’ All of these features entail an 
erasure of the personal from what we would consider professional voice in the 
law.80 
To Getman’s objectivity and generality, Rideout also points to the work of 
Professor Elizabeth Mertz, who adds argumentation to the professional voice.81 
She suggests that the professional voice requires students to learn the language 
of argumentation, to engage with the relevant subject matter from a distance, 
“and [to strip] away . . . emotional and moral content.”82 In this process, “[t]hey 
acquire the professional voice of a lawyer, and doing so is a powerful measure 
of their success at learning ‘to be and think like a lawyer.’ ”83 Both Getman and 
Mertz acknowledge the narrowness and limitations of this professional voice as 
distancing lawyers “not only from the concerns of ‘ordinary people,’ but also 
from themselves.”84 This gap between the professional and personal legal voice 
is extremely problematic because, as Rideout notes, it is too impersonal and 
largely discoursal.85 He writes, 
If personal voice, or human voice, is the touchstone for voice in writing, then 
voice in legal writing—whether the professional voice of certain legal writings 
or the apparent voicelessness of others—seems problematic. Either way, there is 
little room for the individual writer and that writer’s sense of self.86 
Moreover, according to Professor Kathryn Stanchi, the gap between the 
professional and personal legal voice widens “when the writer’s experiences 
run counter to the reasoning of a case, or when the writer cannot identify with 
the ‘rightness’ of a rule or rationale, or worse, finds it repugnant to her personal 
values.”87 In full view of the needs of the individual writer, the reality of hidden 
or explicit biases in legal writing that can mute outsider voices,88 and the fiction 
 
78  Id. (quoting Julius G. Getman, Colloquy: Human Voice in Legal Discourse: Voices, 66 
TEX. L. REV. 577, 577 (1988)). 
79  Id. 
80  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Getman, supra note 78, at 578). 
81  Id. (citing ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE 
A LAWYER” 97–101 (2007)). 
82  Id. at 81–82. 
83  Id. at 82 (quoting MERTZ, supra note 81, at 97–101). 
84  Id. (quoting Getman, supra note 78, at 578 and citing MERTZ, supra note 81, at 133–34). 
85  See id. at 70–71 (referring to discoursal voice as that which “is situated within the features 
of its discourse type”). 
86  See id. at 73. 
87  See Stanchi, supra note 12, at 37. 
88  See id. at 36; see also Lorne Sossin, Discourse Politics: Legal Research and Writing’s 
Search for a Pedagogy of Its Own, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 883, 899 (1995) (“What both the 
‘plain english’ movement and the ‘human voice’ advocates seek to reclaim is the communi-
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that suggests the law is objective or neutral, Stanchi still cedes that “objectivity 
is a hallmark of legal language, of the professional voice.”89 
In keeping with an examination of IRAC’s privileged status, beyond its 
normalization of the characteristics that define (or predominantly shape) legal 
analysis, perhaps, as discussed in the next section, its lesser-known offense is 
that this privileged status permits IRAC to avoid objecting to oppression. 
2.  IRAC’s Privilege Permits Avoiding Oppression 
Wildman’s second feature that helps characterize privilege is that “privi-
leged group members can rely on their privilege and avoid objecting to oppres-
sion.”90 
 
cative wisdom of ordinary or everyday knowledge. In other words, to the extent that legal 
writing, and legal discourse generally, is removed from the sphere of ordinary understand-
ing, whether as a matter of vocabulary or ‘voice,’ legal communication acts as a form of op-
pression on those marginalized outside privileged circles of class, race and gender. The same 
can be said of traditional attempts to disassociate legal reasoning from the sphere of emo-
tional conviction and personal experience.” (footnotes omitted)). 
89  Stanchi, supra note 12, at 35. 
90  WILDMAN, supra note 62, at 13, 16 (recalling the story of the author’s avoiding being 
asked during jury selection (voir dire) if she spoke English, which an Asian man was asked). 
I can relate to Wildman’s story. In August 2019 I was returning home from a workshop 
where I was the guest speaker, and I had a similar privilege-awakening moment like Wild-
man’s. After boarding the plane and settling into my seat, the flight attendant—a “White” 
woman—made her way from the front of the cabin to the exit row. I was sitting a few rows 
behind the exit row. Having flown numerous times, I tuned out the rehearsed speech I knew 
was coming, where the flight attendant asks for a verbal response (preferably yes) that the 
exit row passengers were willing and able to help the flight crew should an emergency arise 
on the plane. But then I heard her say, rather loudly, “Sir, do you speak English?” She was 
looking at an older Asian man. I looked up, as did many around me. Similar to my student 
Thomas, mentioned at the start of this Article, I recognize that I can only offer an outsider 
view of the scene as it unfolded. My eyes briefly scanned the passengers seated in all six 
seats of the exit row. Three appeared ethnically Asian (the male already mentioned, and two 
females—one younger and one older), and the other three appeared “White.” It is quite pos-
sible that when the flight attendant asked her initial question, the Asian gentlemen stared 
back blankly, justifying the follow-up question as to whether he spoke English. The older 
Asian woman stepped in and said that he did not speak English, and the flight attendant pro-
ceeded to have a conversation with the older Asian woman, again, very loudly, stating that 
“he would need to move” because he needed to “understand her” if he was going to sit in the 
exit row, and “he can’t understand [her] if he can’t speak English.” 
        The length of this conversation was likely less than a minute, but it felt like a painfully 
long scene in an already bad movie. I was mortified for that gentleman. With my heart racing 
a bit, I was trying to process why I was upset—this had nothing to do with me after all. I 
think I was embarrassed for him because the attendant’s increased volume was drawing un-
necessary attention to him and the situation. By whatever reason she believed that he did not 
understand her question presented to all the passengers in the exit row; why did she not 
simply kneel down or lean in a bit further to address him more personally? I also wondered 
why she asked him if he spoke English? She could have said, “Sir, did you hear me? Or “Sir, 
did you understand my question?” As I think about Wildman’s jury story, I can certainly 
recognize that I too benefited from a privilege on that plane as a United States citizen. No, I 
was not sitting in the exit row on that particular flight, but, even as a member of a marginal-
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Merriam-Webster defines oppression as an “unjust or cruel exercise of au-
thority or power” or “something that oppresses especially in being an unjust or 
excessive exercise of power.”91 I am cautious that the use of the term “oppres-
sion” in this space, as bearing a relationship to IRAC, could for some diminish 
the gravity of that term as it has been used historically for the mistreatment of 
disadvantaged groups. Without implying or applying the full historical weight 
of the term oppression to a legal analysis paradigm, this discussion relies on the 
work of Paulo Freire, who, in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, offers a rich dia-
logue of oppression through an educational lens. Viewing pedagogy more as 
philosophy than as teaching, he maintains that “oppression and its causes [are] 
objects of reflection by the oppressed,” and that the oppressed must be engaged 
“in the struggle for their liberation[;]” they must take part in “the incessant 
struggle to regain their humanity.”92 
IRAC’s contribution to the struggle for marginalized or oppressed voices is 
distinct but harmonious with legal writing pedagogy. This Article recognizes 
the scholarship that discusses legal writing pedagogy as contributing to the 
muting of outsider voices, vying instead for more critical theory and social jus-
tice frameworks to be woven into the fabric of traditional legal writing cours-
es.93 That is, in many ways the characteristics of IRAC described above—
 
ized group, I have never been asked—on a flight or in any other circumstance—if I “speak 
English.” If someone was not sure that I heard them, they would either ask if I heard them, 
automatically repeat their question, or ask if I am even listening. But never, do I speak Eng-
lish. 
I thought about writing an email to the airline and notifying a manager about this incident. 
But similar to Wildman’s ‘thought in her head’ that did not materialize out of her mouth, I 
kept silent and went on about my business of getting home after a long day of traveling. 
Moreover, I cannot posit if this man, or his Asian companions, felt oppressed, to the extent 
oppression is defined as prolonged unjust treatment. It is not uncommon, however, for mem-
bers of the Asian ethnic group to be asked if they speak English. See, e.g., Connie Zhou, The 
Asian-American Awakening: That Moment When You Realize You’re Not White, HUFFPOST 
(June 2, 2017) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-asian-american-awakening-that-moment-
when-you_b_59307537e4b042ffa289e880 [https://perma.cc/CL2Y-JJKW] (recounting her 
experience as an Ohio-born English speaking five-year-old that had to switch schools to be 
placed in a school that had an ESL program, commenting that “[i]t wasn’t until later in life I 
tried to analyze the situation and came to this conclusion: I was put in that program for one 
reason, I was a shy Asian girl and everyone jumped to the conclusion that I couldn’t speak 
English.” (emphasis omitted)). 
91  Oppression, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oppressio 
n [https://perma.cc/Q7DU-X8WK]. 
92  PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 48, 53–54 (Myra Ramos trans., 30th Anni-
versary ed. 2005) (“The pedagogy of the oppressed, which is the pedagogy of people en-
gaged in the fight for their own liberation, has its roots [in Lukacs warning to the revolution-
ary party]. And those who recognize, or begin to recognize, themselves as oppressed must be 
among the developers of this pedagogy. No pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain 
distant from the oppressed by treating them as unfortunates and by presenting for their emu-
lation models from among the oppressors. The oppressed must be their own example in the 
struggle for their redemption.”). 
93  See, e.g., Sossin, supra note 88, at 901 (rejecting the “one-dimensional” fashion that legal 
writing is normally taught, and advocating for “a pedagogy of LRW capable of mandating 
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formulaic, objective, and general—broadly reflect the ways in which legal writ-
ing pedagogy has been described. For example, Lorne Sossin views legal writ-
ing as “historically . . . taught in a one-dimensional fashion, conveying only a 
singular and status-quo oriented vision of legal communication;”94 Stanchi 
maintains it ignores “certain unique and valuable voices, cultures and concepts 
in law, and ensuring that law remains a language of power and privilege;”95 and 
Brook Baker remarks that “[l]egal education, including legal writing, can be 
criticized for presenting a monocultural, monochromatic, and overly doctrinal 
view of the world.”96 What this Article does is narrow that broader pedagogical 
conversation by focusing on a critical stage in the development of the novice 
legal writer—the process of engaging in legal analysis. 
As has been stated previously, but bears reemphasis, this Article does not 
contend that the analytical conventions that the IRAC paradigm represents are 
problematic. That the law must be used to resolve a legal issue in view of a 
specific set of facts is both intuitive and non-threatening. However, IRAC as a 
framing tool cannot be the end of the conversation (and for some professors it 
never enters the conversation), otherwise novice law students will mistakenly 
transform this paradigm into a legal process, without being mindful of its lack 
of substance. Simply put, IRAC cannot deliver an intellectual process of learn-
ing when it comes to making various decisions. Such decisions include issue 
framing, and from whose perspective; the rule(s) of law, including justifica-
tions, defenses; or when to yield to stare decisis, or push the law to change. 
At best, IRAC’s specific characteristics—its objectivity and generality, and 
also its integral connection to legal writing that often presents a monochromatic 
view of the world—may serve to oppress “unique and valuable voices, cultures 
and concepts in law”97 by avoiding, or altogether ignoring, objecting to oppres-
sion. IRAC’s very essence, its culture, is defined largely by being impersonal, 
unbiased, neutral, and keeping unique human experiences at a distance. In other 
 
the exploration of legal discourse. The content of legal writing traditionally has advantaged 
particular ways of reasoning and expressing argument and, at the same time, undermined 
others. The same may be said of the select ‘sources of law’ to which first-year law students 
are sent to undertake their research. Students should be required both to research and write 
‘like a lawyer’ and also to see the social, political, and economic implications of this form of 
discourse, and to be aware of the alternatives.”); Brook K. Baker, Incorporating Diversity 
and Social Justice Issues in Legal Writing Programs, 9 PERSPS. TEACHING LEGAL RSCH. & 
WRITING 51, 51 (2001) (critiquing legal writing, in part, for selecting “client problems with-
out significant regard to the demographic diversity of our students, the diversity of their fu-
ture clients, and the social justice concerns that might otherwise animate our discipline”); 
and the previously discussed scholars, Stanchi, supra note 12, and Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, 
Still Writing at the Master’s Table: Decolonizing Rhetoric for a “Woke” Legal Academy, 21 
SCHOLAR 255 (2019). 
94  Sossin, supra note 88, at 901. 
95  Stanchi, supra note 12, at 10 (“In the legal writing context, the dilemma for the teacher is 
whether the teacher should ‘socialize’ the student to the culture and language of law, thereby 
risking that the already marginalized will be further marginalized.”). 
96  Baker, supra note 93, at 51. 
97  Stanchi, supra note 12, at 10. 
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words, it not only avoids objecting to oppression, it often does not see it. This 
blindness, in accord with feminists’ communication theory and Freire’s work, 
is the reality of insider or dominant positioning; it is the fruit born of privi-
lege.98 Certainly objectivity is not without some usefulness. As Freire remarks, 
“the denial of objectivity in analysis or action, result[s] in a subjectivism which 
leads to solipsistic [or self] positions, denies action itself by denying objective 
reality.”99 
To the extent, however that IRAC rests on its objectivity as an oppression 
exemption, a free pass to oppress, Freire’s work challenges any presumption 
that objectivity alone can ever transform reality. To demand such of objectivity 
is to “divert the recognition of oppression into patient waiting for oppression to 
disappear by itself . . . .”100 It is intuitive that to avoid objecting to oppression 
certainly does not eliminate it. And in keeping with this Article’s identity de-
velopment framework, according to Freire, we cannot “dismiss the role of sub-
jectivity in the struggle to change structures.”101 The need for the voice of the 
oppressed, i.e., within the dimensions of the Analytical Framework, is not lost, 
it must contribute to its own liberating pedagogy.102 But the point underscored 
here, for IRAC, is that while its objective nature may permit IRAC from truly 
seeing or intentionally providing room to voice oppression, there is feigned lib-
eration in that existence. I believe Wildman’s jury story attests to this.103 Liber-
ation might indicate that Wildman was set free from thinking about the ethnic 
backstory of that Asian-American juror when asked if he spoke English. Even 
given her posture as a critical white studies scholar, reflection on the incident 
could have lasted no longer than the interaction itself. But, as Freire’s theory 
maintains, there is value, a need, for that which is objective to be impacted by 
the subjective—for the oppressor to feel the weight and impact of the op-
pressed. He writes: 
To deny the importance of subjectivity in the process of transforming the world 
and history is naïve and simplistic. It is to admit the impossible: a world without 
people. This objectivistic position is as ingenuous as that of subjectivism, which 
 
98  See Culver, Conscious Identity Performance, supra note 4, at 591–92 (discussing insider 
viewpoint as unable to see outsider status). 
99  FREIRE, supra note 92, at 50 (noting also that “[t]he separation of objectivity from subjec-
tivity, the denial of the latter when analyzing reality or acting upon it, is objectivism”). 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  See id. at 48 (“The central problem is this: How can the oppressed, as divided, unauthen-
tic beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation? Only as they discover 
themselves to be ‘hosts’ of the oppressor can they contribute to the midwifery of their liber-
ating pedagogy. As long as they live in the duality in which to be is to be like, and to be like 
is to be like the oppressor, this contribution is impossible. The pedagogy of the oppressed is 
an instrument for their critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are manifesta-
tions of dehumanization.” (emphasis omitted)). 
103  See WILDMAN, supra note 62, at 16. 
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postulates people without a world. World and human beings do not exist apart 
from each other, they exist in constant interaction.104 
The co-dependency between the objective and subjective, as a means to 
overcome oppression, is a liberating thought. Sadly, IRAC has found security 
under the banner of privilege. Its blind spot, however, particularly for novice 
law students, is both the lack of awareness and confidence to include the neces-
sary weight of subjective thought. We proclaim as law schools to train students 
in the art of critical thinking, in rhetoric, policy, social justice awareness—to 
come into our doors, our halls, our classrooms and transform the world through 
the legal system. Yet we hand them a tool that truncates supposed intellectual 
engagement down to a shallow formula and remarkably wonder why they view 
legal writing as foreign, inauthentic, and void of lived human experiences. In 
short, IRAC’s very presence is a legal writing identity crisis. “No pedagogy 
which is truly liberating can remain distant from the oppressed by treating them 
as unfortunates and by presenting for their emulation models from among the 
oppressors.”105 
3. IRAC’s Privilege and Its Correlation to Whiteness 
“Whiteness is, paradoxically, both full of power and empty of substantive 
meaning. It is an illusion, a false idol, an ideology whose power will diminish 
only when white people stop believing it.”—Matt Wray106 
The privileges associated with IRAC intersect with whiteness. I am inten-
tionally speaking of whiteness as a dominant social construct, “as a resource 
(capital),” a social asset,107 as this more appropriately highlights whiteness as 
being on “the dominant side of the power system.”108 Borrowing a critical 
 
104  FREIRE, supra note 92, at 50; see Teresa Bruce, The Empathy Principle, 6 L. & 
SEXUALITY 109, 120 (1996) (describing jurisprudence based in empathy based on the work 
of Derrick Bell and his “use of allegory [to] demonstrate[] the empathy principle in action. 
His stories communicate a powerful and compelling vision of racial oppression, engendering 
empathy in the reader in a way that dry statistics and traditional legal writing can not. Many 
white people will not, for example, understand ‘the horrified feelings of the subjects 
of . . . statistics’ on slavery and black unemployment unless their empathetic capacities are 
stimulated. Only empathy can cause them to affirmatively demand pay equity, educational 
fortification, adequate welfare systems, aggressive affirmative action programs, and so on. 
Intellectual understanding alone will not suffice. A jurisprudence based in empathy would 
thus adopt many of Professor Bell’s arguments; it would attack white-skin privilege just as it 
would attack a system male entitlement.” (quoting DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF 
THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 148 (1992)). 
105  FREIRE, supra note 92, at 53–54. 
106  Matt Wray, A Typology of White People in America, in THE INTERSECTIONS OF 
WHITENESS, supra note 51, at 63. 
107  See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 61, at 40; Wray, supra note 106, at 65 (contending that 
“the concept of white skin privilege” has been overgeneralized, that “[i]t is not a constant. It 
is a variable.”). 
108  WILDMAN, supra note 62, at 14–15 (discussing examples such as legacy admissions at 
elite colleges). 
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whiteness studies lens is useful in examining the subtlety of this masked affilia-
tion between IRAC’s privileged status—namely an objective methodology and 
ability to avoid oppression—and whiteness. In other words, the characteristics 
and attributes of IRAC “codif[y] the normalcy of whiteness,” by “rhetorically 
legitimizing” them through terms such as normal, natural, and right.109 The rel-
evance in this examination is to avoid unknowingly replicating white norma-
tivity that already exists in a profession aching for diversity.110 
I approach this section in three parts. First, a brief overview of white nor-
mativity borrowing tenets from race and ethnicity discourse, how white norma-
tivity manifests in legal education, and finally how I perceive its materialization 
into legal writing pedagogy. 
First, understanding white normativity is a necessary starting point, par-
ticularly for those unfamiliar with this term. A brief review of legal scholarship 
on understanding white normativity largely credits the starting place to sociolo-
gist Peggy McIntosh, who in the late 1980s began writing about “white privi-
lege.”111 Stemming from her work with women’s studies, where she frequently 
observed that many men were unwilling to acknowledge their male privilege, 
she considered the ways in which her own skin color put her at an advantage 
over her colleagues of color, noting that “[w]hite privilege is like an invisible 
weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, 
clothes, tools and blank checks.”112 When working from a “base of unacknowl-
edged privilege,” there is little relevance in whether white people see them-
 
109  See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 61, at 32 (discussing Trump’s 2016 GOP Platform as 
codifying the normalcy of whiteness through its use of terms such as “God’s Law,” “Law of 
Nature,” and “Nature’s God” despite the Platform’s intentional use of colorblind language). 
110  Compare AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA PROFILE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2020, at 32–34 
(2020), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/news/2020/07/potlp20 
20.pdf [https://perma.cc/47ZF-4KRN] (“86% of all lawyers were non-Hispanic whites” 
(compared to 60% of U.S. residents identifying a non-Hispanic whites in 2019), and the per-
centage of female lawyers is 37%) with QuickFacts: People, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/3SWH-BFW 
C] (76.3% of the U.S. population is White, while 50.8% is made up of women) and Laura 
Bagby, ABA Profile of the Legal Profession: Diversity and Well-Being, 2CIVILITY (Aug. 13, 
2020) https://www.2civility.org/aba-profile-of-the-legal-profession-diversity-and-well-
being/ [https://perma.cc/3TQL-WDPM] (White men and women are still “overrepresented in 
the legal profession compared with their presence in the overall U.S. population. . . . While 
the percentage of female lawyers has increased slowly over the past decade (31% in 2010 vs. 
37% in 2020), recent gains among people of color are minimal. Just 5% of all lawyers are 
Black, the same percentage as 10 years ago, while 13.4% of the U.S. population is Black. 
Comparably, 5% of all lawyers are Hispanic, up from 4% a decade earlier, although 18.5% 
of the U.S. population is Hispanic. Two percent of all lawyers are Asian, up only 0.4% from 
10 years ago, while almost 6% of the U.S. population is Asian). 
111  PEGGY MCINTOSH, WHITE PRIVILEGE: UNPACKING THE INVISIBLE KNAPSACK (1989), 
https://nationalseedproject.org/images/documents/Knapsack_plus_Notes-Peggy_McIntosh.p 
df [https://perma.cc/X2CY-5VL9]. 
112  Id. (“I think whites are carefully taught not to recognize white privilege, as males are 
taught not to recognize male privilege.”). 
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selves as oppressive, because they have been “conditioned into oblivion” about 
the existence of white privilege.113 
While there are many ethnicity scholars that rely on white normativity as a 
starting point for advancing change, very few offer a definition of its character-
istics. Robert Westley’s early work on white normativity is frequently refer-
enced in legal scholarship. He maintains that: 
Whiteness is a norm that both transcends racial categorization and is recognized 
as a racial category analogous to others. . . . This ability of whiteness to function 
both as a norm and as a racial signifier means that the same category can be 
made to operate both as a category of subordination and dominance at the same 
time; if not practically, then at least doctrinally.114 
Whiteness as a transcending norm reverberates in scholarship that consid-
ers the law pertaining to white spaces. Professor Christine Zuni Cruz, for ex-
ample, uses the law of white spaces as a reason to “bring issues of race and 
color into the institution, the legal institution, and to put them on the table for 
students to think about in respect to how race and culture fit into lawyering 
across both.”115 She draws on the earlier work of Peter Goodrich and Linda G. 
Mills, The Law of White Spaces: Race, Culture, and Legal Education,116 who 
wrote: 
The law of white spaces is the object of white studies. It addresses whiteness as 
color. The relationships within the predominantly white spaces of the law school 
are thus to be understood as the expression of the conditions of possibility of ex-
clusionary practices . . . . The law of white spaces is one of nonrecognition, si-
lence, or denial.117 
 
113  Id. 
114  Robert Westley, Reparations and Symbiosis: Reclaiming the Remedial Focus, 71 UMKC 
L. REV. 419, 427–28 (2002). For earlier discussions from Robert Westley, see the often cited 
work, Robert Westley, White Normativity and the Racial Rhetoric of Equal Protection, in 
EXISTENCE IN BLACK: AN ANTHOLOGY OF BLACK EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY 92 (Lewis R. 
Gordon ed., 1997); Robert Westley, Lat Crit Theory and the Problematics of Inter-
nal/External Oppression: A Comparison of Forms of Oppression and Inter-
Group/IntraGroup Solidarity, 53 U. MIA. L. REV. 761, 763 (1999) (“The belief that to be 
light or white is intrinsically and aesthetically better than to be dark or black is a dynamic 
that reflects white normativity and leads to internalized oppression within communities of 
color.”); see also RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 76 (2001) (“Whiteness is also normative, maybe even a kind of property. It 
sets the standard. Other groups, such as Indians, Latinos, Asian Americans, and African 
Americans, are described as nonwhite. That is, they are defined in terms of or in opposition 
to whiteness—that which they are not.”). 
115  Margaret Montoya & Christine Zuni Cruz, Narrative Braids: Performing Racial Litera-
cy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153, 170 (2009). 
116  Peter Goodrich & Linda G. Mills, The Law of White Spaces: Race, Culture, and Legal 
Education, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 15 (2001). 
117  Montoya & Zuni Cruz, supra note 115 (quoting Goodrich & Mills, supra note 116, at 
16). 
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Zuni Cruz adds that the law of white spaces is the denial of the “introduc-
tion of race and color” within the dominant spaces of society—an “unspoken 
code.”118 
In the following decades the narrative of white normativity has evolved to 
a universal, social idea that falsely perpetuates whiteness as the absence of an 
ethnic identity. For example, Professor Cheryl Harris rejects the notion that 
“white normativity—the idea that white spaces (and for that matter white peo-
ple) are unmarked by race[; rather] there is no domain where race is not pre-
sent.”119 Relying on Westley’s work, Professor Imani Perry comments that 
“[w]hite normativity persists, rearticulated as a social ideal of colorblindness 
and equality of opportunity. Moreover, because of the persistence of even ra-
cialized white normativity, state racial policy, under the banner of colorblind-
ness and equality of opportunity, can now be formulated without appearing to 
be racial at all.”120 Professor Frank Rudy Cooper defines white normativity as 
that which is “deemed universal” because it “comports with the norms of upper 
middle-class white culture.”121 And not only is the myth of race as distinct from 
whiteness advanced, but that which is privileged (lack of cultural and social de-
ficiencies) is normal, normal is white, and white is American.122 
 
118  Id. (citing Goodrich & Mills, supra note 116). See also Margaret E. Montoya, Máscaras 
y Trenzas: Reflexiones Un Proyecto de Identidad y Análisis a Través de Veinte Años, 32 
CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 7, 8 (2014) (“The voices of the Latina poets in the epigrams 
echo my personal voice in the stories. Similarly, my professional voice in the expository text 
echoes the voices of predominantly Latina/o social scientists, linguists, and other scholars in 
the footnotes. The use of Spanish and the Latina/o voices expose and disrupt the hegemony 
of the White space of the legal academy. Here, ‘White’ encompasses not only the racially 
dominant group, the dominant cultural norms of the law school classroom and legal dis-
course, including law journals, but also the whiteness of the blank page that entices the writ-
er. My intent is to change the White space of classroom and the journal into multicultural, 
cross-racial, and multilingual canvasses.” (footnote omitted)). 
119  Cheryl I. Harris, Mining in Hard Ground, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2487, 2535 (2003) (review-
ing LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY (2002)). 
120  Imani Perry, Occupying the Universal, Embodying the Subject, 17 L. & LITERATURE 97, 
122 (2005) (quoting Westley, White Normativity and the Rhetoric of Equal Protection, supra 
note 114, at 92). 
121  Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-Racialism and the Gates Controversy: The 
False Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV. L.J. 1, 36 (2010). 
122  See William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: An Introduc-
tion, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 11, 13 (2012) (“White normativity enhances the veneer of neutrality, 
because whites believe that their life trajectories and their access to opportunity are the norm 
and therefore are actually shared equally by everyone in society.”); Vinay Harpalani, 
DesiCrit: Theorizing the Racial Ambiguity of South Asian Americans, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 77, 169 (2013) (“This connection has led some observers to charge that South Asian 
and other youth who engage hip hop are ‘trying to be black.’ Professor Sharma contends that 
such accusations are rooted in a notion of white normativity, which equates ‘American’ with 
‘White.’ These accusations also underscore the continuing significance of the black-white 
paradigm of race in America—even for individuals who are not classified or identified as 
black or white.” (quoting Raesham Chopra Nijhon, Making Brown Like Dat: South Asians 
and Hip Hop, in DESI RAP: HIP HOP AND SOUTH ASIAN AMERICA 79, 97 (Ajay Nair & Murali 
Balaji eds., 2008)). 
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More recent definitions are offered by Professors Michael Morris and Jas-
mine Gonzales Rose, both of whom also connect whiteness to normality. Mor-
ris in his work, Standard White: Dismantling White Normativity,123 reviews 
Professor Ian Haney Lopez’ book, White by Law.124 In broadly defining white 
normativity, Morris summarizes its basic principles as: 
[W]hite people are people, and the members of other racial groups are people to 
the extent they resemble white people. While easily intertwined with overt dis-
crimination or racial animus, white normativity operates more subtly. Whiteness 
defines the normal or accepted range of conduct and characteristics, and all other 
racial categories are contrasted with whiteness as deviations from the norm. As a 
result, whiteness sits at the center of racial categorization. White normativity 
functions to make whites “standard” or “typical” but not always explicitly supe-
rior.125 
Similarly, Gonzales Rose, in Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evi-
dence,126 examines white privilege in the law of evidence, focusing in part on 
“how white norms and white transparency play a role in admissibility determi-
nations.”127 Of relevance, she notes, 
White normativity is the implicit belief that white ideas, practices, and experi-
ences are inherently normal, natural, and right. . . . The imposition of white 
norms is a form of implicit bias which differs from traditional discrimination 
law’s fixation with race-based animosity and impetus. White normativity and 
transparency inflict as much damage as overt discrimination and are even more 
pervasive and difficult to remedy under our current jurisprudence.128 
Next, if we are willing to accept (or at least consider) white normativity as 
an implicit social belief, it is not strenuous to suggest that this belief permeates 
the legal profession, one of largest and oldest professions, and its preceding le-
gal education. To this point, Professor Teri McMurtry-Chubb argues that white 
privilege and white normativity is perpetuated by and manifest through the ob-
jectivity in the legal curriculum. In her work, Still Writing at the Master’s Ta-
ble, she exposes popularity of Christopher Langdell’s traditional case method 
 
123  Michael Morris, Standard White: Dismantling White Normativity, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 
949 (2016). 
124  Id. at 949. (“Standard White reviews WHITE BY LAW by Ian Haney López and examines 
the content and construction of whiteness as a racial category.”). 
125  Id. at 952; see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, A New Southern Strategy of Mul-
tigroup Oppression: A Response to Standard White by Michael Morris, 7 CALIF. L. REV. 
ONLINE 49, 79 (2016) (agreeing with Morris’ notion challenging a “prevailing conception of 
white normativity” as a “benchmark or ideal that places white habits, practices, and norms 
on a pedestal and then demands that minorities measure up[,]” believing too that “casting 
aside white hegemony is considerably harder than we like to believe it is.”). 
126  Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. L. 
REV. 2243 (2017). 
127  Id. at 2252. 
128  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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study as a strategic and sanitary response to an “Industrial America” that need-
ed “legal protections [for capitalism] to survive.”129 She writes: 
The most heavily weighted courses in Langdell’s Gilded Age curriculum remain 
a fixture of the 1L legal curriculum to this day: Property, Equity (Equitable 
Remedies), Contracts, and Torts. These courses endure as a reflection of and 
tools to maintain the imperialist, capitalist, white supremacist patriarchy. 
     Legal scholars [have] critique[d] the case method of study for its sanitary 
presentation of the law as unmarred by history, politics, and human experience. 
By elevating the study of appellate cases, narrowly drawn legal narratives 
framed to serve the interests of stare decisis (precedent) and maintain Western 
cannons of rhetoric, legal education became prescriptive.130 
The notion of legal education as prescriptive, in other words as rigid and 
dogmatic, echoes the earlier work of Hurston, who was critical of the Talented 
Tenth Race Champions. The “Talented Tenth” is both an essay title and phrase 
W.E.B. Du Bois made popular in the 1903 book, The Negro Problem,131 a col-
lection of several essays by well-known African American writers of the era.132 
Du Bois used this term to describe the necessity for the top 10 percent of Black 
America to rise as intellectual leaders in order to counter the growing class of 
industrial Blacks, lest Black people remain in second-class citizenship.133 
Hurston’s critique of the Talented Tenth rose from their repeated silo of the 
uniqueness and life experiences of African American people, like that of “other 
 
129  McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 93, at 270. 
130  Id. at 270–71 (footnotes omitted); see also Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Train-
ing for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 54, 61 (David Kairys 
ed., 3rd ed. 1990) (criticizing the legal curriculum structure, noting that the rules in the first-
year courses “are the ground rules of late-nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism. Teach-
ers teach them as though they had an inner logic, as an exercise in legal reasoning, with poli-
cy.”). What resonates most from McMurtry-Chubb’s work is this picture of the legal profes-
sion, with all the rights, privileges, and protections it affords, built by a largely “White” male 
community as a means of self-preservation based on rapid economic growth. On the one 
hand, I can accept that at its inception, the legal profession never intended to bear the reality 
of my human experience. On the other hand, it is unsettling that in the twenty-first century 
this profession continues to be marked by systems and structures from its birth, which still 
resist bearing the reality of brown- and black-skinned experiences. 
131  DuBoisopedia, Talented Tenth, http://scua.library.umass.edu/duboisopedia/doku.php?id= 
about:talented_tenth [https://perma.cc/FY38-YYRV]; W.E.B. Du Bois, The Talented Tenth, 
TEACHING AM. HISTORY, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/the-talented-
tenth/ [https://perma.cc/8C6S-PGV4]. 
132  W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Talented Tenth, in BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, THE NEGRO 
PROBLEM (Suzanne Shell et al eds., 2005), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/15041/15041-
h/15041-h.htm [https://perma.cc/V7CQ-VQWN] (ebook produced by Project Gutenberg) 
(“The problem of education, then, among Negroes must first of all deal with the Talented 
Tenth; it is the problem of developing the Best of this race that they may guide the Mass 
away from the contamination and death of the Worst, in their own and other races.”). 
133  See id.; Talented Tenth, BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Talented-
Tenth#ref930550 [https://perma.cc/J29W-CN5Q]. I retain Du Bois’ use of “Black” in this 
reference. 
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humans,” into the “Race problem.”134 The abandoned originality, the monotony 
of prose that reified historical boundaries, lured the “Black” man into “follow-
ing in the groove of the Race champions,”135 in the same way rigid methodolo-
gy, objectivity, and neutrality have lured legal pedagogy and legal education 
into following in the groove of normative whiteness. 
To McMurtry-Chubb’s argument that objectivity in legal education perpet-
uates the larger “race” problem of white normativity, we can add Professor 
Duncan Kennedy’s reflections on classroom tone as being defined by white, 
male, and middle-class. In Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy,136 Ken-
nedy argues that whiteness plays a significant role in producing hierarchy in 
legal education. Specifically, he argues that the “White” male professional uni-
verse of law schools becomes the cultural standard or barometer by which eve-
ry outsider, from professor to student, is measured.137 It is unlikely that differ-
ing opinions will yield problems for students, but confrontation may arise if 
students “refuse to adopt the highly cognitive, dominating mode of discourse 
that everyone identifies as lawyerlike.”138 That is, 
[s]tudents who are women or black or working class find out something im-
portant about the professional universe from the first day of class: that it is not 
even nominally pluralist in cultural terms. The teacher sets the tone—a white, 
male, middle-class tone. Students adapt. They do so partly out of fear, partly out 
of hope of gain, partly out of genuine admiration for their role models. But the 
line between adaptation to the intellectual and skills content of legal education 
and adaptation to the white, male, middle-class cultural style is a fine one, easily 
lost sight of.139 
 
134  Hurston, supra note 39, at 22, 24 (“It was so easy to become a Race Leader in those days. 
So few Negroes knew how to read and write that any black man who was proficient in these 
arts was something to be wondered at.”). 
135  Id. at 24. 
136  See Kennedy, supra note 130, at 54. 
137  Id. at 69; see also Montoya, supra note 118, at 11 (discussing how as a Brown law pro-
fessor, her “Buenos Días” greeting to her students is sometimes met with “remonstrative 
‘Good Mornings[]’ [which] . . . scornful or scolding tone and hard eyes that accompany 
their English greetings [, she interprets] as pushback to what [she] ha[s] to say[,]” and af-
firmatively declaring that she is “not stepping out of a stereotype to make White people 
more comfortable.” (emphasis in original)). 
138  See Kennedy, supra note 130, at 69. 
139  See id. at 69–70 (emphasis added) (discussing the hierarchical problems for non-white 
male law students particularly in the classroom, noting that certain disparities between how 
professors treat non-dominant students may easily be seen as “enforced cultural uniformity 
[and] oppressive, but somewhat more difficult to see it [is] as training, especially if you are 
aware of it and hate it. But it is training nonetheless. You will pick up mannerisms, ways of 
speaking, gestures, that would be ‘neutral’ if they were not emblematic of membership in the 
universe of the bar. You will come to expect that as a lawyer you will live in a world in 
which essential parts of you are not represented, or are misrepresented, and in which things 
you don’t like will be accepted to the point that it doesn’t occur to people that they are even 
controversial.”). Kennedy’s quote also raises the reality of code-switching for those in the 
non-dominant group, also perhaps out of fear, gain, or adaptation. See, e.g., Taylyn Wash-
ington-Harmon, Code-Switching: What Does It Mean and Why Do People Do It?, MSN: 
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Finally, legal writing pedagogy, as a critical microcosm of legal education, 
is susceptible to the ills of white normativity. Like Glinda’s larger-than-life 
character, IRAC’s objective methodology and ability to avoid oppression is se-
ductively simple,140 and it is the culprit that mirrors white normativity. As the 
prior discussion has highlighted, white normativity is in its glory when its “ide-
as, practices, and experiences are inherently normal, natural, and right.”141 
Scholars focused on ethnicity, both inside and outside the legal writing disci-
pline, demonstrate the influence of whiteness in legal writing through reductive 
and objective paradigms and the accompanying professional voice. 
To start, Stanchi’s work, in a beautifully radical way, unmasks white nor-
mativity in legal writing.142 Her work exposes how white normativity can drive 
a wedge between marginalized groups and legal writing pedagogy based large-
ly on legal writing’s feigned objectivity. In her piece, Resistance Is Futile: How 
Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider 
 
HEALTH (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.msn.com/en-us/health/wellness/code-switching-what-
does-it-mean-and-why-do-people-do-it/ar-BB17VPcx [https://perma.cc/2ZPD-8QER]; Vi-
nay Harpalani, “Safe Spaces” and the Educational Benefits of Diversity, 13 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 147 & n.139 (2017) (“Minority students must adapt to majority group 
norms: they must learn to act, speak, and present themselves differently in majority White 
settings than they might in safe spaces or other non-White majority spaces” and referencing 
“[t]he phenomenon of ‘code switching’–where minority group members employ different 
language dialects around White Americans than they do when with members of their own 
group–is also well-documented.” (referencing CODESWITCHING (Carol M. Eastman ed., 
1992); Charles E. DeBose, Codeswitching: Black English and Standard English in the Afri-
can American Linguistic Repertoire, 13 J. MULTILINGUAL & MULTICULTURAL DEV. 157 
(1992))). 
140  See Toni M. Fine, Comments on IRAC, 10 THE SECOND DRAFT 7, 8 (1995) (“What we as 
legal educators need to keep in mind when we present concepts like IRAC to our students is 
that such constructs are only starting points for developing the best analytic model or models 
for a given task. The critical focus should remain on the process of developing and executing 
a framework for analysis rather than on the rote application of any predetermined anachro-
nistic method.”). 
141  Gonzales Rose, supra note 126, at 2252. 
142  Stanchi also speaks to white normativity in professional voice. See, e.g., Stanchi, supra 
note 12, at 49–50 (“So, for example, a woman who pauses before answering is unsure, a man 
who pauses is thoughtful. Or, a person of color who speaks in a confident or non-
conciliatory way is ‘uppity,’ but a white person speaking the same way is ‘confident.’ ” 
(footnotes omitted)). For related discussion on linguistic profiling, see Michael Erard, Lan-
guage Matters, 5 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 225, 226 (2003) (discussing the experience of 
Stanford University linguist John Baugh during his move to Palo Alto, California, where, 
having grown up with the ability to switch from Standard to Black to Chicano English based 
on his situation, he relied on his professional voice when looking for housing, but that “when 
the landlords met him in person, . . . things quickly changed;” and it was “when he spoke in 
Standard English[,] he set up far more appointments in predominantly white areas than when 
he spoke in his other dialects.”); Dawn L. Smalls, Linguistic Profiling and the Law, 15 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 579, 582 (2004) (discussing John Baugh’s experience and housing stories 
of people of color). I recognize that “white” is not a monolithic voice, as there are variants of 
whiteness and white voices. See generally Barbara Ellen Smith, De-Gradations of White-
ness: Appalachia and the Complexities of Race, 10 J. APPALACHIAN STUD. 38 (2004). 
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Voices,143 Stanchi posits that although “objectivity is a hallmark of legal lan-
guage,”144 it is fiction to suggest that the law is either objective or neutral.145 
Indeed, legal writing has its own “vocabulary and register of legal language” 
that can mute outsider voices based on hidden or explicit biases in a supposedly 
neutral judicial opinion.146 To this point she comments that “the foundation for 
legal language and reasoning is the experiences of the ‘dominant group,’ which 
has the luxury of terming its members’ experiences and perspectives ‘objective’ 
and pushing aside other experiences and perspectives as outside the norm.”147 
If, as Stanchi articulates, the very foundation of legal reasoning is biased to-
ward insiders,148 and IRAC functions as a “simple tool” for constructing legal 
analysis (which includes legal reasoning), then IRAC may blindly accommo-
date a biased legal vocabulary as normative.149 Outsider voices are naïve to this 
assimilation. 
Similar to Stanchi, Professor Margaret Montoya acknowledges the nexus 
of white normativity with good legal analysis and moves from resistance to-
 
143  Stanchi, supra note 12, at 7, 11 (discussing the process method and the social view meth-
od, both being “built around the idea that legal writing is a way of teaching law as a lan-
guage.”). 
144  Id. at 35. 
145  Id. at 36. 
146  See id. at 36, 41 (“The gap is widened further by the fiction that judicial opinions are ob-
jective and neutral, and therefore represent the writer's professional, not personal, voice. To 
many outsider law students, judicial opinions seem biased in a racial, ethnic, sexist, or heter-
ocentric way, yet legal writing and lawyering require them to use the law without consider-
ing the hidden bias. In addition, the alienation is compounded by the requirement that the 
conventions of legal writing require that the writer’s opinion be expressed without the use of 
the first-person pronoun. For outsider writers, who may already feel like their ‘I’ is not a part 
of the law, the banishment of the explicit ‘I’ from a document purporting to represent the 
writers’ opinion means that these writers are further divorced from the document and from 
their professional voices.” (footnote omitted)). 
147  Id. at 17, 37 (emphasis added) (discussing muted group theory as elevating the language 
of the dominant group, which creates and controls the primary means of communicating; 
thus “the only mode of expression that is heard or listened to is the dominant language.”); 
see also Culver, Conscious Identity Performance, supra note 4, at 588–90 (discussing origin 
of muted group theory as a useful framework for analyzing identity performance for margin-
alized groups); Jewel, supra note 12, at 1061 (discussing the reasonable man as 
“[w]hite/[a]nglo-[s]axon” and arguing that “reason, as it turns out, has a long history of ex-
alting the Anglo-Saxon race as a superior race over all others.”). 
148  Stanchi, supra note 12, at 9, 55 (“But, because legal writing pedagogy reflects the biases 
in legal language (including legal reasoning), its effectiveness in ‘socializing’ law students 
comes at the price of suppressing the voices of those who have already been historically 
marginalized by legal language.”). 
149  Id. at 24–26 (discussing the well-known traffic-stop case of Dujon Johnson, a Black male 
who was represented by a white male attorney, Professor Clark Cunningham, and noting that 
to Mr. Johnson, the “fundamental issue in the case was how his dignity and respect were tak-
en from him by the police officer, who treated Mr. Johnson like a surly teenager, in part be-
cause he was black and had the temerity to challenge the officer’s authority[;]” however, 
“[i]n the final analysis, although under traditional legal principles Mr. Johnson ‘won,’ Mr. 
Johnson was unhappy with the outcome because his perspective and voice were squelched 
by the legal framework.”). 
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ward challenging its very existence. In an interview where she used narrative to 
expose objectivity in legal discourse, she remarked that when law faculty was 
predominately white male “there was largely an acceptance of objectivity as a 
characteristic of good, legal analysis.”150 But the diversification of the legal 
academy, then and now, growing to include more white women and people of 
color, “explode[s] this objectivity.”151 In short, a “story can be told from an ob-
jective frame” but there is also another way of telling it “that is equally legiti-
mate[, and] [t]here is still a battle in the classroom for how things are 
taught . . . .”152 
There is a battle in the classroom indeed. The fight is not a visible one over 
preferred writing models; it is an obscure struggle, broadly, over identity for-
mation, and more discreetly to reimagine and reshape the whole of legal analy-
sis for novice law students. To push against the privileged characteristics and 
attributes of IRAC—largely driven by an objective methodology, blindness to 
oppression, and preferred dominant group professional voice—that replicates 
the subtle way in which white normativity “defin[es] the perspective from 
which acceptability is judged.”153 All law students, not just those from tradi-
 
150  Montoya & Zuni Cruz, supra note 115, at 161. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. (emphasis added). 
153  Morris, supra note 123, at 955 (2016) (“Because society treats whiteness as neutral, the 
benefits that accrue to whites are taken as givens. Those benefits pass almost unnoticed, be-
cause they are simply the way the system is supposed to work. Put another way, the status of 
whites represents how our social, political, and legal systems are meant to function—and 
validates that functioning—while the status of other groups represents those systems’ inevi-
table imperfections.”); see also William M. Wiecek, supra note 122, at 11–12 (examining 
structural racism and white advantage, noting not only black subordination as “one side of 
the coin of racism” but also the other side being “what is frequently termed ‘white privilege.’ 
When legal analysis ignores this issue, it reinforces what sociologists call ‘white normativi-
ty.’ Whites unthinkingly assume that their privileged situation is the norm, and that all others 
could experience it too, were it not for those others’ deficiencies (originally taken to be ra-
cial/biological, now assumed to be cultural and social). . . .The point here is . . . the whites’ 
unthinking assumption that they are ‘normal people,’ while African-Americans are some-
thing else, not ‘normal.’ White advantage offers the bonus of enabling its beneficiaries to 
assume that benefits accruing to them are normal as well, and thus are natural entitlements. 
For whites, their race is invisible, and their superordinate status is normal. Whites do not see 
their relatively privileged position as a built-in advantage.” (referencing work by Peggy 
McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, in RE-VISIONING FAMILY 
THERAPY: RACE, CULTURE, AND GENDER IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 147, 147 (Monica McGol-
drick ed., 1998); WILDMAN, supra note 62; LINDA FAYE WILLIAMS, THE CONSTRAINT OF 
RACE: LEGACIES OF WHITE SKIN PRIVILEGE IN AMERICA 2 (2003); WHITE PRIVILEGE: 
ESSENTIAL READINGS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF RACISM 1 (Paula S. Rothenberg ed., 2005); 
Stephanie M. Wildman, The Persistence of White Privilege, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 245 
(2005); Westley, supra note 114; Kari L. Karsjens & JoAnna M. Johnson, White Normativity 
and Subsequent Critical Race Deconstruction of Bioethics, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 22 (2003))); 
DeLeith Duke Gossett, Take Off the [Color] Blinders: How Ignoring the Hague Conven-
tion’s Subsidiarity Principle Furthers Structural Racism Against Black American Children, 
55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 261, 283 (2015) (“As some suggest, perhaps the greatest privilege 
of being white is that whites are not daily confronted with their race. Yet, when the issue is 
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tionally marginalized groups, benefit when, as Freire’s work illustrates, the ob-
jective posture is honest with the value of and need for the subjective voice.154 
Feigned liberation harms everyone. It is my hope that this Article will join the 
ranks of earlier scholars whose work has been strategic in reclaiming this 
space. 
Despite the rich discussion about IRAC, recall that it is the necessary pro-
tagonist starting point, but it is not the destination. And whether the legal acad-
emy collectively agrees on IRAC’s ethnic identity, the very passionate discus-
sion about its presence, let alone its identity, for decades,155 highlights the 
problem I seek to counter: its dominance and popularity. As the next section 
explores, IRAC has, in every sense of the word, become this popular writing 
formula—this noun turned verb—as the way to write like a lawyer. 
B. Popular: On IRAC’s Rise to Dominance 
“Whenever I see someone less fortunate than I 
(and let’s face it—who isn’t less fortunate than I?) 
My tender heart tends to start to bleed . . .  
I simply have to take over 
I know I know exactly what they need . . .  
Don’t worry—I’m determined to succeed 
Follow my lead 
And yes, indeed 
You will be . . . Popular!” 
 —Glinda the “Good Witch”156 
First year law students begin law school with little to no experience on how 
to engage in critical thinking like many lawyers. It follows then that they arrive 
to their first-year courses equally unable to dole out complex legal analysis as 
seasoned lawyers. This lack of inherent knowledge of lawyering skills is a nat-
ural gap that should exist between college and law school, and, as Professor 
Sherri Keene observes, should also keep, in particular, legal writing professors’ 
expectations humble.157 But what faculty are less likely prepared for is stu-
 
ignored, it reinforces what sociologists have termed ‘white normativity.’ Whites begin to 
think that their privileged status is the norm, and that they are entitled to any benefits accru-
ing to them under that system.” (citing Barbara J. Flagg, ‘Was Blind, But Now I See’: White 
Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 
969 (1993); other footnotes omitted)). 
154  See discussion of PAULO FREIRE, supra notes 92, 99–102, 104–05 and accompanying 
text. 
155  See, e.g., The Value of IRAC, supra note 60, at 1. 
156  Stephen Schwartz, Wicked, “Popular” Lyrics, MUSICALSCHWARTZ, http://musicalschwar 
tz.com/wicked-lyrics-popular.htm [https://perma.cc/BGZ6-BE2X]. 
157  Sherri Lee Keene, Are We There Yet? Aligning the Expectations and Realities of Gaining 
Competency in Legal Writing, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 99, 108 (2015) (commenting on the expecta-
tions of law faculty who teach upper-level courses, who believe “students [should] be pre-
21 NEV. L.J. 655 
Spring 2021] (UN)WICKED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS 689 
dents’ raw and unrefined lawyering identity that is susceptible to most any 
spark of legitimacy. 
In Wicked, Glinda’s character embodies feigned legitimacy—or perhaps 
just spark. Shortly after we learn of the mutual loathing between the witches, 
Glinda solo’s the quirky musical number “Popular,” where with every “flip 
flip”158 of her perfectly coifed blond curls she fully embraces her unearned 
claim to fame. At this point in the musical, the two witches are slowly becom-
ing secret friends, so Glinda commits to making Elphaba popular. During one 
of their early girl talk scenes, Glinda scoffs at the idea that “[c]elebrated heads 
of state or [s]pecially great communicators” somehow possess “brains or 
knowledge.”159 To the contrary, she reveals the secret truth behind their sup-
posed power: “They were popular! Please—It’s all about popular! It’s not 
about aptitude, It’s the way you’re viewed . . . .”160 As Elphaba watches Glinda 
flit about the stage, filling Elphaba’s head with a vision of popularity, Glinda 
closes out the song with one clear stipulation: “You’ll be popular, [j]ust not as 
quite as popular as me!”161 
While popular, as an obvious point almost from the start, Glinda’s charac-
ter is also intended to be a superficial, self-centered, “goodie goodie.”162 De-
spite this major character flaw, however, her simplicity is quite seductive,163 
both to the on-stage cast that revere her, and to the viewing audience, who—in 
my six viewings of this Broadway musical—never fails to erupt with cheers 
and hollering at the end of her number. I posit that the seduction is certainly at-
tributed, in part, to the magnificent casting of this character. But to the broader 
point of this Article, the seduction is also subtle in its cheery and unassuming 
delight in wondering if Elphaba will assimilate. 
IRAC’s own lure toward assimilation has existed for decades based on its 
overwhelming dominance. As previously discussed, many prominent legal 
 
pared as they enter their second year, to engage in increasingly complex legal analysis and 
writing, in a variety of forms, without the need for significant formal instruction and with 
decreased faculty supervision.”). 
158  Wicked Script, Act I, Scene 10, Popular, ALLMUSICALS.COM, https://www.allmusicals.co 
m/lyrics/wicked/script.htm [https://perma.cc/6UGB-5TVY]. 
159  Wicked, Popular Lyrics, ALLMUSICALS.COM, https://www.allmusicals.com/lyrics/wicked/ 
popular.htm [https://perma.cc/W9A7-ZJTF]. 
160  Id. 
161  Id. 
162  Carol de Giere, Wicked Characters: Who’s Who in Wicked the Musical and Novel, 
MUSICALSCHWARTZ, http://www.musicalschwartz.com/wicked-characters.htm [https://perma 
.cc/CJ46-UDFZ] (“Both the novel and musical introduce Glinda as her younger self, Galinda 
Upland of the Upper Uplands, a blatantly self-centered young blond. Gregory Maguire disas-
sociated her from an archetypal ‘good’ to make her a pretentious goodie goodie. The musi-
cal’s writers juxtaposed the two women who were superficially ‘bad (or misfit)’ and ‘good’ 
but underneath were nearly the opposite (until Glinda evolves as a person).”). 
163  See Cort, supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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writing scholars discussed the various features of IRAC circa 1995.164 Despite 
offering a sense of structure in drafting a legal analysis, much of legal scholar-
ship that discusses what comprises good legal writing rarely situates the con-
versation within a formulaic paradigm that leaves little room for thoughtful po-
sitioning and inclusion of information. In fact, for decades “the legal writing 
academy has recognized the limitations of IRAC, and criticisms of the para-
digm have steadily mounted.”165 For example, Calleros called for a tentative 
approach to IRAC, “because we should teach students to feel secure to depart 
from IRAC in any document, such as a complaint, in which they can best meet 
their objectives with a different framework” and for a general approach, “be-
cause students should use it only as a general framework that can be adapted to 
varying circumstances.”166 Professor Linda Edwards eloquently categorizes the 
bulk of the criticisms into three categories: “(1) discomfort with using any heu-
ristic model; (2) the perception that an IRAC format does not accommodate 
forms of reasoning other than rule-based reasoning; and (3) dissatisfaction with 
 
164  For a rich conversation within the legal writing community on the applicability and fra-
gility of IRAC, see The Value of IRAC, supra note 60, at 1 (providing a special edition of the 
journal that contains numerous short articles from legal writing professors on the value and 
limitations of IRAC in the first year curriculum, such as offering a simplistic way to organize 
a legal analysis for novice writers, but also if relied upon to heavily, stunting law students 
ability to provide adequate analytical depth). 
165  Graham, supra note 70, at 681; see, e.g., Beazley, supra note 68, at 1 (“IRAC may not be 
the key to all legal analysis, but as a simple mnemonic that’s helpful to most legal writers—
and most legal readers—it’s great.”); Cort, supra note 74, at 5, 6 (“Most students learn the 
basic model readily enough. But what some students do not necessarily see intuitively, and 
what a teacher may not teach explicitly, is that legal analysis typically involves a series of 
nested IRACs—IRACs within IRACs, wheels within wheels. The student may not see that 
the overall IRAC—the main conclusion—is based on examination of the result of each ele-
ment’s IRAC. Lacking that insight, the student is likely to short circuit the scope of the nec-
essary analysis and not understand why. The student does not see that each element of a rule 
calls for its own IRAC analysis.”); Jane Kent Gionfriddo, Our Focus Should be Analysis, 
Not Formulas Like IRAC, 10 THE SECOND DRAFT 2 (1995) (“Students who do use this type of 
formula too often follow its format without thinking enough about the process of legal analy-
sis. They try to fit their ideas into the ‘pigeon holes’ or labels of the formula’s structure, 
without fully understanding why they are doing what they do or how they should come up 
with the necessary analysis.”); Barbara Blumenfeld, Why IRAC Should Be IGPAC, 10 THE 
SECOND DRAFT 4 (1995) (“But, whether IRAC or IGPAC is used, students must be reminded 
that it is not an end in itself. They must understand that their goal is to present an analysis 
that is legally sound and that the reader of their document can follow and understand.”); Kim 
Cauthorn, Keep on “TRRACING,” 10 THE SECOND DRAFT 5 (1995) (“My next reaction to the 
question posed is the recognition that, unless carefully taught, students will both misuse and 
abuse any method for structuring written legal analysis. In other words, as law students and 
later as lawyers, they will stuff every exam answer, legal memorandum discussion section, 
motion argument, and appellate brief argument into one giant IRAC without really under-
standing the paradigm’s proper function and without fully analyzing all of the legal ques-
tions presented by the problem.”). 
166  Calleros, supra note 69, at 4. 
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the IRAC format itself.”167 Edwards then reminds the legal writing community 
of the limited purpose of IRAC, or any of its versions, stating that: 
[t]he format is designed to help a novice writer organize the discussion of a sin-
gle legal issue—that is, a single element or condition. That’s all. It guides the 
writer in stating the issue or conclusion on that element, in stating and explain-
ing the governing law on that element, in applying that law to the facts, and in 
stating a conclusion. 
We become frustrated with IRAC, and understandably so, when we expect it to 
do more than organize the discussion of a single element. Most legal questions 
raise issues about more than one element or condition, and the IRAC format 
does not provide an “umbrella” organization. It does not help the writer assem-
ble these individual discussions of separate elements.168 
Most enlightening about Edwards’ statement is the awareness, perhaps ob-
vious, that our frustration is a result of unmet expectations. Legal writing pro-
fessors have the benefit of a vantage point to see the value and limitations of 
IRAC, enabling them to modify its structure to respond to the needs of the au-
dience or client, or to confront larger social or policy issues. 
As this Article asserts, using Wicked to reveal the untold story of the Ana-
lytical Framework underscores the limitations of IRAC. The Wizard of Oz mov-
ie alone prevented us from truly learning about the life of the Wicked Witch of 
the West. She was more than prematurely developed; she was truncated to 
shrill music and a horrible demise. What is more problematic is that The Wiz-
ard of Oz, intentionally, did not awaken in us a desire to even care about her. 
[A scary premise when we consider the voices left out of many judicial opin-
ions and our students unwavering reliance and trust in them as objective, neu-
tral, and holistic examinations of the law]. Wicked revived her. And our view 
not only of Wicked, but of The Wizard of Oz, was better for this prequel. In like 
form, when “good legal writing” is falsely reduced to formulaic paradigms, a 
set of skills, or “treat[ed] . . . as a singular activity,”169 the students actual learn-
ing process is prematurely truncated because “most legal skills cannot be easily 
segregated from legal theory and doctrine but instead require attorneys to apply 
 
167  Linda H. Edwards, IRAC Format Accomplishes the Limited Purpose It Is Designed to 
Achieve, 10 THE SECOND DRAFT 7 (1995); see also Jo Anne Durako, Evolution of IRAC: A 
Useful First Step, 10 THE SECOND DRAFT 6 (1995) (noting IRAC or its iterations provides 
“no call for counter-analysis or consideration of policy implications . . . .”); Fine, supra note 
140, at 7 (“[T]he IRAC method of teaching legal analysis is overly simplistic and too formu-
laic to be an adequate approach for the wide range of projects that most students will en-
counter in practice. In part because tools like IRAC are introduced to students at the very 
beginning of their legal careers, when subtleties of the emphasis to be given to certain rules 
may be lost, students often come away with the mistaken notion that IRAC may be appropri-
ately used at all times and for all purposes. Clearly it is not.”). 
168  Edwards, supra note 167, at 7 (emphasis added). 
169  Keene, supra note 157, at 103, 109–11, 128–29 (“[L]egal educators will better meet the 
needs of their students if they recognize that legal writing takes various forms, covers differ-
ent subjects, speaks to different audiences, and serves different purposes. Students will be 
better served if professors acknowledge the breadth of legal writing and avoid setting expec-
tations for them based upon a one–size–fits–all perspective.”). 
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their knowledge of the law to accomplish specific tasks in the course of client 
representation.”170 This arbitrary skills/theory divide is an ache that the legal 
writing community has borne for years. 
Even after decades of IRAC-bullying, which subjected the paradigm to a 
rigorous litmus test of usefulness and viability, IRAC’s dominance is present 
and problematic in legal education. As proof, despite the clear conclusion that 
this paradigm failed to prepare budding lawyers for the necessary depths and 
complexity of legal analysis, the resolution has not been an erasure of the term, 
as even Graham suggests,171 but a legion of add-ons that inflated an already 
dominant paradigm.172 For example, an additional “R” would help students re-
member the Rule and the rule’s Reasoning,173 or a “long A” could remind stu-
dents to not just Apply the law, but to think through counter-Analysis and poli-
cy arguments;174 or, a bit more complex suggestions included appending 
another acronym to IRAC, such as “ ‘(QfrFR)+IRAC’ in which Q = question, fr 
= the entire set of possibly relevant facts and rules, and FR = relevant fact(s) 
and rules used to formulate the I of IRAC.”175 All of these iterations are valua-
ble to the extent they reflect agreed-upon and overlapping conventions of legal 
analysis. But the constant of IRAC’s presence, as a base, underscores the point 
that after decades of deliberation over the value of IRAC as a tool in legal writ-
 
170  Sherri Lee Keene, One Small Step for Legal Writing, One Giant Leap for Legal Educa-
tion: Making the Case for More Writing Opportunities in the “Practice-Ready” Law School 
Curriculum, 65 MERCER L. REV. 467, 475 (2014) (“The current ‘practice-ready’ debate sug-
gests that the learning of legal theory and practice are separate and distinct activities, with 
each needing to occupy a separate space in the law school curriculum. However, to the con-
trary, most legal skills cannot be easily segregated from legal theory and doctrine, but in-
stead require attorneys to apply their knowledge of the law to accomplish specific tasks in 
the course of client representation.”). 
171  Graham, supra note 70, at 709–10 (discussing opportunities to provide students with the 
tools to “talk about writing in a sophisticated and meaningful way’ . . . without the necessity 
of agreeing upon any one paradigm, using a variety of plain-language terms that will reso-
nate and ‘stick’ with our students . . . .This can be done easily without continually mention-
ing the IRAC ‘formula.’ ” (quoting Terrill Pollman & Judith M. Stinson, IRLAFARC! Sur-
veying the Language of Legal Writing, 56 ME. L. REV. 239, 245 (2004))). Graham further 
suggests that legal writing professors should focus on pre-writing to get students thinking 
about IRAC in a recursive as opposed to linear way, and use terms like “intellectual loca-
tion,” “intellectual weight,” to help students think about the best memo structure; and 
“roadmap,” “landscape,” “broad governing rule,” “sub-rules,” for example, for rule devel-
opment and placement, and so forth. Id. at 709–11. 
172  See, e.g., id. at 712 (calling the additional letters to IRAC “an explosion of alternative 
acronyms.”). See generally The Value of IRAC, supra note 60 (offering several iterations of 
IRAC from legal writing professors across the country); Pollman, supra note 36, at 898 n. 
51–52; Graham, supra note 70, at 691–92 (discussing variant iterations of IRAC); Turner, 
supra note 23, at 352, 354–55 (2012) (recognizing the “debate over the usefulness of para-
digms, [Turner seeks] to liberate the core principles of effective organization without debat-
ing the merits of a particular method,” which she asserts include “rule-centered analysis, 
separation of discrete issues, synthesis of the law, and unity.”). 
173  See Cauthorn, supra note 165, at 5. 
174  See Durako, supra note 167, at 6. 
175  Dennis R. Honabach, “IRAC” or “(QFRFR) + IRAC”, 10 THE SECOND DRAFT 8 (1995). 
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ing,176 all we have really done as a community is changed some of its partners, 
but we have not really abandoned it, and perhaps we cannot. In hindsight, per-
haps the surge of IRAC iterations was a feeble attempt to lessen IRAC’s power. 
But in adding more letters, we magnified its presence and spread its wings of 
dominance (and confusion) upon our students. 
To this point of dominance, I briefly return to the prior sentiment of 
IRAC’s status as embodying and perpetuating whiteness.177 In the prior section 
some of the desirable features of IRAC were discussed, both among legal writ-
ing scholars and legal practitioners. While IRAC may, for some, have broad 
usefulness as a drafting tool, the literal and figurative publication of the 
“[i]mportance of IRAC and legal writing” raises two concerns: first, the seduc-
tive simplicity of novice law students producing effective legal analysis.178 I 
would venture to say that any legal professor or practitioner familiar with IRAC 
would agree it is an acronym for organizing a legal argument—it simply cannot 
detail for novice law students the relevant content or substance that each “sec-
tion” should consider. An experienced attorney is better equipped to engage in 
such necessary discernment. This obvious content gap leads to the second fun-
damental concern: its dominance. Who is the gatekeeper to prevent this seem-
ingly innocuous organizational tool from being elevated to the key for students 
to “do better on [their] exams, have an easier time passing the bar, be more 
successful in [their] legal career[s], and [perhaps] achieve a higher state of in-
ner peace and happiness[?]”179 This is a lofty goal, even for IRAC. I cannot 
conceptualize a more figurative picture of its dominance. 
INTERLUDE: “WHITE CONSTRUCTION OF BLACK EXPERIENCE”180 
This Article’s suggestion of IRAC’s privilege and dominance as a trope for 
whiteness is both daunting and uncomfortable. Other scholars who read this 
work often defended IRAC as “simply” a neutral tool to aid novice legal writ-
 
176  See Graham, supra note 70, at 705 (commenting that IRAC was “meant [to function] 
primarily as an analytic tool,” not a writing formula). 
177  See supra Act I, Section A.3. 
178  See generally Fine, supra note 140, at 7 (“Beginning law students, who are all too eager 
to be offered ‘rules’ and normative standards for across-the-board application, view IRAC as 
a safe harbor in a sea of indeterminate concepts, which they enthusiastically embrace.”); 
Chris Iijima & Beth Cohen, Reflections of IRAC, 10 THE SECOND DRAFT 9 (1995) (“Indeed, 
pedagogical considerations aside, if one remembers that the two most common emotions 
first year law students experience are confusion and panic, IRAC’s stolid accessibility may 
be its greatest attribute.”). 
179  Metzler, supra note 71, at 503. To be clear, I express no personal judgment toward the 
author of this article. For starters, the article is almost two decades old, so much may have 
changed in his thoughts toward IRAC or general writing approach. But the greater point is 
that IRAC can so easily be espoused as sound legal analysis without offering a critique of its 
limitations. And if IRAC is the key to success, and success looks like an Ivy League back-
ground, with related career opportunities, why wouldn’t any student feel compelled to “mas-
ter” IRAC?. 
180  Giarrusso, supra note 24. 
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ers in developing legal analysis in a way that is common (or required) in the 
legal profession. There was little harm in letting it be an entry point for more 
complex legal analysis. But if IRAC is a dominant paradigm that mimics white 
normativity, is it possible that its ‘race’ is unmarked, invisible, and its structure 
essentially stands in for all legal analysis—from simple to complex, for domi-
nant groups to Others?181 Further, I question whether a reductionist legal analy-
sis that mimics whiteness can effectively help novice law students interact with 
and analyze the law holistically, particularly as it impacts marginalized voices 
or viewpoints.182 I am not convinced there is a clear Yes or No. There is, how-
ever, a diametric tension triggered between the reality that Others lack access 
to, and representation in, the law; and the reality that IRAC’s privilege affords 
blindness to oppression, and thus does not intuitively make room for the unique 
and valuable contribution of Others voices—a positioning that is emblematic of 
a discourse community structured in whiteness. The resulting analysis may feel 
and sound familiar, yet foreign; feel and appear relatable, yet inauthentic; and 
feel and purport to be transformative, yet prosaic. In short, it may look like The 
Wiz. 
In between The Wizard of Oz in 1939, and Wicked in 2003, there was The 
Wiz in 1974 (Broadway musical) and 1978 (film). For this Interlude, the focus 
is on the 1978 film version, as it fared far worse than its Broadway counter-
part.183 The emergence of The Wiz, both musical and film, onto the artistic sce-
ne, particularly during a controversial Black Arts Movement,184 magnified ra-
 
181  I attribute this thought of IRAC as having an unmarked ‘race’ that is silently dominating 
legal analysis to Devin Carbado’s work in Colorblind Intersectionality, where he discusses 
the case of Darlene Jespersen, a “White” woman who brought a sex discrimination claim 
against Harrah’s Casino based on the Casino’s groom policy—that all female employees 
wear makeup, which Jespersen refused. Devon W. Carbado, Colorblind Intersectionality, 38 
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 811, 818–19, 821–23 (2013). Carbado argued that while 
the “Ninth Circuit never expressly invoke[d] race,” her racial identity was never discussed, 
rather the analysis ensued with Jespersen as stand in “for gender per se,” and not specifically 
for white women; that is “[h]er whiteness facilitate[d] [a] representational authority in that it 
[was] both juridically unmarked and juridically incorporated.” Id. at 822. As a point of com-
parison, Carbado similarly notes that Black heterosexual men are not framed in intersection-
al terms, as they have the potential “to stand in for ‘the race.’ ” Id. at 818. 
182  I was asked by a colleague what a “Black IRAC” would look like. After we chuckled at 
the thought, I believe the short answer is that it does not—and should not—exist. Simply put, 
to the legal discourse belongs the expectation that effective and persuasive legal advocacy 
will rely on issue framing, governing law, and applying that law (and its related defenses and 
justifications) to render a conclusion in a given set of facts. A “Black version” that purports 
to uproot these genre conventions would do little to bridge any perceived dissonance be-
tween marginalized voices and legal writing pedagogy. 
183  See supra text accompanying note 26. 
184  A Brief Guide to the Black Arts Movement, POETS (Feb. 18, 2014), poets.org/text/brief-
guide-black-arts-movement [https://perma.cc/SS8N-S9M2] (noting that “[b]oth the Black 
Power and Black Arts movements were responses to the turbulent socio-political landscape 
of the [civil rights movement].”). 
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cial tensions between “Black” and “White” America.185 This tension offers a 
perspective that is highly relevant in the broader IRAC discussion, namely vis-
ualizing the experience of marginalized voices through a constructed white par-
adigm. What follows is a brief discussion first—in sections A and B—of the 
cultural problems and critiques The Wiz presented, during the Black Arts 
Movement, as a “Black” film constructed by white writers; and second, of 
IRAC’s white structure as an appropriate entry point or framing for diverse per-
spectives and experiences in view of the divergent opinions of The Wiz. 
A. The Black Arts Movement 
“We want a black poem. And a 
Black World. 
Let the world be a Black Poem 
And Let All Black People Speak This Poem 
 Silently 
or LOUD” 
—Amiri Baraka, “Black Art”186 
“Sometimes referred to as ‘the artistic sister of the Black Power Movement,’ 
the Black Arts Movement stands as the single most controversial moment in the 
history of African-American literature—possibly in American literature as a 
whole.”—Black Creativity: On the Cutting Edge187 
The Black Arts Movement was birthed in the late 1960s and early 70s dur-
ing the Civil Rights movement188 to protect and honor Black Art from the grips 
of white interpretation or influence.189 Led by Imamu Amiri Baraka, the 
Movement’s intent was to: 
 
185  See supra text accompanying note 184. For this section I retain the use of “Black” (in-
stead of African American) and “White” in view of the thorough discussion of the Black 
Arts Movement and the White critic. 
186  Giarrusso, supra note 24 (quoting an excerpt from Amiri Baraka’s poem “Black Art”). 
187  A Brief Guide to the Black Arts Movement, supra note 184 (quoting Black Creativity: On 
the Cutting Edge, TIME (Oct. 10, 1994)). 
188  See id.; see also Rhonda Williams, The Wiz: American Culture at Its Best, in THE 
UNIVERSE OF OZ: ESSAYS ON BAUM’S SERIES AND ITS PROGENY 193 (Kevin K. Durand & 
Mary K. Leigh eds., 2010) (noting that the political mood of the country in the 1970s cen-
tered on Civil Rights and the equality of the races, which was an issue that Sidney Lumet 
wanted to address in his adaptation of the film The Wiz). 
189  See A Brief Guide to the Black Arts Movement, supra note 184 (“Sometimes criticized as 
misogynist, homophobic, anti-Semitic, and racially exclusive, the Black Arts movement is 
also credited with motivating a new generation of poets, writers, and artists. In recent years, 
however, many other writers—Native Americans, Latinos/as, gays and lesbians, and younger 
generations of African Americans, for instance—have acknowledged their debt to the Black 
Arts movement.”); Erik Nielson, White Surveillance of the Black Arts, 47 AFR. AM. REV. 
161, 161 (2014); Giarrusso, supra note 24 (“The Black Arts Movement began in 1965, fol-
lowing the assassination of Malcolm X (which some call the inciting incident for the move-
ment), and stretched until about 1975. As a corollary to the Black Power movement, the 
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‘destroy the double consciousness—the tension that is in the souls of the black 
folk’ . . . in order to stake a claim for a uniquely black form of artistic expres-
sion[,] . . . [which meant] purg[ing] white presence and its ‘useless, dead ideas’ 
from black art . . . .190 
As the human experience unfolds in Black works, Black Arts proponents 
insisted the message must push the work to “do something . . . as a force for 
better or worse which has been someplace and is going somewhere;”191 it must 
both acknowledge and destroy colonialism in body and in mind, liberate the 
Black community, and for many, do so through the “rich, figurative black 
speech.”192 There was a general concern about whether White writers could au-
thentically capture the black character, as Professor Catharine Stimpson notes, 
because “even the best of black characters created by white writers function 
within white contexts. They objectify white notions, values, ambitions, theatri-
calities, anxieties, and besetting fears.”193 
More concerning than whether White writers could aptly portray Black 
characters was that Black Art and literature were heavily dependent on white 
resources, including the White critic, to survive.194 The Black community, 
 
Black Arts Movement facilitated the creation of a black voice, the creation of a home for 
black culture. The essence of the Black Arts Movement was a redefinition of what it meant 
to be a black writer and artist; where the Black Power movement was political, the Black 
Arts Movement was artistic. The movement served as a way for black artists to define their 
art separately from the white mainstream.”). 
190  Nielson, supra note 189; see also A Brief Guide to the Black Arts Movement, supra note 
184 (“One of the most important figures in the Black Arts movement was Amiri Baraka 
(formerly LeRoi Jones), who began his career among the Beat generation, living in Green-
wich Village and associating with poets such as Allen Ginsberg, Charles Olson, and Gary 
Snyder.”); STACY WOLF, CHANGED FOR GOOD: A FEMINIST HISTORY OF THE BROADWAY 
MUSICAL 93 (2011) (noting that “[r]ace consciousness and race pride also became more 
mainstream in the 1970s” and “[i]ncreased awareness of race found its way into popular cul-
ture”). 
191  Catharine R. Stimpson, Black Culture/White Teacher, 2 CHANGE HIGHER EDUC. 35, 38 
(1970). 
192  Id. at 36 (rejecting black speech as “the language of the ghetto, the deprived, the folk,” 
and regarding it as “subtle, precise, vibrant. Its speaker, as much leader or performer as 
speaker, possesses both formal oratorical power and spontaneous wit.”); see also Joseph Kel-
ler, Black Writing and the White Critic, 3 NEGRO AM. LITERATURE F. 103, 107 (1969) (dis-
cussing the “great emphasis on language one finds in black writing”); Geneva Smitherman, 
Black Idiom, 5 NEGRO AM. LITERATURE F. 88, 116 (1971) (“We bees bout extending the le-
gitimacy of the Black Idiom into America and the world. The necessity of using our lan-
guage as a unifying vehicle can only be understood in a political context. Language is/has 
been/will continue to be, if we let it, a tool of oppression. And the answer lies not in remak-
ing our Black students in the linguistic image of the oppressor. . . . In the trend away from 
allegiance to this system, the clarion call is ethnic, the style revolutionary, and the language 
Black. (Admittedly, in the American context, this becomes a language often fused with lin-
guistic pollutions from the white middle class, but the oratorical patterns, the speech 
rhythms, the tonal qualities, the underlying rhetorical strategies and the language behavior 
are definitely Black.)” (emphasis omitted)). 
193  Stimpson, supra note 191, at 37. 
194  See Rhett S. Jones, Community and Commentators: Black Theatre and Its Critics, 14 
BLACK AM. LITERATURE F. 69, 69 (1980) (“The critic is particularly important to those in-
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however, criticized the White critic as being unqualified to judge the black ex-
perience, scoffing that “whites [were] so certain that their interpretations—
intellectual structures—. . . based on their color words were the norms.”195 This 
notable black experience, at least to the Black community, went far beyond 
merely having a Black body in a play on stage or as the hero/heroine in a liter-
ary work. In many ways, Black work posed “unique statements about identi-
ty.”196 The White critic, on the other hand, criticized the Black artist for not 
displaying a clear message, function, or role that their work needed to convey. 
 
volved in black theatre who want to do more than entertain, who want to place theatre in the 
vanguard of the black struggle, and who want to use theatre to help black people cope with a 
racist society. [As it stands,] the majority of working-class black Americans . . . view theatre 
as the pastime of the middle classes, and see little on the stage that speaks to them and to 
their problems.”); C.W.E. Bigsby, The White Critic in a Black World, 6 NEGRO AM. 
LITERATURE FOR. 39, 44–45 (1972) (commenting that the “black writer has a vested interest 
in creating mysteries, in encoding his insights in such a way as to make decipherment a ra-
cial prerogative[,]” and while there may be no attempt by the white critic “to intrude on art 
deliberately created as a cabalistic gesture[,] . . . if Imamu Baraka chooses to publish his 
work through Bobbs-Merrill or Ed Bullins to collect royalties on plays offered for public 
performance the white critic will continue to be tempted to venture an opinion, and to do so 
without even a sympathy pain for Liberal anguish.”); Robert C. Hart, Black-White Literary 
Relations in the Harlem Renaissance, 44 AM. LITERATURE 612, 613 (1973) (commenting of 
DuBois, that despite his claims that white writers should not write about Black people, “it is 
probably true, as one biographer of DuBois has said, that he failed to appreciate the full ex-
tent to which black creative work was dependent on white support until the Harlem Renais-
sance collapsed in the early years of the Great Depression.”); Nielson, supra note 189, at 164 
(discussing the sense of entrapment felt by those in the Black Arts Movement, leading them 
to create their own black institutions; however, “despite Baraka’s attempt to create a truly 
independent and separate space for blacks, he had to seek funds from the very white estab-
lishment he hated in order to operate.”). 
195  Keller, supra note 192, at 104 (“I propose that someone who has not had the black expe-
rience forget about making critical judgments. Assuredly he can’t do it the way it has so of-
ten been done[.] . . . [T]hat is, by assembling a model of the skeleton, assert meaningful 
things about the dimension of the flesh. Because he must of course deduce the structure of 
the whole from its many fragilities of meaning. . . . Such critics are inept, for the most part, 
because they cannot claim competence.”); see also Bigsby, supra note 194, at 41–42 (cri-
tiquing editorial by Lisbeth A. Grant, who in a 1970 issue of Black World, wrongly identi-
fied an editor of short stories (written by Black authors) as a white man, and thus argued that 
the short stories were “tinge[d]” so they could “ ‘live up’ to certain white standards[;]” when 
in fact, as Bigsby writes, the editor was a black man, and Lisbeth’s mistake of the editor’s 
race made her “critical response . . . utterly and drearily predictable. Since she is convinced 
that no white can hope to understand what she calls ‘the black experience’ this must become 
a collection of impressive black stories ruined by an arrogant and ignorant white editor.”); 
Hart, supra note 194, at 613 (commenting that DuBois, “[w]ith all his cooperative associa-
tions with the white world, however, . . . took the stand that militant young blacks often take 
today, which is that white writers would keep their hands off Negroes as subject matter to 
write about.”). 
196  Stimpson, supra note 191, at 40 (“Black plays demand a vital relationship between actors 
and audience, which is also participant and chorus. Black novels promise acute characteriza-
tion. . . . Creating characters means not only focusing the imagination upon others, but also 
detecting psychological fraud, sniffing out the gap between illusion and reality, between 
word and deed: these gifts exist in abundance in black literature. . . . [B]lack literature organ-
izes human experience for the sake of experience, vitality and consolation.”). 
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It was well understood that speaking to the Black community through a Black 
voice was the driving force behind the Black Arts Movement. 
In the end, without “a corps of critics, respected by both artists and mem-
bers of the community,”197 the Black community was left without guidance on 
how to respond to Black Arts. One White critic went so far as to remark that 
“Black literature is not created simply by fiat or a semantic shift from ‘Negro’ 
to ‘Black.’ ”198 Rather, Black literature 
must not merely reflect a totally different experience but must express funda-
mentally different values and aesthetics in a form and language exclusive to the 
black community. Such a literature is possible . . . . But nine-tenths of the litera-
ture presently described as black differs no more radically from American litera-
ture than Dylan Thomas does from English. The accent is black, the language 
white; the daily experience black, the cultural context white. . . . So long as this 
remains true the white critic has a legitimate and valuable role to play, and even 
when it ceases to be true the interplay of black writer and white critic may still 
strike sparks which may be mutually illuminating.199 
Whether right or wrong, that Black literature needed to express an experi-
ence so uniquely different than that of White America, the larger point is that 
the for us by us sentiment ultimately failed because it could not escape “the 
very forces of white repression that ‘Black Art’ strive[d] to expel.”200 This ten-
sion is the soil in which The Wiz was planted. 
B. The Wiz: The Super Soul Musical “Wonderful Wizard of Oz” 
Revered by some, criticized by many, The Wiz was donned by one com-
mentary—to which belongs the Interlude’s opening quote—as the “white con-
struction of black experience.”201 The musical version of The Wiz, written by a 
Black man in 1974,202 followed the plot and characters of its 1939 predecessor, 
but, as one critique wrote, introduced a “black influence” by “incorporat[ing] a 
new vocabulary of speech, song, and movement, as well as new meanings for 
the tropes of ‘home’ and a spiritual journey in a hostile environment.”203 Four 
years later, in 1978, Sidney Lumet, a White man, turned the musical into an 
MGM movie.204 The storyline is largely the same. The Kansas Dorothy of 1939 
 
197  Jones, supra note 194, at 70 (“Both sides [stood] in need of critics capable of explaining 
the reasons that a given work [did] or [did] not make a contribution to black life.”). 
198  See Bigsby, supra note 194, at 43. 
199  Id. 
200  Nielson, supra note 189, at 162. 
201  Giarrusso, supra note 24. 
202  WOLF, supra note 190. 
203  Id. at 112–13 (providing a detailed commentary on The Wiz musical, circa 1974, as im-
portant to the 1970s feminist movement where Dorothy, as the only woman “leader or initia-
tor” of a Broadway musical during this era “allude[ed] to the significance of women as 
mothers, breadwinners, and leaders in the African American community in the 1970s.”). 
204  Charlie Smalls & William F. Brown, The Wiz, BROADWAY MUSICAL HOME, http://www.b 
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is now the Harlem, New York, Dorothy of 1978.205 Like her predecessor, Har-
lem Dorothy is dissatisfied with her home, and yearning to find her place she 
travels down the Yellow Brick Road and also meets “her three expected com-
panions . . . [e]ach . . . looking, ostensibly, for the same thing as the original—
brains, a heart, courage. But one could also argue that all the characters—not 
just Dorothy—are looking for a home.”206 
The stark difference between Dorothy circa 1939 and 1978 is this: the 1978 
film (and 1974 musical) had an all-Black cast. But whether this all-Black cast 
transformed The Wiz into a “Black” work befitting the Black Art movement, 
begs a return to the sentiment of a White critic: did The Wiz simply “reflect a 
totally different experience” of the 1939 film with Black faces, or did it “ex-
press fundamentally different values and aesthetics in a form and language ex-
clusive to the black community[?]”207 The latter seems to be the necessary fea-
ture to move black art outside of white contours. 
The critiques of The Wiz were plentiful, but for this Article’s purpose, I 
highlight for consideration one broad question a commentator posed: was The 
Wiz film part of the Black Arts Movement?208 On the one hand, some viewed 
The Wiz as part of the Black Arts Movement because it highlighted themes of 
liberation for Black people, representing a story of the “black experience in 
white mainstream America.”209 For example, one supportive commentator 
donned The Wiz as “American Culture at Its Best”210 and in many respects re-
buked the movie-going American public for its inability to “see past” the 1939 
version of the film, to the intentional use of “stereotypical images and typecaste 
characters [that] point to a greater political statement[,]” that is, “mainstream 
America and Hollywood’s refusal to come to grips with the issues and obsta-
cles concerning Black people in the United States.”211 To the extent the White 
critic did not sing its praises, it was often the viewpoint that the critic “was on 
foreign ground culturally[,]”212 and was trying to “force the black perspective 
into alignment with the white one.”213 
 
roadwaymusicalhome.com/shows/wiz.htm [https://perma.cc/S8BA-DSK4]; Sidney Lumet 
Biography, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001486/bio?ref_=nm_ov_bio_sm [https 
://perma.cc/JQH9-L2UH]. 
205  Giarrusso, supra note 24. 
206  Id. 
207  Bigsby, supra note 194, at 43. 
208  Giarrusso, supra note 24. 
209  Id. 
210  Williams, supra note 188, at 191. 
211  Id. at 191–92 (noting that “Lumet shows that the salvation of the Black family and com-
munity lies with the Black woman.”). 
212  Jones, supra note 194, at 72. 
213  Id. (“When blacks interpret white works, white critics want the result to match the white 
prototype, and when it does not, they become hostile . . . .”). 
21 NEV. L.J. 655 
700 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:2  
On the other hand, The Wiz was discounted by many for inclusion in the 
Black Arts Movement.214 It was simply not enough that the cast was all Black. 
For Black members of the movement, Black Art had to embody the for us by us 
mantra central to the movement.215 A prevailing thought was that in order to 
“facilitate the survival of black people,” white mainstream culture had to be 
wholly rejected.216 Put another way, “assimilation or [other] tools of the white 
mainstream culture” could not be used “to further black art and literature.”217 
That was The Wiz’s (film) downfall. It was not written or produced by Black 
people. It was “written, directed and produced by white men for Broadway, a 
white mainstream institution, and then Hollywood.”218 One commentator called 
it “an all-black adaptation of The Wizard of Oz.”219 And perhaps that was the 
problem. Some White critics found that The Wiz bore “no resemblance” to the 
beloved The Wizard of Oz, and thus it was discarded as lacking quality.220 This 
subtle (or not so) requirement that The Wiz needed to resemble The Wizard of 
Oz has an explicit subtext, which is this: black interpretations of white works 
must still imitate white life.221 
 
214  Giarrusso, supra note 24 (analyzing The Wiz in the Black Arts Movement by looking at 
“production and creation of the film and its role as a musical, some of the major themes that 
arise and how they reflect aspects of black culture and the use of music”). 
215  See, e.g., Nielson, supra note 189, at 166 (commenting on Larry Neal’s desire for the 
movement to destroy double-consciousness and noting the difficulty in doing so “when 
whiteness is so thematically central to poetic expression that is intended to be by and for 
black people.” (emphasis added)); Giarrusso, supra note 24 (“Black Arts Movement artists 
considered their work to be art created by black people for a black audience—that speaks 
‘directly to the needs and aspirations of Black America.’ ” (quoting Larry Neal, The Black 
Arts Movement, 12 THE DRAMA REVIEW: TDR 28, 29 (1968)), and also noting that the “most 
notable feature of The Wiz that might exclude it from direct placement in the Black Arts 
Movement is its almost entirely white creation team. If we strictly adhere to Baraka and 
Neal’s credo about the Black Arts Movement that it was a separatist endeavor and art that 
was by black people for a black audience, the fact that the director (Sidney Lumet) and pro-
ducer (Rob Cohen), along with the writer of the original book for the Broadway production 
(William F. Brown) and the man who adapted the Broadway book for the screen (Joel 
Schumacher), were all white seems to be an immediate disqualification.”). 
216  Giarrusso, supra note 24. 
217  Id. 
218  Id. 
219  WOLF, supra note 190, at 111; see also Claudia A. Beach, The Wiz as the Seventies’ Ver-
sion of The Wizard of Oz, in THE UNIVERSE OF OZ, supra note 188, at 200–01 (critiquing the 
1974 musical, noting “The Wiz, has been described as the black version of the classic chil-
dren’s story, The Wizard of Oz[,]” and analyzing and ultimately discrediting The Wiz’s fail-
ure to have a discernible message—compared to the 1939 version (“There’s no place like 
home”) on three facts: “the security of home, the threat of Oz, and the relief of returning to 
home[.]”). 
220  Jones, supra note 194, at 72. 
221  See id. at 73–74 (noting that “white critics are usually unfriendly to black interpretations 
of ‘white’ classics,” and that “[b]ecause whites control the arts, they are in a position to 
make black art imitate white life.”); Williams, supra note 188, at 195–96 (commenting that 
critics dismissed Sidney Lumet’s The Wiz “as a poor replica of [Frank] Baum’s text,” and 
perhaps in an attempt to legitimize The Wiz in the eyes of its original predecessor, adding 
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The inquiry of whether The Wiz was part of the Black Arts movement forc-
es a more theoretical conversation that bears relevance when drawing parallels 
with legal writing pedagogy and IRAC. Namely, whether a white construction 
or prototype can authentically capture the marginalized voices and experi-
ence,222 or put otherwise, whether a marginalized experience now embodies an 
element of assimilation into a mainstream discourse.223 Perhaps it is the want 
for certainty that reflects the divergent critiques of The Wiz, then and now. 
C. Rethinking IRAC’s Innocence 
This Interlude opened with the question of whether there was harm in let-
ting IRAC, and similar reductive paradigms, be an entry point for more com-
plex legal analysis. In a word, Yes. And similar to The Wiz, I suspect there are 
divergent critiques to this seemingly harmful approach, chief of which is a 
stunted analytical process—which I argue subsumes identity development—for 
novice law students. 
It is largely accepted within the legal academy, particularly among legal 
writing scholars, that good legal writing does not rest in novice law students 
simply mimicking IRAC because many students mimic the form without regard 
for the underlying substance.224 To this point, while many inside and outside 
the legal writing discipline offered mountains of praise toward IRAC’s method-
ical usefulness, there were also valleys of caution. For example, Professor 
 
that “The Wiz has the same characters, character flaws, and names as the Baum’s narra-
tive[,] . . . [t]he Land of Oz has the same plights of a Wicked Witch . . . . Dorothy journeys 
through Oz to find the Wizard[,]” thus there is an “alignment on the basic genetic struc-
ture.”). 
222  Or experience from any traditionally marginalized group that diverges from the dominant 
group. 
223  See Giarrusso, supra note 24. 
224  Legal scholars make a clear distinction between novice and expert legal writers. See, e.g., 
Keene, supra note 170, at 486, 488 (2013) (commenting that “[a] novice lacks certain char-
acteristics and competencies: the novice does not yet have the knowledge of an expert in a 
community or yet have the habits of thinking or the tone of voice[,]” and that “novice legal 
writers may have difficulty organizing a document not because they lack an understanding of 
the law or the technical steps needed to devise a proper structure, but because they lack the 
depth of experience needed to decide what information the document’s decision maker will 
find most useful or persuasive.”); Graham, supra note 70, at 700 (summarizing the differ-
ences between novice and expert legal writers, finding that “[e]xpert legal writers adopt spe-
cific rhetorical strategies for producing well-organized, precise, and deep legal analy-
sis. . . . Expert legal writers are also able to step back from their writing and imagine 
audience needs and responses. The expert’s written product is thus reader-centered, with a 
clear focus on the document’s communicative purpose. Novice legal writers, on the other 
hand, tend to view the writing process as linear, cannot remove themselves from their writ-
ing, and concentrate on telling what they know irrespective of their audience’s needs. The 
result is a ‘knowledge-telling’ document that memorializes the writer’s thought processes 
but is not of great use to the reader.” (quoting Susan E. Provenzano & Lesley S. Kagan, 
Teaching in Reverse: A Positive Approach to Analytical Errors in 1L Writing, 39 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 123, 162 (2007))). 
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Gionfriddo calls “[f]ormulas like IRAC and its progeny” dangerous because 
their 
simplistic nature masks the series of complex, interrelated steps that students 
need to learn to analyze and write about legal problems in a sophisticated man-
ner. . . . Students who do use this type of formula too often follow its format 
without thinking enough about the process of legal analysis.225 
Similarly, Graham “urge[d] the legal academy to . . . return to the roots of 
IRAC, using it only to illustrate the basic framework for conducting legal anal-
ysis, instead of presenting it as a template for writing that students should rigid-
ly follow.”226 I would, however, push these sentiments even further by high-
lighting the highly relevant context: these are first year law students. 
Is it reasonable to ask first year law students to moderate their use of a 
framework that, to them, may correlate with success? And should we do so, as 
Calleros notes, to a group that is arguably insecure in their ability to succeed 
against the rigors of the first year?227 Stated frankly, despite our warning, they 
may be powerless to acquiesce to such a cautious approach. If presented with a 
template for conducting legal analysis that they can imitate, with a false percep-
tion of success, how do we realistically temper students’ use of this “simple” 
tool, especially if the alternative is to engage with the in-depth Analytical 
Framework? And perhaps of greater concern, who or what are they imitating? 
Such a fear of imitation created a serious problem for Black Arts, as its propo-
nents questioned whether work that purported to “speak to and for blacks 
through a traditionally white medium”228 could be included. How does one dis-
tinguish between trustworthy Black voices, and “those who had become tools 
of the white establishment.”229 Going one step further, as Wildman warns, there 
is a subtle and often masked affiliation between “[m]embers of the privileged 
group” and “the dominant side of the power system.”230 
For these reasons, this Article’s critique of IRAC goes further than a view 
of IRAC as just a framework. For novice law students, the seductive allure of 
IRAC’s professed usefulness as a prototype of analytical structure may be a 
slow fade toward a perceived norm of analytical process. But IRAC’s short-
coming is not a technical oversight that is cured by simply teaching IRAC 
alongside a legal analysis process. To do so would ascribe IRAC as only repre-
senting the outer signal of deductive reasoning. In other words, IRAC is Issue, 
 
225  Gionfriddo, supra note 165. 
226  Graham, supra note 70, at 682. 
227  See Calleros, supra note 69, at 4. 
228  Nielson, supra note 189, at 168. 
229  Id. 
230  WILDMAN, supra note 62, at 14–15 (1996) (discussing examples such as legacy admis-
sions at elite colleges and professional schools that are perceived to be merit-based, but have 
ignored any affiliation with power, thus “[a]chievements by members of the privileged group 
are viewed as the result of individual effort, rather than privilege.”). 
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Rule, Application and Conclusion—no more. That is not my claim.231 To the 
extent that IRAC, from an identity perspective, presents as a rigid, scientific, 
methodical, objective, and neutral232 approach to legal analysis, an approach 
that may unconsciously blind oppression, we do students a disservice to readily 
offer it up as an entry point to a more complex analysis that is equipped to au-
thentically express marginalized voices and borderland perspectives.233 
This critique mirrors the pinnacle critique of the Black Arts Movement—
that is, could the black (i.e., marginalized) perspective or experience be deemed 
authentic when relying on a “white prototype.”234 I am equally concerned that 
as professors and evaluators of our students’ work, we will unconsciously be-
come that “White critic” who found it “easier to evaluate black performing art-
ists in terms of white canons, . . . [which] cheat both black and white artists out 
of the rich exchange[,] . . . leav[ing] their respective racial communities in ig-
norance of one another.”235 
 
231  See supra notes 24, 75 and accompanying text. 
232  Professor Margaret Montoya makes an interesting point regarding neutrality, stating the 
following: 
We see the world through our lived experience, we see the world through our gender, through 
our race, through our sexual orientation. An important observation that Martha Minow, a femi-
nist law professor at Harvard Law School, has made is that we are not abandoning impartiality. 
We increase our impartiality when we claim our partiality. That is when we say, “I speak as a 
Latina, I speak from this place of experience.” I then put more things on the table about that ob-
servation. 
Montoya & Zuni Cruz, supra note 115, at 159. 
233  Id. at 157, 159 (discussing a narrative braids project by Professors Margaret Montoya and 
Christine Zuni Cruz during an American Indian Law & Literature conference, where the cul-
tural braid-wearing became a decision to “abandon the accouterments of success as deter-
mined by ‘others’—the suits, the ties, the car” and “contend[ing] that the silencing of race 
throughout the legal system, in classrooms and in courtrooms, is one of the principal mecha-
nisms for maintaining the ideology of White supremacy. It is the practice of hegemony 
through education. From a Freirean perspective, students are denied the ability to participate 
in liberatory education because of this systemic silencing about racism and other types of 
oppression.”); see also Williams, supra note 188, at 193–94 (analyzing the social and politi-
cal setting of The Wiz 1978 film, namely the Women’s Rights and Civil Rights movements, 
and noting that Black women (referencing Andres Benton Rushing, Barbara Smith and Deb-
orah McDowell) began to create narratives for themselves on “how and where they fit in the 
feminist movement” by distinctly creating “a gap analysis” of “traditional white femi-
nism[;]” that is, “ ‘Eurocentric’ or white feminist qualities and categories of stereotypical 
white women were ‘passivity, compliancy, the submissive wife, and woman on a pedestal” 
compared to the “signs and structures to categorize Black women,” including “[m]otifs of 
interlocking racism, sexism, and classism oppression[;] Black feminist protagonist[;] Spir-
itual journeys from victimization to the realization of personal autonomy or creativity[;] 
Centrality of female bonding and networking[;] Sharp focus on personal relationships in the 
female realm or community[;] Deeper, more detailed exploration and validation of epistemo-
logical power or emotions[;] Iconography of women’s clothing[;] Black feminist lan-
guage.”). 
234  Jones, supra note 194, at 72. 
235  Id. at 73–74 (commenting that white teachers of voice, performing artists, and critics, 
must be careful to not “measure black artistic works against white society and culture[,]” for 
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As an identity scholar, and one who ascribes to the white normativity of 
IRAC, I am sensitive to a narrative that casts IRAC as an entry point, and I 
question whether it is implicitly an invitation to assimilate. Assimilation can 
“eliminate cultural differences, and the loss of any distinctive characteristics, to 
fit in with the dominant society.”236 Its use as an identity strategy signals that 
“[t]o effectively participate in dominant society, you must conform to the struc-
tures of mainstream organizations.”237 This cannot be the spirit of legal analy-
sis. Not only do novice law students lack the expertise and wisdom to appreci-
ate IRAC’s analytical limitations, they also cannot appreciate IRAC’s 
positioning inside a larger and dominant power structure. It is possible, howev-
er, to remain mindful of genre conventions for any profession and simultane-
ously leave ample room for creative and conscious use of voice to highlight 
blind spots or push boundaries. Such heavy lifting is the delight of the Analyti-
cal Framework. 
Of interest to me here, however, is both personifying and exploring the 
narrative of the Analytical Framework, how it is constructed or represented to 
an audience238 and its ability to reach to the margins. What is its identity devel-
opment? The Wizard of Oz, for decades, offered a story of the Wicked Witch of 
the West, and a very one-dimensional story at that. She was the creepy mean 
neighbor who hated Dorothy’s dog Toto, and later, after predictably evolving 
into the wicked witch of Dorothy’s dream, was particularly perturbed by the 
red shoes Dorothy wore. Needless to say, we did not shed a tear when Dorothy 
dumped a bucket of water on her head. But Wicked offers a much-needed narra-
tive of Elphaba, the famed Wicked Witch of the West—a telling of how her 
identity developed. She has a name; and we learn of her birth, her college 
years, her passions, frustrations, and insecurities; and we gain insight into the 
choices that she made (or was left with) before and leading up to the timeline of 
The Wizard of Oz. 
Ironically, when Act I began, we tapped our feet to the beat of “No one 
Mourns the Wicked”239 and understood the Ozians joy in the death of the 
Wicked Witch of the West. As Act I closes, however, arguably with the most 
captivating score of the entire show, “Defying Gravity,” our hearts ache as we 
watch Elphaba tire of succumbing to the rules of a community that has unjustly 
and unashamedly declared her wicked.240 And as she is magically hoisted into 
 
fear as many Black people argued, “whites employ their dominant position to determine the 
direction of black art.”). 
236  MARK P. ORBE, CONSTRUCTING CO-CULTURAL THEORY: AN EXPLICATION OF CULTURE, 
POWER, AND COMMUNICATION 89 (1998). 
237  Id. at 90–91. 
238  CAROLYN GROSE & MARGARET E. JOHNSON, LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND NARRATIVE: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR LAW STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 9 (2017). 
239  No One Mourns the Wicked Lyrics, ALLMUSICALS, https://www.allmusicals.com/lyrics/w 
icked/noonemournsthewicked.htm [https://perma.cc/XCA9-XKGT]. 
240  Defying Gravity Lyrics, ALLMUSICALS, https://www.allmusicals.com/lyrics/wicked/defyi 
nggravity.htm [https://perma.cc/U9CK-XVKK]. 
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the sky daring anyone to “ground” her or “bring [her] down,”241 and bravely 
proclaims her decision to be through accepting limits “[c]uz’ someone says 
they’re so,”242 our hearts and minds are opened to the social scar that the 
“green-skinned freshman” endured. After decades of being called wicked, we 
enter Act II a bit humbled. Perhaps we owe it to Elphaba to let her navigate her 
identity as she sees fit. 
 
“I want to remember this moment, always. Nobody’s pointing, nobody’s star-
ing, for the first time, I’m somewhere that I belong.” —Elphaba243 
ACT II: I’M NOT THAT GIRL: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK’S UNTOLD 
NARRATIVE 
“All of us experience being misunderstood and feeling ourselves out-
side. . . . ‘All of us have that green girl inside of us. It’s that stroke of genius 
that [the Wicked author] had in seeing something that no one sees until they 
do, then everyone sees it. And that’s to look at the story from the so-called vil-
lain’s point of view and realize that they are so much more than we like to paint 
them for our own convenience . . . .244—Wicked composer Stephen Schwartz245 
If Act I is the wicked side of good in terms of the shortsightedness that can 
come from privilege, status, and dominance, then Act II is the good side of 
wicked in terms of pushing against socially constructed identities and fighting 
with conviction toward the welfare of others.246 For the Analytical Framework, 
overshadowed and perhaps weighed down (at least in the eyes of law students) 
by complexity, Act II is her freedom song. As Freire articulates in Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed, the oppressed “discover that without freedom they cannot exist 
authentically,” though they often fear such an authentic existence.247 For there 
is a conflict the oppressed must acknowledge between 
 
241  Id. 
242  Id. 
243  Wicked Script: act I, sc. 14, WICKEDLYWICKED, (Jan. 30, 2009), http://wickedlywicked.b 
logspot.com/2009/01/wicked-script.html [https://perma.cc/5D5K-FREV] (during the song 
“One Short Day” near the end of Act I, when Glinda and Elphaba are journeying toward the 
Emerald City, and “it’s all green!”). 
244  Rizzo, supra note 26. 
245  Id. (interviewing the “two wizards of ‘ahs’—‘Wicked’ author Gregory Maguire and the 
musical’s composer Stephen Schwartz” on the process behind the creation of Wicked). 
246  The broad strokes of Elphaba’s story in Act I reveal her goodness when she learns about 
the mistreatment toward the animals, (see “Something Bad (happening in Oz)”), and when 
she decides to take a stand against the Wizard in order to help the animals. See Defying 
Gravity Lyrics, supra note 240; Carol de Giere, Wicked Summary of Plots and Subplots, 
http://www.musicalschwartz.com/wicked-songs.htm [https://perma.cc/6AQA-AUD9]; see 
also Rizzo, supra note 26 (discussing Elphaba’s desire to do good although mistakes are be-
ing made). 
247  FREIRE, supra note 92, at 48. 
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following prescriptions or having choices; between being spectators or actors; 
between acting or having the illusion of acting through the action of the oppres-
sors; between speaking out or being silent, castrated in their power to create and 
re-create, in their power to transform the world.248 
If allowed to tell her own narrative249 in all its richness, the Analytical 
Framework is freed to add depth to legal analysis, to create room for marginal-
ized voices, and to develop further the existing identity of novice law students. 
In many ways the Analytical Framework is an Other in legal analysis. It is 
not that it is invisible, but its process is often the drudge—burdened as the hard, 
menial, and tedious journey of creating effective and moving legal analysis. If 
students can bypass, for example, the rhetorical considerations in issue framing, 
particularly in view of narrow judicial opinions; avoid the political and social 
considerations stemming from today’s headlines; or ignore cultural considera-
tions that may challenge a Western normative worldview and just replicate a 
formulaic structure such as IRAC as mirroring good legal writing, they will. 
Who wouldn’t? The answer, however, is not to rid legal analysis of its depth. 
But to view the depth on its own terms and give meaning to its own story, 
without viewing it through the shallow and misleading lens of IRAC. To do so 
otherwise would make anything look wicked. 
In earlier work I questioned if there was any space for Others to prosper 
within a dominant structure and simultaneously retain all or part of their cultur-
al identity.250 This inquiry gave rise to what I termed conscious identity perfor-
mance—a theory that emanated from the limitations that tended toward assimi-
lation in legal scholarship, coupled with a fusion of the work of anthropologist 
and feminist communication theorists who more thoroughly examined how 
non-dominant cultures communicated in dominant spaces.251 Conscious identity 
performance offers an empowerment for Others to choose how they will per-
form their identity, but here, it is the development of identity performing strate-
gies through the phenomenological analytical approach252 that bears relevance 
to both Elphaba and the Analytical Framework. The beauty and strength of the 
phenomenological approach is to provide transparency to the identity develop-
ment of Elphaba and the Analytical Framework—to bring the reader “as close 
as possible to the experiences and structures” of these two essences in a crea-
tive and approachable way.253 After all, “everyone deserves the chance to 
fly.”254 
 
248  Id. 
249  This is the benefit of phenomenology as an exploratory tool of identity. 
250  Culver, Conscious Identity Performance, supra note 4, at 579, 586, 592, 605. 
251  Id. at 579–80 (citing MARK P. ORBE, supra note 236, at 50). 
252  See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text, and infra note 257, for a brief overview 
of the phenomenological approach. 
253  GRBICH, supra note 16, at 100. 
254  Wicked Script: act I, ALL MUSICALS, https://www.allmusicals.com/lyrics/wicked/script.ht 
m [https://perma.cc/5BZF-VX2S] (providing lyrics to “Defying Gravity” sung by Elphaba at 
the end of Act I). 
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As an example of phenomenology in literature, Elizabeth Peterson models 
the phenomenological approach through her study on the will and success of 
African American woman through their own works.255 Specifically, in reading 
the literature of African American women, Peterson observed themes of will 
and success as emanating from their own writing, noting that the “[phenomeno-
logical] approach will allow the will to be studied as it emerges in the con-
sciousness of individual human beings. By intuiting, analyzing, and describing 
the will as it appears, a deeper understanding of the African American woman 
is possible.”256 To this point, Mary Helen Washington remarks that 
When black women told the stories ’bout their real lives and actual experiences, 
they proved the power of art to demolish stereotypes; and if power is the ability 
to name one’s own experience . . . a first step toward power, for it celebrated the 
legends of black women, weaved dreams into myths that allowed us to recover 
and name our own past.257 
I believe the success behind Wicked is largely due to the power it gave the 
Wicked Witch of the West—Elphaba—to name her own experience. Viewing 
her narrative, through her eyes, through her point of view was so powerful that 
it turned the 1939 classic, The Wizard of Oz, on its head, and the crowd revered 
the “so-called villain[].”258 
The use of narrative storytelling has been instrumental in the lives of those 
living at the margins.259 For this Article, I add broad strokes of the phenomeno-
logical approach to the narrative storytelling (how the subject is represented), 
with particular focus on investigating one phenomenon: Elphaba. I also include 
analogies drawn between Elphaba and the Analytical Framework. As I read and 
 
255  PETERSON, supra note 16, at 23, 30–31. 
256  Id. at 29–30. Here, Peterson is relying on the intricacies of the first of seven steps of the 
phenomenological approach. Id. at 25–26. Martin Heidegger is the creator of the phenome-
nological method, a Greek study that combines phenomenon and logos, “which roughly 
translates to ‘let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows 
itself from itself.’ ” Id. at 23 (quoting MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME, 58 (John Mac-
quarrie & Edward Robison trans., 1962)). In sum, the seven steps are: (1) investigating par-
ticular phenomenon (which include intimating the phenomena, analyzing the phenomena, 
and describing the phenomena; (2) investigating general essences, (3) apprehending essential 
relationships, (4) watching for modes of appearing, (5) exploring the constitution of phe-
nomena in consciousness, (6) suspending belief in existence, and (7) interpreting the phe-
nomena (this is the hermeneutical process of interpretation). Id. at 25–26. 
257  Id. at 31 (quoting Mary Helen Washington, Introduction to MIDNIGHT BIRDS xiii (1980)). 
258  Rizzo, supra note 26. 
259  See, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 114, at 45, 52–53 (offering robust discus-
sion on legal storytelling and narrative analysis, noting that “[c]ritical race theorists have 
built on everyday experiences with perspective, viewpoint, and the power of stories and per-
suasion to come to a deeper understanding of how Americans see race.”); Henry Louis 
Gates, Jr., Introduction to READING BLACK, READING FEMINIST: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, 
supra note 37, at 2, 6–7 (canonizing the “Afro-American women’s literary heritage” in tradi-
tion to, as Mary Washington argues, “record the thoughts, words, feelings, and deeds of 
black women, experiences that make the realities of being black in America look very differ-
ent from what [Black] men have written.”). 
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re-read the script of the Wicked musical, being transported back to the many 
live performances I saw over the last decade, Elphaba’s exchanges with the 
other famed characters from The Wizard of Oz intrigued me because the essen-
tial essence of her own character was manifested through those interactions. In 
respecting the phenomenological approach, which is to bring the reader closer 
to Elphaba’s experiences, I intentionally include excerpts of the Wicked script 
that narrate her interactions with these characters before drawing any thematic 
conclusions. While there is no yellow brick road to follow here, we are off to 
see the Wizard, eventually; but let us first visit the Tin Man, Scarecrow, and 
Cowardly Lion. 
A. The Tin Man: On the Heart of the Issue 
“[O]nce legal writing teaches the student the perspective of the legal audience 
and how to frame the issues in a way consistent with that audience, it is unlike-
ly that the student will be able to step outside the legal framework, and use his 
or her ‘pre-lawyer’ outsider voice to address legal issues.”—Kathryn M. Stan-
chi260 
A life-size chunk of rusted metal, holding an ax mid-swing, who longed for 
the therapeutic relief of oil—that was the 1939 portrayal of the Tin Man in The 
Wizard of Oz. Fast forward a few decades and we are transported back in time 
and introduced to Boq, a college classmate of Glinda who is utterly obsessed 
with her, but she is utterly obsessed with the new boy in town, Fiyero.261 And to 
add yet another vulnerable heart into the equation, Nessarose, Elphaba’s sister 
who is aided by a wheelchair, is obsessed with Boq.262 So recap: Nessarose is in 
love with Boq who is in love with Glinda who is in love with Fiyero who is in 
love with . . . well, himself, at least in Act I.263 In Act II, the conflict between 
Elphaba, Nessarose, and Boq shows broadly how reframing an issue can shift 
what is seemingly good to wicked or what is seemingly wicked to good. More 
particularly, as we move into Act II, we are given insight into the essence of 
Elphaba that can be intuited, analyzed, and described264 most simply as Elpha-
ba’s genuine goodwill. 
In second scene of Act II, arguably three issues illuminate from the vantage 
point of these three characters. To start, the once love-struck Boq has become a 
dispassionate emblem of his former self as he serves at the (dis)pleasure of 
Nessarose, who is now the Governor of Munchkinland.265 Elphaba has moved 
 
260  Stanchi, supra note 12, at 30; GROSE & JOHNSON, supra note 238, at 9. 
261  Wicked Script, supra note 243, at act I, sc. 7. 
262  See id. at act I, sc. 8 (showcasing Galinda, in an attempt to deflect Boq’s desire to dance 
with her at the upcoming Ball, encouraging Boq to invite Nessarose to the Ball). 
263  See id. 
264  For the discussion of the first step of phenomenological research method, see Sossin, su-
pra note 88, at 888–89, 894, 899, and accompanying text. 
265  Wicked Script, supra note 243, at act II, sc. 2. 
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away from Oz to spread the wings of her newfound courage and conceal herself 
from those trying to capture her, but in this scene she appears suddenly in Nes-
sarose’s mansion seeking her father’s help in rescuing the animals from 
Munchkinland.266 Needless to say she is quite surprised to learn all that has 
happened in her absence, chief of which is Nessarose’s less than sunny disposi-
tion during her rise to power and an equally embittered Boq. When Elphaba 
confronts Nessarose, she tells her that their father died due to shame from 
Elphaba, and that she has now become the governor.267 Unmoved by her fa-
ther’s death, Elphaba leans on her sister to help her, remarking, “now it’s just 
us. You can help me and together we can . . . .”268 Nessarose interrupts Elpha-
ba, clearly not interested in helping her sister, and yells, “And why should I 
help you? You fly around Oz, trying to rescue animals you’ve never even met, 
and not once have you ever thought to use your powers to rescue me!”269 We 
can begin to see a bit of what (or who) Nessarose thinks is the problem in the 
present conflict. 
Perhaps a bit defeated, but wanting to help her sister, Elphaba begins 
chanting and conjures up a spell that allows Nessarose to get out of her wheel-
chair and stand.270 And with a sigh of relief, Elphaba exclaims, “Oh, Nessa, at 
last . . . I’ve done what long ago I should and finally from these powers some-
thing good[,] finally something good. . . .”271 
Naturally excited for her own miracle, Nessa calls for Boq to surprise him 
with what she hopes will be a new chapter in their awkward and unrequited 
love tale. As he hastens quickly to tend to “Madame” Nessarose, he sees 
Elphaba, who seems saddened by his state of being and softly assures him that 
she is not going to hurt him.272 Unmoved by her concern, Boq raises his voice 
and retorts that both Elphaba and Nessarose are equally wicked, particularly 
because Nessarose has not permitted Boq or anyone else in Munchkinland to 
leave.273 Ultimately we learn that Nessarose intended to use her power to keep 
Boq by her side, as Boq cries out, “Ever since she took power, she’s been strip-
ping the Munchkins of our rights . . . and we didn’t have that many to begin 
with!”274 Here, like Nessarose, we can begin to see a bit of what (or who) Boq 
thinks is the problem in the present conflict. 
Arguably from the vantage point of Boq or Nessarose, it might appear that 
the central problem is Elphaba. But what does this scene look like from Elpha-
ba’s vantage point? The intensity increases on stage, now between Nessarose 
 
266  Id. 
267  Id. 
268  Id. 
269  Id. 
270  Id. 
271  Id. 
272  Id. 
273  Id. 
274  Id. 
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and Boq. Boq becomes instantly enlightened at Nessarose’s new ability to 
walk, seeing it as a perfect reason to leave her and return to his true love, Glin-
da—who is now conveniently engaged to Fiyero (yes, the plot thickens).275 
When Boq confesses that he “lost [his] heart to Glinda from the moment [he] 
first saw her[,]” Nessarose erupts, “Lost your heart? Well, we’ll see about 
that . . . .”276 Despite Elphaba’s cry for Nessarose to release Boq, Nessarose’s 
anger wraps Boq in a magical grip, and she yells, “You’re going to lose your 
heart to me, I tell you! If I have to . . . I have to . . . .”277 In her fury, Nessarose 
grabs Elphaba’s book of spells and begins stammering uncontrollably, mispro-
nouncing the words, and completely ignoring Elphaba’s pleas to stop.278 Her 
rage is intense. The tragic result of her passionate utterance is a shrinking heart 
for Boq, for which Nessarose shrieks at Elphaba to do something:279 
 Elphaba: I can’t! You can’t reverse a spell once it’s been cast! 
 Nessarose: So what do we do? 
*** 
 Nessarose: Elphaba, do something! 
Nessarose: This is all your fault! If you hadn’t shown me that horrendible book. 
Elphaba: I have to find another spell . . . it’s the only thing that might work. 
*** 
 Nessarose: Save him, please!280 
While Elphaba takes Boq behind a curtain on stage, the orchestra’s melody 
intensifies the audience’s anxiety as we wait nervously and stare—perhaps a bit 
differently now—at Nessarose and Elphaba. Eventually, Elphaba emerges from 
behind the curtain; her heaviness is palpable as she responds to Nessarose’s in-
quiry about Boq’s heart. “It’s all right[,]” Elphaba says softly, “[h]e won’t need 
one now. I have to go. I have business to attend to in the Emerald City.”281 As 
she turns to walk away, with one last glance at Nessarose, Elphaba’s final 
words are, “Nessa, I have done everything I could for you but it has never been 
enough and it never will be . . . .”282 With that, Elphaba leaves Nessarose forev-
er. Like Nessarose and Boq before her, especially in her final words to Nessa-
rose, we can begin to see a bit of what (or who) Elphaba thinks is the problem 
in the present conflict. 
And what of Boq? What does any of this have to do with the Tin Man? 
Well, when Boq wakes up from Elphaba’s spell, he sits up confused and 
squeaking. To the shock of both himself, Nessarose, and the viewing audience, 
he has been transformed into the Tin Man—a necessary transformation to save 
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276  Id. 
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his life.283 As the scene ends, Boq screams and clamors off stage. And the final 
words of this scene are those of Nessarose pleading for him to stay, “Boq, 
please listen! It was Elphaba! Boq! It was Elphaba!!!”284 
But was it Elphaba? While The Wizard of Oz fans are given a curious and 
creative version of the Tin Man’s genesis, it is Elphaba’s thematic goodwill 
that is revealed when we view the conflict and specific issue both from Nessa-
rose’s and Elphaba’s vantage point. Interestingly, Nessarose frames the issue in 
a few ways: first, whether Elphaba should use her powers to help her sister in-
stead of others, and second, whether Elphaba can save Boq’s heart. But as the 
scene ends, we see that even when Elphaba resolved Nessa’s first issue, by us-
ing magic to enable her to walk, and the second issue, by fixing the mess of 
Boq’s heart, which Nessarose actually created, neither were good enough. So 
Nessarose’s issues are arguably narrow-minded. But from Elphaba’s vantage 
point, an entirely different issue is presented—one largely concerning her sis-
ter’s heart and whether anything that Elphaba could ever do would be enough. 
Likely not. And because the audience can see more clearly what Nessarose 
cannot, Elphaba, this “wicked witch,” becomes the hero at the end of this sce-
ne, and we can empathize with her accepting the limits of that relationship and 
leaving. 
The theme of goodwill is one that prevails not only in this scene but 
throughout Act II. Goodwill toward others comes naturally for Elphaba, and 
she is incredibly sensitive to the boundaries between her goodwill and others’ 
free will. For example, she made it clear from the start that she sought both her 
father’s and sister’s help in rescuing the animals that have been captured in Oz. 
But when Nessarose criticizes her intentions as misplaced, Elphaba shifts her 
own goodwill focus to instead advance her sister’s free will by helping her 
walk again, with whatever power she can muster. Before the dust can settle on 
Nessarose’s miracle, however, Boq also questions Elphaba’s goodwill, and in a 
final gesture to help her sister restore a lost love, Elphaba spares Boq’s body, 
though she could not save his soul. Perhaps most telling of her sensitivity to the 
boundaries between her goodwill and others’ free will is her final words to her 
sister where she acknowledges that nothing she can ever do would be enough 
for her sister. 
The discussion of the various issues from each character’s vantage point, 
and the larger theme of goodwill, is used to draw the point of the power that 
can rest within the conscious of the Analytical Framework. By comparison, a 
novice law student in drafting the “I” (Issue) of IRAC may only replicate a sin-
gular view of the issue as stated by a supervising attorney, a client, or as framed 
by a judicial opinion. The richness of the Framework, however, invites and en-
courages the audience (i.e., writer) to step back, observe all the characters, and 
consider the issue/conflict as they see it. It may be that a reframing of a seem-
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ingly apparent issue raises or challenges additional themes that can have an in-
dividual or more global impact. Here, Elphaba’s very presence and presumed 
selfish power were arguably the issues from the perspective of both Nessarose 
and Boq. But in view of the narrative from Elphaba’s perspective, there is a 
significant theme of Elphaba’s goodwill, as opposed to malevolence like her 
sister; thus, Nessa’s heart could also serve as the real issue. 
As the Outsider, however, I wonder if Elphaba’s viewpoint would have 
been considered at the outset, and if a white normative paradigm would have 
given voice to her narrative? I recognize that this is perhaps an advanced and 
subjective analysis for a first-year law student or even junior associate. Further, 
I can empathize with the concern of whether a law student or junior attorney 
should question how an issue is posed. But the difficulty and uncomfortable-
ness of such an inquiry is not a reason to avoid it altogether. In many ways this 
questioning, this curiosity, this heightened awareness to systems of power, 
class, or other markers that divide, is no longer an add-on that students can af-
ford to be without in their legal education. By no means should we teach law 
students to challenge their superior’s framing of an issue, but students can learn 
to provide additional or appropriate context of an issue to discern whether there 
is a perspective that is lacking, an interpretation that is skewed, or a voice that 
is missing.285 
 
285  A discussion of expansive issue framing need not be overly complex. For example, I 
teach my students to consider the context of their issue in light of, what I call, the “Big W”—
the Big Win. Consider a California statute that permits certain contracts to be void and unen-
forceable if they violate public policy. To determine if a contract does in fact violate public 
policy turns on five factors stemming from a seminal California Supreme Court decision. 
The particular issue for the student’s memo may be to determine if two of those factors are 
met. I pose to them, what is the issue? To equip them only with IRAC is to end up with “pick 
of the litter” of issues. That is, some students may say the issue is whether factor one is met. 
They would be correct. Other students may say the issue is whether factor two is met. They 
also would be correct. Some may say the issue is whether both factors are met. They too, 
would be correct. And a small few might view the problem from a more aerial view and sug-
gest the issue is whether the contract is void for public policy. Also correct. How is the “I” of 
IRAC helpful here? It is not. But by teaching context, perspective, and audience needs and 
expectations, students can learn that framing the issue so narrowly as whether factor one is 
met does not lead them to the Big Win. They cannot win (or resolve the problem) on that 
conversation alone. The problem is whether the contract is void for public policy. That larger 
overarching issue turns on a few small conversations about the factors. I teach my students to 
always put themselves in the shoes of the court, the supervising attorney, and critically think 
whether their audience will know the larger resolve if the student offers “Whether factor one 
is met” as the singular issue. I have little doubt that many legal writing professors similarly 
guide their students to recognize both narrow and broad issues. The point is not one of sim-
ple issue spotting, but a broader focus on shift in perspective—a novel idea for novice law 
students. 
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B. The Scarecrow & Lion: On a Voice for the Voiceless 
“[B]ecause legal writing pedagogy reflects the biases in legal language (in-
cluding legal reasoning), its effectiveness in “socializing” law students comes 
at the price of suppressing the voices of those who have already been histori-
cally marginalized by legal language.”—Kathryn Stanchi286 
Who could forget the oversized ball of caramel fur (with soft curls framing 
his face) who burst fiercely from the forest toward Dorothy, only to retreat in 
pain when Dorothy slapped him on the nose? And then there was the billowing 
sack of hay, situated atop a wooden stake surrounded by a golden field, lacking 
any intellectual dexterity. That was the 1939 portrayal of the Cowardly Lion 
and Scarecrow, respectively, in The Wizard of Oz. As our story moves away 
from the Tin Man, if there is an essential theme that stems from Elphaba’s in-
teraction with the Cowardly Lion and Scarecrow, it is this: she is compelled to 
defend those who cannot defend themselves, to be a voice for the voiceless. 
The discussion of the Scarecrow and Cowardly Lion together is intentional 
because through Elphaba’s own narrative, her interaction with the lion cub in 
Act I reveals the theme of her need to defend the voiceless and serves as a pas-
sionate catalyst for reaction toward the Scarecrow’s potential demise in Act II. 
Let us start with the Cowardly Lion to discover where he is and when he 
lost his voice. This revelation actually begins with Boq—now the Tin Man—in 
Act II. The Tin Man knows where the Lion is. In Scene eleven, Boq has all but 
led the charge in the hunt for the Wicked Witch of the West. He is just a tad 
bitter about being turned into tin. As proof of the depraved condition of his own 
heart (or space where a heart would be), he confesses that as more than a ser-
vice to the Wizard, he has a “personal score to settle with Elph . . . with the 
witch!” because she turned him into tin.287 Stepping aside from his own rage 
momentarily, he adds that he is not the only one that has a bone to pick with 
Elphaba. As he turns his head offstage, he yells into the darkness, “Oh, come 
on, you! Come out and tell them what she did to you in class that day. How you 
were just a cub and she cubnapped you.”288 And in his hidden Broadway debut, 
a meek shout is heard from the abyss, “no!” To this, Boq turns back to the 
crowd inciting them that the Lion also has a gripe with the witch because, “[i]f 
she’d let him fight his own battles when he was young, he wouldn’t be a cow-
ard today!”289 
 
286  Stanchi, supra note 12, at 9 (adding that “[l]aw is a species of language that some lin-
guists call a ‘language of power’ or ‘high language’—a prestigious type of language that 
must be used if the speaker is to function effectively and to which only the most powerful 
members of society have access.”). 
287  Wicked Script, supra note 243, at act II, sc. 11 (“It’s due to her I’m made of tin[,] her 
spell made this occur[,] so for once I’m glad I’m heartless[,] I’ll be heartless killing her!”). 
288  Id. 
289  Id. 
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For context, we must briefly return back to Act I, during Elphaba’s college 
days where her personal relationship with her professor, who is himself an out-
sider, is really the fuel behind her crusade for marginalized voices. Briefly, her 
professor Dr. Dillamond, a talking goat (which could only happen in a musical 
of course), had been fired from the university because animals were no longer 
permitted to teach and were being silenced.290 After Dr. Dillamond informs the 
class of his departure, a new professor, a human being and insider, attempts to 
offer some semblance of understanding to the students. The new human profes-
sor is pointing to a cage on stage as he begins to speak, assuaging the students’ 
concern that the changes in Oz are ringing with the “silence of progress.”291 He 
slowly moves to pull the cloth off the cage revealing a lion cub inside, and re-
marks, “[n]ow, we will be seeing more and more of them in the near future. 
This remarkable innovation is actually for the Animal’s own good . . . .”292 
While some of the students seemed intrigued, Elphaba questions whether “this 
is for his own good,” as she and the other students watch the lion cub trem-
ble.293 
Adding to the theme of goodwill, Elphaba’s narrative in this scene high-
lights her championing the burden of the voiceless. Perhaps it was her collegial 
relationship with Dr. Dillamond—that they could relate as marginalized citi-
zens of Oz—or her outrage at the new professor’s implication that there were 
actually “benefits of caging a [l]ion cub,” namely that “he never, in fact, will 
learn to speak[,]”294 which fueled her social justice movement to rescue the an-
imals. Whatever it was, she must have felt pressured to help because she and 
Fiyero grabbed the lion cub from the classroom and ran away in efforts to free 
him.295 Perhaps a bit unsure of the wisdom of Elphaba’s defense of the Lion, or 
himself as being an accomplice to her actions, Fiyero comments that Elphaba is 
always “causing some sort of commotion.”296 Her response is telling that her 
support is more of a distressing burden she must carry versus any drive toward 
some loftier version of herself. She proclaims, “[o]h! So you think I should just 
keep my mouth shut! Is that what you're saying? . . . Do you think I want to be 
this way? Do you think I want to care this much? Don’t you know how much 
easier my life would be if I didn’t?”297 
Before moving to the parallels between Elphaba’s interaction with the 
Cowardly Lion and the Analytical Framework, let us visit the Scarecrow, 
whose voiceless story requires a bit of a passage through Elphaba and Glinda’s 
relationship. Wicked transports us back before the timeline in The Wizard of Oz 
 
290  Id. at act I, sc. 11, sc. 6. 
291  Id. at act I, sc. 11. 
292  Id. 
293  Id. 
294  Id. 
295  Id. 
296  Id. 
297  Id. 
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and introduces us to Fiyero, the hunky new boy in town and college classmate 
of Glinda.298 Of relevance, I promise, at the end of Act I, Elphaba has found her 
courage to challenge all of Oz and is essentially trying to avoid being captured. 
[And as a side note, in the love triangle (or quadrangle) between Nessarose af-
ter Boq after Glinda after Fiyero, Fiyero is now intrigued by Elphaba, natural-
ly]. In Act II, as an attempt to lure Elphaba back to Oz to capture her, and ad-
mittedly a bit perturbed over losing Fiyero’s heart, it is Glinda who suggests for 
the town to trick Elphaba into believing her sister is in trouble [see, Act I’s love 
quadrangle is very relevant].299 And the trick? Probably one of the most well-
known movie scenes of all time—Dorothy’s house dropping on the Wicked 
Witch of the East, Nessarose. When Elphaba rushes to Oz only to find her sister 
dead, she encounters Glinda supposedly mourning over Nessarose’s death.300 
After a brief exchange of words with glares, between once enemies, turned 
friends, and now enemies again, the guards appear to capture Elphaba.301 As 
Elphaba struggles to get free, the hunky love-triangle college-boy-turned Cap-
tain of the Guard appears and commands that the other guards let Elphaba go or 
he will kill Glinda.302 After Elphaba is released and tries to leave with Fiyero,303 
Fiyero is then seized.304 As the plot thickens on the greatest love triangle Oz 
has ever seen, the fate of Fiyero results in yet another visionary genius moment 
for fans of The Wizard of Oz. The scene ends with a second guard yelling for 
Fiyero to be taken to a nearby field and placed on a “poles until he tells [them] 
where the witch went.”305 
In the next scene Elphaba’s instinctive ache and fight for the defenseless is 
revealed. In her musical monologue the accompanying score is so fast you can 
almost feel Elphaba’s heart race as she drops to the floor and begins chanting 
frantically from her book of spells. And in between the indiscernible incanta-
tions, she pushes out her plea in English that gives the audience a gripping look 
into her pain, “let his flesh not be torn let his blood leave no stain, will they 
beat him, let him feel no pain . . . let his bones never break and however they 
try to destroy him let him never die, let him never die!”306 If you have not seen 
 
298  Id. at act I, sc. 7. 
299  Id. at act II, sc. 5 (noting it was Madame Morrible, (former Head of Shiz and now the 
Press Secretary) who takes it too far). 
300  Id. at act II, sc. 9. 
301  Id. In case you are curious, part of Elphaba’s irritation with Glinda in this scene is that 
when Elphaba arrives, Glinda is waving Dorothy off as Dorothy skips down the Yellow 
Brick Road wearing the infamous red shoes. To which Elphaba remarks, “I wanted some-
thing to remember [Nessarose] by, and all that is left were those shoes, and now that 
wretched little farm girl has walked off with them. So I’d appreciate some time, alone, to say 
goodbye to my sister.” Id. 
302  Id. 
303  Id. 
304  Id. 
305  Id. 
306  Id. at act II, sc. 10. 
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the musical, the moment where she desperately tries to save Fiyero (her love 
interest) is incredibly powerful. When I close my eyes and visualize this scene 
live on stage, the lights are dim with a shallow spotlight on Elphaba who is 
slouched on the ground, her back to the audience, and she is almost shaking as 
she rocks back and forth over her spell book. You can feel the intensity of her 
pleas from the orchestra box to the balcony. Eventually the Guards capture 
Elphaba when they find her with Dorothy . . . still trying to get those red 
shoes,307 after which Elphaba accepts her fate (the infamous scene where Doro-
thy dumps a water bucket on the witch’s head).308 
And what became of Fiyero who was placed on a pole in a field? In the fi-
nal scene as the Ozians are singing a modern twist on the classic “Ding Dong 
the Witch is Dead,”309 Fiyero, to the shock of the audience, appears on stage as 
the Scarecrow. He bends down, knocks on a trap door on the stage floor, and 
says, “[i]t worked!”310 In what is one of the best Wicked reveals, in my opinion, 
the trap door opens and out climbs Elphaba, who looks at Fiyero and touches 
his straw face, saying, “Fiyero! I thought you’d never get here.”311 You can 
hear the cheers explode in the audience, which barely quiet down enough to 
hear Fiyero respond, “[g]o ahead, touch, I don’t mind. Ah, you did the best you 
could. You saved my life.”312 
Now we come full circle on the comparisons between Elphaba’s interac-
tions with the Cowardly Lion and the Scarecrow. Out of her passion-filled 
rambling and incantation to save Fiyero’s life, we can see remnants of her pas-
sion-filled cubnapping of the Cowardly Lion during her time in college. Con-
trary to Fiyero suggesting that she is always causing a commotion, it is imagi-
nable that her actions stem from her natural instincts to protect. In fact, she 
appears frustrated that she “care[s] this much” about ensuring there is justice in 
Oz for all the voices, including the animals. This stance is not arguably one she 
signed up for, but one she feels compelled toward even in view of opposition 
by an entire community. I found myself pausing at her words to Fiyero, “[c]an 
you imagine a world where Animals . . . never speak?”313 And we cannot let it 
slip that the Tin Man (Boq) suggests that if Elphaba had let the Lion “fight his 
own battles,” he would not be a coward today. But the lion cub was grabbed 
and caged by a governing body who touted the caging and silence of all the an-
imals as a “remarkable innovation” that was somehow for their own good.314 
The irony is hopefully not lost as to how many global communities this senti-
ment metaphorically rings true for. 
 
307  Id. at act II, sc. 13. 
308  Id. 
309  Id. at act II, sc 14. 
310  Id. 
311  Id. 
312  Id. 
313  Id. at act I, sc. 11. 
314  Id. 
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If we allow Elphaba’s heart ache for caring so much to be the lens through 
which we view her spell for Fiyero, the integral nature of her need to champion 
for those who cannot fight for themselves is palpable, despite any clear or logi-
cal process for doing so. She literally makes no sense when she cries out to 
save Fiyero, toggling furiously between unclear incantations and English. If he 
bleeds, she cries for there to be no stain, for his bones not to break as they beat 
him, that he never dies. In our finite minds, how is any of that possible? The 
point is that her need to try, her need to speak out even if it was ridiculous or 
hopeless, outweighed any thought of being silent. For both the Cowardly Lion 
and the Scarecrow, it was her voice and actions that saved them from a lesser 
state, or at the very least ensured their personhood was not rendered invisible. 
We cannot always say as much about the law. The law, as represented by fed-
eral and state constitutions, legislation, and judicial opinions is a static fixture 
that, at best, can capture the vision of a progressive society,315 and at worst, 
memorialize its darkest moments.316 And as time ebbs on, and tomorrow be-
 
315  See, e.g., Jamison v. McClendon, No. 3:16-CV-595-CWR-LRA, 2020 WL 4497723, at 
*9, *11, *28 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 4, 2020). This is a 2020 incident where Clarence Jamison, an 
African American man, had purchased a 2001 Mercedes-Benz convertible and was pulled 
over by a “White” officer, Nick McClendon, because the temporary car tag was folded over 
and not visible to the officer. Id. at *3. Yet after the background check “came back clear 
immediately[,]” the officer still ran a criminal history on both Jamison and his car. Id. After 
asking five times to search the vehicle, Jamison relented because the “officer refused to lis-
ten” to him that there was nothing in his car. Id. at *4. The officer later admitted that he lied 
about having received a phone call about cocaine being in Jamison’s car. Id. at *3–4. The 
stop lasted nearly two hours and included the following assertions: the car was stolen, 
Jamison did not have insurance, and the officer deployed a drug dog. Id. at *5. Ultimately, 
the officer admitted he did not find anything suspicious. Id. While it was determined that 
qualified immunity protected Officer McClendon’s reasonable suspicion to stop the car, 
Jamison presented a motion to determine if qualified immunity was appropriate on Jamison’s 
lack of consent and prolonged stop claim. Id. at *6. The court’s opinion leaned on the history 
of the Civil Rights movement, the history of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983—born from the failure 
of the South to cope with the violence from the Ku Klux Klan—and the twentieth century 
Supreme Court’s limitation of the scope and effectiveness of Section 1983 through the quali-
fied immunity doctrine, which has resulted in a multitude of harms. Id. at *7, *9, *11. It con-
cluded, in part, that it would “not be fooled by legal jargon. Immunity is not exoneration. 
And the harm in this case to one man sheds light on the harm done to the nation by this man-
ufactured doctrine. As the Fourth Circuit concluded, ‘This has to stop.’ ” Id. at *3. 
316  Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled 
by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“The white race deems itself to be the dom-
inant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, 
and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great 
heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the constitu-
tion, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citi-
zens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.”), with Jamison, 2020 WL 497723, at *21 (“A reader would be for-
given for pausing here and wondering whether we forgot to mention something. When in 
this analysis will the Court look at the elephant in the room—how race may have played a 
role in whether Officer McClendon’s actions were coercive? Jamison was a Black man driv-
ing through Mississippi, a state known for the violent deaths of Black people and others who 
fought for their freedom. . . . For Black people, this isn’t mere history. It’s the present.”). 
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comes today, and today becomes history, who is to say how many caged lion 
cubs were overlooked and not set free, thus figuratively losing their ability to 
speak by not being represented in the law? 
The IRAC paradigm wholly eliminates an explicit directive or implicit 
sense to consider whether reliance on the past, i.e., analogical reasoning, would 
be helpful in illustrating the parameters of a particular rule. Yet, the Analytical 
Framework is constructed at the outset to encourage students to view the whole 
of the legal analysis through a particular lens, such as cultural, indigenous, rhe-
torical, social, or economic justice. And in view of the chosen framework, the 
student engages with certain considerations at every stage of the analysis—
which, over time, can become intuitive (e.g., viewing precedent for gaps in rep-
resentation or voice, or limitations in controlling law). It is not that the Analyti-
cal Framework inserts a stream of consciousness that structurally uproots the 
need for an issue, rule, analysis, or conclusion, as is common in legal discourse. 
Rather, for novice law students, the Framework removes the formulaic strait-
jacket and welcomes a healthy interrogation of the law to consider whether the 
current law (which can still be decades old) reflects today’s voices or con-
cerns.317 
The elephant in the room, to me, is examining whether we are so tethered 
to “objective” writing that we are paralyzed with fear to depart from this tradi-
tional route, and whether this fear is suffocating us as professors and our stu-
dents. If we seek creativity and depth, consideration of many viewpoints—yes, 
even in a legal memorandum—can we continue to leave our human self and all 
our multi-faceted identity aspects out of the writer’s pen?318 Does the law re-
quire us to? To this point, the work of Arthur Miller is instructive as he chal-
lenges this “myth of objectivity in legal research and writing.”319 He writes: 
What this proposition means, in essence, is that the very reasoning process of 
lawyers, including judges and law professors, is from conclusion to premise ra-
ther than a logical deduction from major premises to conclusions. At the very 
best, legal reasoning depends on choices to be made from basic value premises, 
choices that quite often (perhaps usually) can only be personal and essentially 
 
317  See, e.g., McClendon, 2020 WL 4497723, at *2–3, *12–13, *17 (2020 federal case judi-
cially challenging the limits of qualified immunity for law enforcement); Sonia M. Gipson 
Rankin, Technological Tethereds: Potential Impact of Untrustworthy Artificial Intelligence 
in Criminal Justice Risk Assessment Instruments, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021) (manuscript at 2–4) (arguing against the use of AI in criminal justice reform because 
the court has “yet to address legal issues caused by likely hacked artificial intelligence,” and 
“without transparent safeguards to ensure that data sources have not been manipulated,” Af-
rican American people and other people of color will be disproportionally harmed), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3662761 [https://perma.cc/D5TZ-X276]. 
318  I continue to be drawn to the McClendon opinion, where the court asked, “When in this 
analysis will the Court look at the elephant in the room—how race may have played a role in 
whether Officer McClendon’s actions were coercive?” McClendon, 2020 WL 4497723, at 
*21. 
319  Arthur Selwyn Miller, The Myth of Objectivity in Legal Research and Writing, 18 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 290 (1969). 
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arbitrary. . . . In whatever type of dialogue that is conducted, including law, the 
personal valuations of the actor unavoidably are part of his presentation.320 
In other words, why is objectivity the standard, aloof elimination of human 
connection to the law?321 
Return with me briefly to the scene where Elphaba is tricked into returning 
to Oz to mourn for the loss of her sister. Being dubbed a “wicked” fugitive on 
the run, she is captured by the guards. When Fiyero, coincidentally the Captain 
of the Guards, commands his own men to let Elphaba go at the potential risk of 
Glinda being harmed, it is Fiyero who is then seized. Perhaps the Ozian law re-
quires extinction for anyone who threatens royalty. But can we see the short-
sightedness of a law that fails to hear marginalized voices and human experi-
ence? This “law” not only ignored the actual victim, but it was unable to cast 
any other character as deserving of being heard. Glinda, the only victim the law 
actually seemed to protect, was ignored when she sought a different outcome. 
Fiyero was left for dead when he took a stand against a system that ignored one 
of its own community members. And Elphaba, as the unquestionable Other in 
this scene, having been lured under false pretenses, never had a chance to 
speak to defend herself. It is telling that not only do both people in privileged 
positions (Glinda, as royalty, and Fiyero, as law enforcement) tell Elphaba to 
run away, but their own privileged statuses could not even reason with the law 
on its own terms. Is the law that untouchable? 
Whether the law is right or wrong is actually the lesser concern to whether 
it can give voice to human experience. A critical Analytical Framework offers 
the starting point for where the law is on a particular principle, but it is also 
malleable enough to consider how that principle has been represented, inter-
preted, modified, and so forth. Thus, to the extent the law fails to account for a 
new voice or human experience, the Analytical Framework can empathize and 
is comfortable raising that point too.322 
For Elphaba, she often seemed burdened by her own complexity through-
out her life but nonetheless walked in her calling toward defending the welfare 
of the defenseless. When a law student gains comfort in critically evaluating 
the law and how to configure it in a narrative way—to lessen, modify, expand, 
 
320  Id. at 293, 298. 
321  See id. at 299 (“In the words of Karl Mannheim, the ‘type of objectivity [that is attaina-
ble] in the social sciences [and presumably this has to include law] is . . . not through the ex-
clusion of evaluations but through the critical awareness and control of them.’ ”). I recognize 
that Miller’s article discusses legal scholarship at some length, whose audience is admittedly 
different than a legal client; but Miller also takes care to discuss the myth of objectivity as it 
relates to judges that have taken the bench after years of practice and speaks broadly of law-
yers. Miller’s broader focus concerns the objectivity in legal research and writing and the 
myth that research and writing about “legal matters can be free from value judgments of the 
writer or commentator. . . . The requirement, in sum, is to perceive that not only is objectivi-
ty unattainable, but that it is not even desirable.” Id. at 291–93, 304. Thus, I argue his propo-
sition has applicability for law students, and perhaps even more so, that they gain awareness 
of a human connection to the law at the outset of their legal education. 
322  See supra notes 317–18 and accompanying text. 
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or maintain a general rule—I think they are freed from needing to be perfect in 
their exposition of it. Elphaba was certainly not perfect in her spell to try to 
save Fiyero, nor in her rescue attempt of the Cowardly Lion. And to say she 
lacked privilege would be an understatement. But she was the only voice that 
took a stand for the welfare of others, and it certainly earned her the love of the 
audience in the end. Similarly, the law is arguably forced to listen to the other 
voices that may come to its door bearing no privilege. I do not suggest that nov-
ice legal writers engage in a “let me decide if I like the law and want to use it” 
approach when engaging with constitutions, statutes, or precedent. Even the 
most free-spirited of us lawyers (and I count myself in that rank) can respect 
the need for borders that separate the objectives of varying professions. But 
once students learn the general rule of law in its current state, who is to say so-
ciety is better for accepting “limits ‘cuz someone says they’re so.”323 Even the 
Wizard of Oz himself is worthy of being challenged for the greater good. 
C. The Wizard: On Dismantling Power 
“What we have to recognize is that the creation of the fiction of tradition is a 
matter of power, not justice, and that that power has always been in the hands 
of men—mostly white but some black. Women are the disinherited.”—Mary 
Helen Washington324 
Finally, we come to the great and powerful Wizard of Oz. Literary history 
knows him well: the small mortal man who hid behind a curtain while electron-
ically projecting on a screen an obnoxiously oversized bald green head whom 
the crowd believed possessed magical powers. That was the 1939 portrayal of 
the infamous Wizard of Oz. Like the stories before, fast forward a few decades 
to Wicked, and we are transported back in time and introduced to the Wizard, 
the leader of Oz, who—unknown to Elphaba—is actually her father.325 (This 
was the biggest cinematic reveal since Darth Vader as Luke Skywalker’s father, 
again, in my opinion). 
The theme that prevails from Elphaba’s interaction with the Wizard is quite 
simple: The Wizard is a corrupt power structure that must be dismantled. This 
was Gregory Maguire’s goal when he wrote Wicked. When Maguire was inter-
viewed about his inspiration for Wicked, he essentially sought out to show the 
 
323  Wicked Script, supra note 243, at act I, sc. 17. 
324  Washington, supra note 37, at 32. 
325  Wicked Script, supra note 243 (noting in Act I, Scene 1, the birth of Elphaba stemming 
from an affair between the Wizard and Elphaba’s mother, where the Wizard gave her mother 
a green potion prior to Elphaba’s birth, and Act II, Scene 13, where Glinda gives the same 
green bottle to the Wizard after Elphaba left Oz, informing the Wizard that Elphaba always 
carried it with her). 
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more sinister side of the Wizard, an aspect the 1939 movie failed to do.326 He 
stated that he 
began thinking about the story of ‘The Wizard of Oz’ when [he] was about 
5[.] . . . The witch scared me, sure, but so did the wizard. What really frightened 
me was that he confessed to doing terrible deeds. In the film Dorothy says, 
‘You’re a bad man’ and he says, ‘No, I’m just a bad wizard.’ And Dorothy just 
simpers and that’s the end of the conversation. But she should have said, ‘Ex-
cuse me, are you listening? Read my lips. You are a bad man.’327 
In the 1939 film, The Wizard of Oz, the Wizard first appears as an older 
white man, a traveling magician, who Dorothy meets on the road when she runs 
away from her terribly perfect life. After this brief interaction between Dorothy 
and the magician, we do not see him again until the end of the film, when 
Dorothy and her friends—the Scarecrow, Tin Man, and Cowardly Lion— try to 
get help in sending Dorothy back home and appear before the Wizard, a larger-
than-life green bald head projected on a screen. Fans of the film know how this 
story ends. The Wizard makes the group prove themselves by killing the Wick-
ed Witch of the West, and when they do, he still denies their requests. Irritated, 
by an already long journey and now this broken promise, Dorothy manages to 
uncover the small modest man—coincidentally the traveling magician—hidden 
behind the curtain feigning real power. Classic. 
Fast forward to 2003, and the Wizard appears in the opening scene as the 
“Lover” of Elphaba’s mother, while her father was away on business.328 And it 
was this Lover that provided her mother with a peculiar green drink that set 
Elphaba’s life on a difficult course from birth.329 When Elphaba begins her col-
lege studies, Madame Morrible, the director of Shiz University, learns that 
Elphaba has magical powers and takes a personal interest in her.330 In this mo-
ment Elphaba’s powers, which have previously caused her grief, are reimag-
ined as she is told that her talent is a gift and her gift can help her meet the 
Wizard so long as she “make[s] good.”331 Thus, the desire to meet the Wizard 
begins, as does her singular focus to be good so that the Wizard might “de-
greenify” her one day.332 
Most systems of power do not begin corrupt; it can often be a slow fade 
that answers the call of greed. Such was the case with the Wizard. At the end of 
Act I we catch a glimpse of the Wizard’s true intentions. Now great friends, 
 
326  Rizzo, supra note 26 (“And that was the point Maguire’s revisionist look at the tale be-
gan, he says, one in which he presented a sympathetic perspective to the Wicked Witch of 
the West and a more sinister one for that man behind the curtain. Maguire’s was a much 
more complicated, nuanced and human story than what was portrayed in either the 1900 
book by L. Frank Baum or the 1939 movie musical.”). 
327  Id. 
328  Wicked Script, supra note 243, act I, sc. 1. 
329  Id. 
330  Id. at act I, sc. 2. 
331  Id. 
332  Id. at act I, sc. 3. 
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Glinda and Elphaba have come to the Emerald City to see the Wizard. As the 
two young ladies stand trembling before the incredibly large head, flashbacks 
of the 1939 Dorothy and her friends are likely racing through the audience’s 
mind. The Wizard is delighted to meet Elphaba, and stepping from behind the 
large head he remarks that he “hardly ever let[s] people meet the real [him],” 
because “people expect this sort of thing[, and] [y]ou have to give people what 
they want.”333 And most of all, he loves making people happy.334 
Making people happy seems the appropriate life goal for a magical wizard, 
does it not? Or for any privileged system for that matter. But lest we take com-
fort that we can leave Elphaba safely in the hands of the Wizard where all of 
her proverbial hopes and dreams will come true, we quickly learn that “making 
people happy” comes at a cost. When Elphaba reveals that she has come to him 
because something bad is happening to the animals in Oz, the Wizard asks her 
to prove herself with some sort of gesture—“something to test her adept-
ness.”335 And right on cue, Madame Morrible enters the scene, to the shock of 
Glinda and Elphaba. She is the new Press Secretary who has “risen up in the 
world,” and comments that, “[y]ou’ll find that the Wizard is a very generous 
man. If you do something for him, he’ll do much for you.”336 The air is thick 
with the stench of quid pro quo. 
Nervously asking what the Wizard wants her to do, Elphaba is handed the 
infamous book of ancient spells.337 Offhandedly, as if they just thought of the 
idea, the Wizard and Madame Morrible “suggest” Elphaba use the book to con-
jure up a levitation spell so that the Wizard’s servant monkey, Chistery, would 
be able to fly with the birds in the sky, which the Wizard believes he desperate-
ly seeks to do.338 As Elphaba begins chanting, the Wizard appears delighted at 
the forthcoming experience for the monkey, remarking that “everyone deserves 
the chance to fly!”339 But when the monkey begins to scream, Elphaba stops, 
and seeing the monkey writhe in pain because wings painfully sprout out of his 
back, she cries out asking how she can reverse the spell.340 Sadly, she cannot, to 
the obvious delight of the Wizard and Madame Morrible.341 
Their plan from the beginning was to use Elphaba’s power to turn the 
monkeys into spies, to have them fly around Oz and “[r]eport any subversive 
Animal activity.”342 This scheme was not one Elphaba was prepared for, as she 
remarks, “You can’t read this book at all! Can you? That’s why you need ene-
 
333  Id. at act I, sc. 15. 
334  Id. 
335  Id. 
336  Id. 
337  Id. 
338  Id. 
339  Id. 
340  Id. 
341  Id. 
342  Id. 
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mies, and cages, and spies. You have no real power,” to which the Wizard sin-
isterly replies, “Exactly . . . that’s why I need you.”343 The slow fade to corrup-
tion has begun (or continues). While Act I reveals the Wizard’s sinister plot to 
take over the world, well . . . at least Oz, Act II renders his entire character re-
pugnant. 
This battle with the Wizard is Elphaba’s largest challenge yet. Her prior in-
teractions with the Tin Man, the Cowardly Lion, and the Scarecrow warmed 
our hearts toward her—we could see that she had been misjudged, and that she 
was a champion for the voiceless. But what does she gain by challenging the 
Wizard of Oz—the voice and protector of the people? If she is wrong about 
him, the public’s sentiment toward her as “wicked” will be cemented in history. 
And if she is right, who would care? She will have exposed a fraud that every-
one else seemed comfortable being blinded by. 
Unmoved by the odds, in Scene four, Elphaba appears again before the 
Wizard proclaiming her intent to set the monkeys free, and this time she is far 
less naïve about his supposed wonderfulness. The Wizard’s response is subtly 
seductive. In one of the few musical monologues the Wizard has, his score, ti-
tled “Wonderful,” in many ways resembles Glinda’s score “Popular,” in Act I. 
Both songs make us question the rise to their privileged status positions, and to 
the critical part in us, how Glinda and the Wizard comfortably rested in their 
unearned positions. This is the blind spot of privilege. During his song the 
Wizard reveals that he never asked to be the Wizard, that he was “blown here 
by the winds of chance.”344 In fact, he calls himself a “dime a dozen mediocra-
tes,” who out of nowhere was “respected, worshipped even just because the 
folks in Oz needed someone to believe in.”345 Perhaps we cannot fault the Wiz-
ard from getting carried away; after all, he was called “wonderful”—they 
thought he was wonderful.346 Elphaba is mesmerized by his narrative, and for a 
brief moment he dances around and lures her in with the possibility of being 
deemed wonderful by the masses.347 And can we blame her? Power, privilege, 
status is at her fingertips, and she drinks the Kool-Aid on the singular condition 
that the Wizard set the monkeys free.348 
As the energy of the music increases, the Wizard opens the cage door and 
many of the monkeys fly away.349 With delight, Elphaba cheers, “Go! Fly! 
You’re Free! Fly! Chistery, Chistery, you’re free, isn’t it wonderful?! Go, 
fly!”350 As she makes her way to what she believes is another monkey covered 
by a sheet, the Wizard tries to stop her, but she pulls off the cover to reveal Dr. 
 
343  Id. 
344  Id. at act II, sc. 4. 
345  Id. 
346  Id. 
347  Id. 
348  See id. 
349  Id. 
350  Id. act II, sc. 5. 
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Dillamond, her former college professor.351 He is huddled up and scared, and 
simply looks at Elphaba and says, “Bahhhhh.”352 He cannot speak. The dancing 
has stopped. In complete rage, but with a resolute voice, Elphaba looks toward 
the Wizard and sternly says, “No . . . We have nothing in common. I am noth-
ing like you and I never will be and I will fight you until the day I die!!!”353 
Whether she has weighed the cost of her statement or even cares is unclear. But 
fight him she will. 
The famed Wizard of Oz, this iconic power structure, is not so wonderful 
as his glowing resume reveals, circa 1939 and 2003. He is a white middle-aged 
businessman, a self-proclaimed “mediocrites,” who had an affair, was unaware 
he had a child, and who was presumed competent enough to govern an entire 
community because he was in the right place at the time. And having done 
nothing of substance to earn this position of supreme power, he makes those 
less fortunate do his dirty work to prove their worth for his resources. Oh, and 
how he lies, easily and often. Whether power and dominance created this wick-
edness, or the wickedness had the space to finally be released due to power and 
dominance, we can only guess. But what is clear, and disheartening, is that the 
citizens of Oz needed “someone to believe in.”354 Isn’t it wonderful? 
I am almost at a loss of words in highlighting the inadequacy of IRAC to 
assist students in dismantling systems of power. I jokingly tell my students that 
the way they earn their money as lawyers is through the application of the law 
to the facts, that everything else the client can Google. I believe this is true. 
Even still, for law students tethered to IRAC, the deductive reasoning required 
to apply law to the facts is likely a systemic process of looking at one element, 
determining whether our facts satisfy that element—yes or no—and moving on 
to the next consideration. Yes, we take care to teach students how to locate the 
law, and as previously discussed, to consider how the law has been interpreted, 
modified, and so forth. But the implication of that law for a specific client is 
not easily spelled out for them, and this can be a space of heightened resistance. 
It is human nature to want to be right, and for novice law students, being right 
often means to mimic something that was deemed “right” before, and if the cli-
ent’s facts align with the precedent, the client is right; and if the facts do not so 
align, the client is wrong. End analysis. If the existing law, however, has not 
only failed to include particular voices, but, like the master plot of the Wizard 
and Madame Morrible, is actually intended to preserve a status inequity, is it so 
wicked to challenge it? This is the very reason many students come to law 
school—to use the law to change systems of inequality. 
The Analytical Framework allows students to push against inequities.355 It 
permits law students to consider, if appropriate, counter-analysis and policy 
 
351  Id. 
352  Id. 
353  Id. 
354  Id. act II, sc. 4. 
355  See supra notes 317–18 and accompanying text. 
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considerations where the law itself perpetuates a harm to an individual or 
community. Is there an injustice that is being advanced in the name of good-
will? A discrimination that is being cloaked in equality? In Wicked, the law 
prevented the animals from speaking, and the government worked to enforce 
that law by any means necessary. A rote application of that law to Chistery (the 
monkey), Dr. Dillamond (goat), or any other animal, resulted in the obvious 
conclusion that they were to be captured and silenced—and if caging them fur-
thered that objective, so be it. To push against this law is to push against the 
system that created it, and Elphaba accepted the consequence of her decision. 
But a similar decision is a tall order not only for law students, but lawyers 
alike. Whether to push is a moral and value-driven choice, but the intellectual 
space to do so is within the boundaries of the Analytical Framework. 
Helpful in supporting a push, in Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to In-
terrogate Racial Privilege, john a. powell suggests that where 
responses to the power structure are available [they] should be implemented, 
even if they do not represent a complete solution. The search for a total solution 
not only should not stand in the way of action. It also should be built on a con-
sciousness that attempts to abandon systems that altogether cannot leave the 
Other “intact.”356 
Being an Other is difficult in a dominant society.357 Elphaba understood 
that all too well. I would argue that one of the hallmark features of the legal 
profession—if not at its inception, then in this current age of cultural globaliza-
tion—is to use critical analysis to challenge dominant structures in view of 
bringing equality to Other, or non-dominant groups. Consider the various civil 
rights and liberties that have been granted to traditionally marginalized com-
munities because someone was brave enough to use a creative framework to 
dismantle unequal systems of power. The legal profession could use a few 
more green-skinned people. 
We have now come to the end of the road, although not the yellow brick 
one. And it is my hope that the untold narrative of the Analytical Framework 
has come alive through the life of Elphaba and her interaction with the other 
famed characters from The Wizard of Oz. As Act II demonstrates, if given the 
 
356  powell, supra note 49, at 426–27 (discussing a visibility approach used by Ruth Franken-
berg). 
357  While beyond the scope of this Article, for a critical examination of how law students 
who are Others are affected by legal writing pedagogy, see Stanchi, supra note 12, at 37–38. 
(“[T]he existence of a wide gap between personal and professional opinion means that the 
part of the writer’s identity that causes the gap is not ‘professional’ and has no place in the 
law. When that part of the writer’s identity is the writer’s outsider status, whether race, eth-
nicity, gender, or sexual orientation, the outsider status is what is devalued—it is that part of 
the writer’s ‘I’ that is expunged. The teaching of objective writing exacerbates this because it 
teaches that the information that belongs in the memorandum is professional and therefore, 
valued. This means that any other opinions are devalued, and the experiences on which the 
opinions are based are not the norm. The social method of acculturation contributes to this 
by imposing, and therefore valuing, the existing legal language and culture and expunging, 
and therefore devaluing, any competing language and cultures.”). 
21 NEV. L.J. 655 
726 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:2  
chance, the Analytical Framework can shift what is the heart of the issue, as 
seen through the Tin Man; it can provide a voice for the voiceless, as seen 
through the Scarecrow and Cowardly Lion; and—if it dares—it can dismantle 
power structures, as seen through the famed Wizard himself. 
EPILOGUE 
In view of the broader theme of this Article, if there is one aspect of Elpha-
ba’s narrative that I would change, it is this: when she tells Glinda that she, 
Elphaba, is limited. As an audience we have been invited to learn about Elpha-
ba’s birth, her dysfunctional family, her formative collegiate years, and her re-
lationship with Glinda the Good Witch, the “only friend [she’s] ever had.”358 In 
the final scenes where Elphaba and Glinda are together, and Elphaba is ready to 
surrender to her impending death by water, she implores Glinda to not try to 
clear her name, and to carry on the work that Elphaba was unable to do.359 As 
the two friends see each other for the last time, there is a magic and gentleness 
on stage as they honor the friendship in a tender number titled, “For Good.”360 
Glinda sings of understanding “that people come into our lives for a reason[,] 
bringing something we must learn.”361 And whether that is true she is unsure, 
but she is unwavering that she is who she is today because of Elphaba—
because they knew each other.362 Elphaba shares this sentiment. Knowing the 
fate that awaits her, Elphaba sings that though they “will never meet again in 
this lifetime[,] . . so much of me is made of what I learned from you.”363 As the 
song ends, they sing in unison, “who can say if I’ve been changed for the bet-
ter? I do believe I have been changed for the better. Because I knew you[:] I 
have been changed for good.”364 The lights are dimmed, the screen is drawn be-
tween the two friends, and as Elphaba meets her fate downstage, Glinda stands 
silently upstage.365 For the first time Glinda is alone and vulnerable, and I think 
the audience appreciates the humility. 
In like form to Glinda, the truth is that IRAC standing alone is vulnerable. 
It is not inept, it is not wholly ineffective, but it is the one that is limited. 
Through this work, I sought out to demonstrate that legal writing has an 
identity. Specifically, that even the legal analysis process is one of identity de-
velopment and formation. And if legal analysis is dominated by reductive para-
digms such as IRAC, novice law students lose the opportunity to further devel-
op their authentic identity. They will miss issues and voices, and if 
 
358  Wicked Script, supra note 243, at act II, sc. 11. 
359  Id. 
360  Id. at act II, sc. 12. 
361  Id. 
362  Id. 
363  Id. 
364  Id. 
365  See id. 
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unobservant, they will replicate existing power structures through their very 
words. There is nothing wonderful about that. 
For a moment I admit, like Glinda, I was caught up in the popularity of 
IRAC—initially intended as a prompting tool—and its false promise of analyti-
cal depth. In a word, I initially loathed it. But then I reflected back on an earlier 
quote from Gregory Maguire as he reflected on Elphaba’s character: “ ‘I am 
good,’ maybe ‘I’m not so good,’ or maybe ‘I’m both.’ I think this question 
[faces us] every day. What are we doing that’s good and what are we doing 
that’s bad?”366 This sentiment grounded me in IRAC’s derivation from the 
Analytical Framework. If IRAC were personified, I can imagine it saying, “I 
am good,’ maybe ‘I’m not so good,’ or maybe ‘I’m both.” Channeling my inner 
Glinda, it is “confusifying” to say the least. Whether one continues to assert 
that in the proper context, IRAC can be a good guiding tool, I have resolved 
that any sliver of usefulness is not so good. Not only is it unnecessary as an or-
ganizational template in view of genre and convention discovery; but it is also 
harmful as a normative gateway into critical legal analysis and is ultimately ill-
equipped to bear the weight of complex issues, marginalized voices, or powers 
of inequity. Thus, unlike Elphaba, it is IRAC that is actually limited. It cannot 
do both. 
And then there is the Analytical Framework. I am sensitive to the critique 
that the Analytical Framework need not abandon IRAC. That is, the difference 
in writing ability for the novice law student and the experienced law profes-
sor/practitioner compel some to firmly believe that students need a guiding or-
ganizational paradigm until their process becomes intuitive. And there is some 
support for this sentiment at least in the relationship between Glinda and 
Elphaba. In their final song, Elphaba—the unsuspecting heroine—did not 
abandon Glinda; in fact, she remarks that “so much of me is made of what I 
learned from you.”367 But in the space of legal analysis, I disagree. I believe the 
Analytical Framework can stand alone. In fact, the effectiveness of legal analy-
sis has always depended upon the depth of the Analytical Framework, and a 
shortcut to remember its depth is not needed. Unlike Wicked, where moments 
before Elphaba’s departure, she insists that Glinda can carry on the work 
Elphaba was unable to do,368 IRAC can never engage in the work of the Analyt-
ical Framework. In truth, it was never meant to. 
 
366  Rizzo, supra note 26. 
367  Wicked Script, supra note 243, at act II, sc. 12. To this point of unity, even in the face of 
apparent conflict, I find the words of Paulo Freire insightful as he maintains that dehumani-
zation of the oppressed is not a given destiny, that 
[b]ecause it is a distortion of being more fully human, sooner or later being less human leads the 
oppressed to struggle against those who made them so. In order for this struggle to have mean-
ing, the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity (which is a way to create it), be-
come in turn oppressors of the oppressors, but rather restorers of the humanity of both. 
FREIRE, supra note 92, at 44 (emphasis added). 
368  Wicked Script, supra note 243, at act II, sc. 11. 
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I began this Article challenging IRAC as the arbiter of legal analysis. More 
pointedly, that because IRAC’s rigid, objective, and neutral approach to legal 
analysis mimics white normativity, its dominant presence is the proof of its 
privilege and masks the problem of its simplicity. In fact, whether IRAC can be 
restricted to this supportive role is the larger concern. For example, Glinda was 
just a college girl whose social class provided her classmates with a modest 
whiff of privilege—which was inflated due to Elphaba’s very presence—and 
the crowd arbitrarily chose to call one good and the other bad. Further, the 
Wizard, an admitted mediocre person, was likewise catapulted to power and 
privilege because, once again, the crowd dubbed him good (or wonderful in his 
case). The crowd’s superficiality blinded the masses who could not discern 
shallowness and depth. When it comes to IRAC, what gatekeeper exists to en-
sure IRAC remains simply a guiding tool and is not similarly persuasive as ana-
lytical depth that holds the “keys to success?” Even if IRAC could remain a 
guiding tool, I am also weary of suggesting that IRAC’s simplicity must be 
used to introduce students to the Analytical Framework. In this context, the 
Analytical Framework can stand alone because it invites students to engage in 
necessary and relevant considerations for the whole of legal analysis from the 
outset; it does not need to begin with an empty framework. And from a critical 
identity perspective, it would likewise be damaging to suggest the dominant 
and privileged voice must be the voice for the marginalized voice. Providing 
access where real barriers to power exist, yes. But representing a single unified 
voice, concerning.  
While I suspect each person will come to their own conclusions as to the 
boundaries of the friendship between IRAC and the Analytical Framework,369 I 
believe nonetheless it is useful to raise the discussion. Of great importance, 
Elphaba is an Other, a marginalized voice. Wicked was her untold story, and the 
world is better for having learned her story through her own words. Using 
Wicked as a contemporary framework, this Article similarly provided a glimpse 
of the untold narrative of the Analytical Framework, showcasing its richness 
and connection to human experience. In the end, I pray our students will appre-
ciate engaging with the Analytical Framework—not because it outshines 
IRAC—but because they can finally understand the identity formation of the 
Analytical Framework through its own narrative. Its presence takes us into the 
deep. And it is not so wicked. 
 
 
369  I attribute this consideration to Professor Teri McMurtry-Chubb, a scholar in critical 
rhetoric, discourse and genre analysis, and legal history, who suggests IRAC as a distillation 
of the analytical framework. That is, IRAC is like the first black and white scenes of The 
Wizard of Oz; IRAC never makes it to the technicolor scenes of Oz.  
